Lewis v. Commonwealth

11 Citing cases

  1. City of St. Paul v. Morris

    258 Minn. 467 (Minn. 1960)   Cited 31 times
    Stating "[w]hile it is obvious that not every abusive epithet directed toward police officers would be sufficiently disturbing or provocative to justify arrest for disorderly conduct, there is no sound reason why officers must be subjected to indignities such as present here (calling officer a "white mother-fucker"), indignities that go far beyond what any other citizen might reasonably be expected to endure."

    State v. Cantrell, 220 Minn. 13, 18 N.W.2d 681; State ex rel. Thurston v. Sargent, 71 Minn. 28, 73 N.W. 626. State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N.W.2d 886; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389; 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Conduct, § 1. It is noteworthy that "disorderly conduct" does not mean merely offensive conduct.

  2. Collins v. City of Norfolk

    186 Va. 1 (Va. 1947)   Cited 12 times
    In Collins v. City of Norfolk, 186 Va. 1, 41 S.E.2d 448 (1947), we upheld the statutory ancestor of the ordinance at bar against a challenge for vagueness as applied to the conduct of the defendant there.

    "The effect of this ordinance is to attempt to make 'disorderly conduct' which was not an offense at common law, an offense without defining the prohibited act so as to supply the standard by which the guilt of the accused person is to be determined. "That 'disorderly conduct' was not an offense at common law is too well settled to be argued here; see Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, which quotes briefly from Encyclopedia Criminal Law, Vol. 3, Par. 1319, as follows: " 'Disorderly conduct — As a crime.

  3. United States v. Gonzalez-Mancilla

    551 F. App'x 128 (5th Cir. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    Nor is disorderly conduct an offense category defined at common law. See Rodriguez, 711 F.3d at 552 n. 16 (omitting disorderly conduct from its lists of common law offenses); see also Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 2.1 n. 67 (2d ed. 2003) (acknowledging the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 34 S.E.2d 389 (Va. 1945), that disorderly conduct was not a common law crime). To determine the "generic, contemporary meaning" of disorderly conduct, we look to its common usage as stated in legal and other well accepted dictionaries.

  4. State v. Sweeney

    157 Conn. 485 (Conn. 1969)   Cited 10 times

    See cases such as Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. Oral remonstrance, without the use of abusive epithets or indignities directed toward an officer, although bad manners, is not considered to be disorderly conduct. See Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Sup. 183, 187 (N.D. Ill.); Oratowski v. Civil Service Commission, 3 Ill. App.2d 551, 561, 123 N.E.2d 146. It is to be noted that a statute defining disorderly conduct is to be construed strictly; Commonwealth v. Lombard, 321 Mass. 294, 296, 73 N.E.2d 465; in favor of the accused; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389; and against the prosecution. Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 892, 45 S.E.2d 241; see 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Conduct, 1 (1).

  5. Dougherty v. Commonwealth

    100 S.E.2d 754 (Va. 1957)   Cited 2 times

    The opinion in that case stated: (191 Va., at p. 276) "We could, of course, add to or rearrange the words of the statute and make its third section apply only when there is a strike; but our function is to interpret the Act as written, not to rewrite it. Va. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 578, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390." Following the decision in the Edwards case, the next regular session of the General Assembly amended the statute to make it applicable only when a strike or lockout is in progress.

  6. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Koontz

    138 W. Va. 84 (W. Va. 1953)   Cited 20 times

    When a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as here, the incorporation of additional words, terms, or provisions is not for the courts but for the Legislature. If the statute, which the majority in point 1 of the syllabus says is to be applied as written and not construed where the intention is made clear by the language used, is to be changed or rewritten to include delayed payment charges, that function should be performed by the Legislature and not by the courts. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Bullington's Admr., 135 Va. 307, 116 S.E. 237; Lewis v. Commonwealth 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 29 S.E.2d 838. Courts may interpret the law but may not enact it. They are not permitted to rewrite statutes or to incorporate new words in a plain statutory enactment. They should interpret the law as it is written. 17 M. J., Statutes, Section 33.

  7. Edwards v. Commonwealth

    191 Va. 272 (Va. 1950)   Cited 12 times
    In Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916 (1950), the court held unconstitutional a statute which made it unlawful for any person to picket who was not, at the commencement of a strike or immediately prior thereto, a bona fide employee of a business or industry being picketed.

    We could, of course, add to or rearrange the words of the statute and make its third section apply only when there is a strike; but our function is to interpret the act as written, not to rewrite it. Virginia Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 578, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390. So construed, it is clear that the first-named provision of section 3 applies to the defendants under the undisputed facts of this case and makes unlawful the acts and conduct for which they were arrested and convicted.

  8. Taylor v. Commonwealth

    187 Va. 214 (Va. 1948)   Cited 7 times
    In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 214, 46 S.E.2d 384 (1948) the Virginia Supreme Court again considered the statute, although this case is only marginally relevant to the case at bar because the defendant was alleged to have violated the second clause of the statute by failing to move to the rear of a bus when requested by the driver to do so.

    On the part of the Commonwealth, it is contended that the carrier had the right to adopt and enforce regulations providing for racial segregation on its conveyances; and that the operator of the bus thus had lawful authority to request Mrs. Taylor to move accordingly, and that her refusal to do so constituted an "unnecessary disturbance." In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, decided June 6, 1945, it was held that disorderly conduct is not a common law crime, and that Virginia Code, 1942 (Michie), section 4533 did not cover disorderly conduct "on a common carrier known as a bus." At the next session of the General Assembly, by an act approved March 26, 1946 (Acts of 1946, page 494), Code section 4533a was enacted.

  9. Hackney v. Commonwealth

    186 Va. 888 (Va. 1947)   Cited 16 times
    In Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 45 S.E.2d 241 (1947) the Virginia Supreme Court considered the application of the disorderly conduct statute in the context of a case in which a son, standing on his porch, used "vile and abusive" language to his mother passing along a public highway, which was overheard by at least two other persons.

    See 19 A. L. R. 1534; and State v. Syphrett, 27 S.C. 29, 2 S.E. 624, 13 Am. St. Rep. 616. This court held, in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, that disorderly conduct was not a crime at common law and that section 4533 of Code of 1919 did not, in express terms, prohibit disorderly conduct on a bus used as a common carrier of passengers. Shortly after this opinion was published, the General Assembly adopted the act in question (Acts 1946, p. 494), title to which reads: "An Act to amend the Code of Virginia, by adding a new section numbered 4533-a, to provide punishment for riotous or disorderly conduct in certain public places and to permit cities and towns to parallel this section."

  10. Stewart v. Commonwealth

    Record No. 0248-96-3 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997)

    The officer testified that during the confrontation he remained "calm, cool, and collected . . . [and] at no time did he feel that he was in danger." Disorderly conduct was not a crime at common law and "is not punishable as a separate and distinct crime unless made so by statute or ordinance. . . ." Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 72, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1945). Section 15-16.1 of the Lexington City Code provides: A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (a) In any street, highway or public building, or while in or on a public conveyance or public place, engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons at whom, individually, such conduct is directed; provided, that such conduct shall not be deemed to include the utterance or display of any words or to include conduct otherwise made punishable under this Code.