Opinion
No. 05-09-00895-CR
Opinion issued March 4, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 006-87830-08.
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Naurice Sean Lewis waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to burglary of a vehicle. The trial court found appellant guilty and, based on an agreement between appellant and the State during the punishment hearing, assessed punishment at 120 days in the county jail, probated for fifteen months, and a $400 fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether (1) the evidence supporting the conviction is too weak to support the fact-finder's verdict or, (2) considering conflicting evidence, the fact-finder's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We may only find the evidence factually insufficient when necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To obtain a conviction, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant broke into or entered a Chevrolet truck with intent to commit theft and without the effective consent of Kimberly McBride, the owner. On April 13, 2008, Kimberly McBride and her husband awoke to find their 2007 Chevrolet truck had been burglarized and several items were missing, including a Magellan GPS unit, a Sirius satellite radio and dock, and a Bluetooth headset. McBride testified that although none of the truck's windows were broken, she believed someone used a device to enter the truck because she saw hand prints on the truck. The doors to the truck were locked when she and her husband went to bed the night before, but when her husband went out to the truck the next morning, the doors were unlocked. McBride gave police the model and serial numbers of the stolen items. The responding police officer detected no obvious signs of forced entry or damage to the truck. Attempts to lift latent fingerprints from the truck were unsuccessful. Detective Steve Williams investigates burglary cases for the Anna Police Department, and was assigned McBride's case. Williams ran the serial number of the stolen GPS unit through the Leads Online database (Leads) but did not get a positive result at that time. On August 29, 2008, while investigating about twenty other burglary cases in Anna, Williams ran the GPS serial number again. This time, he found that a pawn ticket was issued to appellant for a GPS with McBride's serial number. The Leads information showed appellant pawned the item on April 27, 2008, left his own driver's license number and date of birth, and listed the serial number and description of the GPS unit stolen from McBride. Williams went to the pawn shop and talked with a clerk and the shop's manager. He learned appellant had already redeemed the GPS system he had pawned, and that the signature on the ticket said "Naurice Lewis." Williams explained that in many burglary cases, the perpetrator does not dispose of the stolen property immediately, and it was not unusual for a GPS unit to be pawned two weeks after being taken. Jeffrey Anderson is the manager at McKinney Jewelry and Loan, a pawn shop that loans money to individuals for items they bring into the shop. Anderson testified he supervised six clerks at the shop, and he and the clerks are licensed by the State of Texas to write pawn tickets. When a customer brings in an item, a clerk looks it over and determines what amount he can loan on that item. The shop does not loan money on satellite radios or Bluetooth headsets. If a customer decides to pawn an item, the clerk obtains the customer's driver's license or other valid state-issued identification. The license or identification must have a photograph on it that matches the customer before the clerk will issue a ticket. The clerk inputs information from the license or identification into the shop's computer system, and a ticket is printed. Anderson said pawnbrokers are required to obtain model and serial numbers from all electronic items and list them on the pawn tickets they issue. Police agencies download this information on Leads. After the clerk prints a ticket, the customer signs it at the bottom and receives a "soft copy" of the ticket; a "hard copy" of the ticket is maintained at the shop. Anderson told the court that on April 27, 2008, a pawn ticket was issued to appellant by his employee, Felix Gonzales, for a GPS unit. The pawn ticket, signed "Naurice Lewis," was admitted into evidence. Anderson explained that a person redeeming an item is required to have the pawn ticket or a valid state-issued identification. The person signs the back of the ticket, and the clerk verifies that the signature matches the one on the front of the ticket. If the signatures match, the person pays the loan amount and the item is returned to him. If the customer does not have a ticket, the clerk prints out a "lost pawn ticket" statement and requires the customer to sign it. Only the actual customer who pawned the item can redeem it without a pawn ticket, and the signatures on the original ticket and the statement must match. Anderson testified appellant redeemed the GPS he had pawned. Appellant did not testify or present any evidence during the trial. Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because the identification of him as the person who committed the offense is insufficient. Although two weeks after the burglary someone pawned one of the stolen items using appellant's name, appellant argues no evidence shows he broke into McBride's truck or that he was the person who pawned the stolen item. If an accused is found in possession of recently stolen property, the fact finder may draw an inference of guilt. Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Generally, the shorter the interval between the theft and the possession, the stronger the inference, but whether the stolen property is recently possessed is a question to be determined by the acts of each case. See Hardage v. State, 552 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). When there is independent evidence of a burglary, however, the unexplained personal possession of recently stolen property will support an inference of guilt. Hardesty, 656 S.W.2d at 76. A pawn ticket issued to appellant for a GPS unit whose serial number was the same as the number on McBride's stolen GPS tends to show appellant had possession and control over the property at the time he presented it to the pawn shop clerk. The ticket bore appellant's name, date of birth, and signature. A licensed clerk viewed a driver's license and determined the individual depicted in the license photo was appellant and a pawn ticket was issued. Appellant's driver's license information was put in the computer system and accessed by police. Appellant later redeemed the pawn ticket. As the fact-finder in this case, the trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support's appellant's conviction. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518; Vodochodsky, 158 S.W.3d at 509. We resolve appellant's two issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.