State v. Cantrell, 220 Minn. 13, 18 N.W.2d 681; State ex rel. Thurston v. Sargent, 71 Minn. 28, 73 N.W. 626. State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N.W.2d 886; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389; 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Conduct, § 1. It is noteworthy that "disorderly conduct" does not mean merely offensive conduct.
"The effect of this ordinance is to attempt to make 'disorderly conduct' which was not an offense at common law, an offense without defining the prohibited act so as to supply the standard by which the guilt of the accused person is to be determined. "That 'disorderly conduct' was not an offense at common law is too well settled to be argued here; see Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, which quotes briefly from Encyclopedia Criminal Law, Vol. 3, Par. 1319, as follows: " 'Disorderly conduct — As a crime.
Nor is disorderly conduct an offense category defined at common law. See Rodriguez, 711 F.3d at 552 n. 16 (omitting disorderly conduct from its lists of common law offenses); see also Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 2.1 n. 67 (2d ed. 2003) (acknowledging the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 34 S.E.2d 389 (Va. 1945), that disorderly conduct was not a common law crime). To determine the "generic, contemporary meaning" of disorderly conduct, we look to its common usage as stated in legal and other well accepted dictionaries.
See cases such as Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. Oral remonstrance, without the use of abusive epithets or indignities directed toward an officer, although bad manners, is not considered to be disorderly conduct. See Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Sup. 183, 187 (N.D. Ill.); Oratowski v. Civil Service Commission, 3 Ill. App.2d 551, 561, 123 N.E.2d 146. It is to be noted that a statute defining disorderly conduct is to be construed strictly; Commonwealth v. Lombard, 321 Mass. 294, 296, 73 N.E.2d 465; in favor of the accused; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389; and against the prosecution. Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 892, 45 S.E.2d 241; see 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Conduct, 1 (1).
The opinion in that case stated: (191 Va., at p. 276) "We could, of course, add to or rearrange the words of the statute and make its third section apply only when there is a strike; but our function is to interpret the Act as written, not to rewrite it. Va. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 578, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390." Following the decision in the Edwards case, the next regular session of the General Assembly amended the statute to make it applicable only when a strike or lockout is in progress.
When a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as here, the incorporation of additional words, terms, or provisions is not for the courts but for the Legislature. If the statute, which the majority in point 1 of the syllabus says is to be applied as written and not construed where the intention is made clear by the language used, is to be changed or rewritten to include delayed payment charges, that function should be performed by the Legislature and not by the courts. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Bullington's Admr., 135 Va. 307, 116 S.E. 237; Lewis v. Commonwealth 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 29 S.E.2d 838. Courts may interpret the law but may not enact it. They are not permitted to rewrite statutes or to incorporate new words in a plain statutory enactment. They should interpret the law as it is written. 17 M. J., Statutes, Section 33.
We could, of course, add to or rearrange the words of the statute and make its third section apply only when there is a strike; but our function is to interpret the act as written, not to rewrite it. Virginia Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 578, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 73, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390. So construed, it is clear that the first-named provision of section 3 applies to the defendants under the undisputed facts of this case and makes unlawful the acts and conduct for which they were arrested and convicted.
On the part of the Commonwealth, it is contended that the carrier had the right to adopt and enforce regulations providing for racial segregation on its conveyances; and that the operator of the bus thus had lawful authority to request Mrs. Taylor to move accordingly, and that her refusal to do so constituted an "unnecessary disturbance." In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, decided June 6, 1945, it was held that disorderly conduct is not a common law crime, and that Virginia Code, 1942 (Michie), section 4533 did not cover disorderly conduct "on a common carrier known as a bus." At the next session of the General Assembly, by an act approved March 26, 1946 (Acts of 1946, page 494), Code section 4533a was enacted.
See 19 A. L. R. 1534; and State v. Syphrett, 27 S.C. 29, 2 S.E. 624, 13 Am. St. Rep. 616. This court held, in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389, that disorderly conduct was not a crime at common law and that section 4533 of Code of 1919 did not, in express terms, prohibit disorderly conduct on a bus used as a common carrier of passengers. Shortly after this opinion was published, the General Assembly adopted the act in question (Acts 1946, p. 494), title to which reads: "An Act to amend the Code of Virginia, by adding a new section numbered 4533-a, to provide punishment for riotous or disorderly conduct in certain public places and to permit cities and towns to parallel this section."
The officer testified that during the confrontation he remained "calm, cool, and collected . . . [and] at no time did he feel that he was in danger." Disorderly conduct was not a crime at common law and "is not punishable as a separate and distinct crime unless made so by statute or ordinance. . . ." Lewis v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 69, 72, 34 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1945). Section 15-16.1 of the Lexington City Code provides: A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (a) In any street, highway or public building, or while in or on a public conveyance or public place, engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons at whom, individually, such conduct is directed; provided, that such conduct shall not be deemed to include the utterance or display of any words or to include conduct otherwise made punishable under this Code.