Torres, 372 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 383-84). See also In re Lang, 305 B.R. 905, 910 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (citing decisions by other circuits holding that mistakes by office staff do not constitute excusable neglect), aff'd, 414 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. $310,659.56 in U.S. Currency, 92 F.3d 1197 (Table), 1996 WL 437395, at *1 (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (affirming district court's denial to set aside default judgment, stating that “relying on someone other than their own counsel to represent their interests in the courts, [is] an unreasonable proposition at best.”); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. S/S “Hellenic Challenger,” 88 F.R.D. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (evidence that employee misplaced complaint so that it never reached attention of appropriate authorities did not establish excusable neglect); Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 886, 890-91 (Ky. App. 2003) (holding tribunal's refusal to vacate default judgment was not abuse of discretion where defendant's lack of participation resulted from defendant's own “internal corporate problem” and tribunal “properly held [defendant] duly accountable for an alleged breakdown within its own corporate structure”).

Several other cases also illustrate that courts act well within their discretion in refusing to vacate a default judgment where, when a lack of actual knowledge of a lawsuit is asserted as excusable neglect, the excusable neglect was due to the defendant's own willful ignorance or negligence. See Deskins, 314 S.W.3d 300 (default judgment not vacated because lack of actual knowledge was due to the defendant repeatedly refusing service of process from the Secretary of State); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Com'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 886 (Ky. App. 2003) (tribunal did not abuse discretion in refusing to vacate default judgment because evidence indicated the defendant's lack of actual notice, if any, regarding default judgment proceedings resulted from defendant's own internal corporate problems); Haven Point Enterprises, Inc., 690 S.W.2d at 395 (Defendant's misinterpretation of the law of service, and argument that "due process requires the kind of service which is most likely to result in actual notice," did not amount to excusable neglect). This necessarily leads to why Bradford White did not have actual notice in this case.