Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:15-1282-PMD-KFM
03-03-2016
Jeffery E. Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Andy Strickland and Captain Jodie Taylor, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 41). The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated while he was a pretrial detainee at the Colleton County Detention Center ("CCDC") in 2014. Specifically, he states that he was confined to his cell "23 hours a day for six days per week, and a full 24 hours one day per week" without due process, and that the living conditions in his cell were inhumane, as he was subjected to rust, dust, and mold (comp., pp. 3-4). The plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances for these issues on April 17 and June 10, 2014, and received unsatisfactory responses from defendant Captain Taylor, who served as the Jail Administrator at CCDC at the time. The plaintiff has not provided copies of these grievances with his complaint, but instead has included a grievance dated January 1, 2015, in which he complains about an unrelated matter involving another inmate (doc. 1-1).
The plaintiff is now incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections, as he provides his return address as MacDougal Correctional Institution in Ridgeville, South Carolina (doc. 49-1).
The defendants filed an answer generally denying the allegations and raising the affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint here (doc. 24). In their motion for summary judgment (doc. 41) filed on October 13, 2015, the defendants argue that the plaintiff was not an inmate at the CCDC on April 17th or June 10th, the dates he claims to have filed his grievances, and that no such grievances from him exist. In support, Captain Taylor provides her sworn affidavit confirming that the plaintiff was not housed at the CCDC on the dates in question and that the plaintiff did not file any such grievances (doc. 41-2, Taylor aff. ¶¶ 5-7). On October 15, 2015, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately (doc. 42). In his response, the plaintiff fails to address the defendants' evidence that he was not at CCDC on the dates he purportedly filed his grievances. Instead, he contends that the jail received them and then threw them away (doc. 49, p. 2).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. Summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut" but an important mechanism for weeding out "claims and defenses [that] have no factual bases." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court"). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory," Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Although PLRA exhaustion is not jurisdictional, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that can be pleaded by the defendants. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Anderson, 407 F.3d at 681. "[U]nexhausted claims cannot be brought in court." Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. "Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court." Id. at 204. It also has the "potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record." Id.
The PLRA requires "proper exhaustion" of available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). As the Supreme Court noted, "[a]ggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust administrative remedies for a variety of reasons," whether it be concerns about efficiency or "bad faith." Id. at 89-90. This is especially true in a prison context. Id. at 90 n.1. Nevertheless, "[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff filed any grievances with the CCDC regarding the conditions and duration of his confinement at issue here. To the contrary, Captain Taylor's uncontradicted affidavit reveals that the plaintiff was not even incarcerated in the CCDC on April 17 and June 10, 2014, the dates he claims to have filed the grievances. The only grievance before the court concerns an unrelated incident that occurred in December 2014, when the plaintiff was in fact a CCDC inmate (Taylor aff., ¶ 4). Because there is no evidence that the plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies prior to bringing this suit, the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 41) be granted. The attention of the parties is directed to the notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge March 3, 2016
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk of Court
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street — Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).