Id. The claimant, Allen, has the initial burden of establishing that she was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Jones v. Schweiker, 524 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D.Ala. 1981); see Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980). Turning to the record in this case, the claimant offered substantial evidence to the ALJ concerning the details and history of her back problem.

Regarding the evidence in question here — the determination of permanent disability by Pennsylvania's State Employees' Retirement System — the Third Circuit requires that an ALJ consider the evidence and give an explanation if he disagrees with it. "[A] determination [of disability] by another government agency is entitled to substantial weight." Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir 1980)). Furthermore, the ALJ's obligation to consider all probative evidence cannot be met after the decision has been rendered.

Thus, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ violated Social Security regulations and Third Circuit law requiring an ALJ to either assign substantial weight to VA disability determinations or explain why she is rejecting another agency's findings. (Pl's Mem. at 14) (citing Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980); Sell v. Barnhart, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21006, *6-7 (E.D. Pa. 2003); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(5). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's notation that the disability determination of another agency "is not binding on the Social Security Administration" is insufficient. (Pl's Mem. at 14, citing R. at 15).

I have carefully examined the Magistrate's report and recommendation, as well as checked the record for verification of the factual conclusions set forth by the Magistrate. I find these to be specifically and pertinently accurate. While the Secretary contradicts the meaning of Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, C.A. 3, 1980, and argues that the burden is upon the plaintiff in a case such as this to prove liability on the part of the Secretary, as well as to procure a re-examination in light of additional evidence as may have been presented, I deem the Magistrate's analysis of the evidence as presenting the facts in the case originally and before the Administrative Law Judge to be basic. It is true that the Secretary through the processes of the Administrative Law Judge, the Council and eventually the Secretary giving final approval of the decision, is obligated to determine the credibility of witnesses and whether or not a plaintiff has by appropriate evidence established a right to benefits under the statute. But the law does not rest there; the Administrative Law Judge, the Council and the Secretary must have evidence which supports the findings eventually made by the Secretary, and that the reviewing court is bound by the findings of the Secretary if they are supported by "substantial e

Such a determination by another government agency is entitled to substantial weight." Kane, 776 F.2d at 1135 (citing to Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980)). To support this proposition, the Kane decision cited to a case involving a doctor's disability finding for another agency.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that disability determinations made by other government agencies, while not binding, are entitled to substantial weight. Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980). Therefore, "[i]f the ALJ reaches a contrary conclusion, the ALJ must offer an explanation of why he rejected the other agency's finding."

Findings of fact by the ALJ must be accepted as conclusive by a reviewing court if they are supported by substantial evidence.See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasoning mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Report and Recommendation, p. 17. While it is true that decisions by other government agencies concerning an individual's disability are not binding upon the Secretary, the Third Circuit requires that these determinations be given "substantial weight" in determining whether an individual is disabled. Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1979); Brown v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 284, 288-89 (E.D.Pa. 1983). Indeed, in Lewis, supra, the Third Circuit held that a medical determination that an individual is disabled for purposes of receipt of welfare benefits satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proving disability and shifts the burden of proving nondisability to the Secretary. 616 F.2d at 76.

Although decisions by other government agencies concerning an individual's disability are not binding upon the Secretary, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (1982), this circuit requires that these determinations be given "substantial weight" by the ALJ in deciding whether an individual is disabled. Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1981); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1979); DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 100 (5th Cir. 1972); Pulaski v. Finch, 415 F.2d 613, 618 (3d Cir. 1969); Miller v. Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D.Pa. 1980).

. . . However, [plaintiff] who is a member of the . . . Church of Christ . . . does have strong convictions against the use of any kind of medications and we respect his views.'" ( Id. at pp. 219-220; see also Maier v. Besser (1972) 73 Misc.2d 241 [341 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412]; cf. Lewis v. Califano (3d Cir. 1980) 616 F.2d 73, 75.) Were these parents charged with failure to furnish medical attendance under section 270, they would face conviction regardless of their alternative provision of "treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone."