Opinion
4909, 305072/12.
11-09-2017
Daphne O.B. LEWIS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The City of NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Michael B. Palillo, P.C., New York (Ryan Amato of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Daniela Jampel of counsel), for respondents.
Michael B. Palillo, P.C., New York (Ryan Amato of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Daniela Jampel of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered May 19, 2016, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted since the record shows that defendant Kohler, a police officer, was operating a police vehicle while performing an emergency operation and did not recklessly disregard the safety of others before the accident happened (see Daniels v. City of New York, 28 A.D.3d 415, 813 N.Y.S.2d 164 [2d Dept.2006], lv. dismissed in part denied in part 7 N.Y.3d 825, 822 N.Y.S.2d 753, 855 N.E.2d 1168 [2006] ). The fact that Koehler was mistaken in believing that plaintiff was stopping her vehicle when he proceeded to pass through the red light did not render his conduct reckless. Koehler testified that as he approached the intersection, he reduced his speed and looked left and right. He was traveling approximately 10 miles above the speed limit when the accident occurred. Koehler attempted to avoid colliding with plaintiff by braking hard and turning the steering wheel to the right upon realizing that plaintiff's vehicle had entered the intersection (see Frezzell v. City of New York, 105 A.D.3d 620, 963 N.Y.S.2d 637 [1st Dept.2013], affd. 24 N.Y.3d 213, 997 N.Y.S.2d 367, 21 N.E.3d 1028 [2014] ; Quock v. City of New York , 110 A.D.3d 488, 973 N.Y.S.2d 72 [1st Dept.2013] ). The fact that there is a question as to whether the police vehicle's lights and siren were activated is not material because Koehler was not required to activate either of these devices in order to be entitled to the statutory privilege of passing through a red light (see Flynn v. Sambuca Taxi, LLC, 123 A.D.3d 501, 502, 999 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept.2014] ).
MANZANET–DANIELS, J.P., ANDRIAS, GISCHE, KERN, SINGH, JJ., concur.