Opinion
No. 112872
June 11, 1999.
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal from the May 5, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.
I would peremptorily reverse for the reasons stated in Judge Cavanagh's dissent. 229 Mich. App. 483, 491 (1998). The plain meaning of the phrase "vital bodily function" as used in the statutory provision means a bodily function that is necessary to life. I agree with Judge Cavanagh that the definition of "vital" is unambiguous:
According to Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1992) "vital" means "1. of, pertaining to, or necessary to life . . . 3. necessary to the existence, continuance, or well-being of something; indispensable; essential." The American Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition defines "vital" as "Necessary to the continuation of life; life-sustaining." In the Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, "vital" is defined as "Essential to life; pertaining to life." [ Id. at 494.]
The Court of Appeals majority improperly rewrote the statutory provision to define the word vital as meaning "very important" rather than "necessary to life." While the ability to walk is certainly an important bodily function, it is not a function that is necessary to the existence or continuation of life.
WEAVER, J., joins in the statement of Justice CORRIGAN.