Opinion
J-A02042-17 No. 965 EDA 2016
05-17-2017
XIAN DAI LIANG Appellant v. ROBERT HUTNYK, BARBARA HUTNYK AND BILL TAM
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated February 11, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 150301623 BEFORE: OTT, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Xian Dai Liang, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment of Appellee, Bill Tam. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by declining to find the lease at issue void as against public policy and thereby unenforceable. We affirm.
Appellant subsequently settled her claims against Robert and Barbara Hutnyk. See Civil Docket Sheet (R.R. 16(a)). --------
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court's opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/16, at 1-3. In this timely appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review: "[w]hether the [trial] court erred in granting summary judgment pursuant to a lease that delegated [Appellee's] duty for removing snow and ice from his property's front sidewalk ["the Lease"], when the Lease was formed in violation of municipal ordinances and public policy, and therefore is void under Pennsylvania law and irrelevant to [Appellee's] duty as a landowner to remove snow and ice from his property's front sidewalk?" Appellant's Brief at 10.
Appellant argues that because Appellee "never obtained a Housing Rental License, a Commercial Activity License, or a Business Income and Receipts Tax Number, he was not authorized to lease the residential property where [Appellant] slipped and fell." Id. at 14. Thus, according to Appellant, the Lease was void upon formation. Therefore, Appellant contends Appellee remained responsible for the removal of snow and ice from his property because the Lease provision delegating such duty was void. We conclude no relief is due.
Our standard of review is well settled:
[o]ur review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits and other materials show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We must view the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party. We will reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment only upon an abuse of discretion or error of law.412 North Front Street Assocs., LP v. Spector Gadon & Rosen , P.C., 151 A.3d 646, 660 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
It is beyond cavil that "a contract which violates a statute is illegal and will not be enforced." Rittenhouse v. Barclay White Inc., 625 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted). However, "an agreement will be considered void for illegality only where it cannot be performed without violating a statute." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Daniel J. Anders, we conclude the trial court's opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the sole issue presented. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-6 (finding that the Lease was not per se illegal because none of the provisions of the Philadelphia Code cited by Appellant prohibited the parties from entering into the Lease; therefore, the Lease operated to release Appellee from the duty to remove snow and ice from his property). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/17/2017
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