Opinion
No. C 03-04403 JSW.
September 27, 2004
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Now before the Court is defendant Bayer Corporation's ("Bayer") motion to dismiss plaintiff Crystal A. Lewis's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having carefully reviewed the parties' papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS Bayer's motion to dismiss with leave to amend.
This action arises out of Lewis's employment with Bayer beginning December 18, 2000. (Compl. at 3.) Lewis is an African American, female citizen of the United States. ( Id. at 2.) Bayer employed Lewis as a Purification Production Technician, or Biotech I. On June 2, 2003, Bayer terminated Lewis. Lewis alleges that she was terminated because of her "race or color and/or her gender." Lewis further alleges that during her employment, Bayer subjected her to a hostile and abusive work environment because of her race or color and/or gender. ( Id. at 3.)
Lewis actually worked at Bayer's Berkeley facility, operating as part of Bayer Healthcare, LLC, which has not been named as a party in this action.
Based solely on the allegations above, Lewis asserts claims for: (1) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(a)(1)(2) and 1981, and California Government Code § 12940(a) (the first, third and fourth claims for relief, respectively); (2) gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1)(2), and California Government Code § 12940(a) (second and fifth claims for relief, respectively); (3) hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(a)(1)(2) and California Government Code § 12940(h)(1) (sixth and seventh claims for relief, respectively); and (4) violation of public policy against employment discrimination under Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution (eighth claim for relief). On July 23, 2004, Bayer moved to dismiss all eight claims for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard.
A motion to dismiss is proper if the complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss must be denied unless "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). A complaint must also give the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. A court must accept all factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). A court "is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations as true if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
B. Claims for Relief Alleging Discriminatory Employment Practices Based on Race and Gender Are Dismissed with Leave to Amend.
In its motion to dismiss, Bayer contends that Lewis's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims for relief lack factual bases to establish a claim for relief and further, that Lewis's claims contain only conclusory allegations of wrongdoing. (Motion at 3.) Lewis contends that such factual prerequisites are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rather, she contends that she is only required to set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (Opp. Br. at 3, quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.) It is clear that if Lewis set forth no facts upon which this Court could find a violation under the alleged statutes, her claim fails the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. However, the issue here is whether a bare allegation of racial and gender discrimination based on wholly conclusory legal allegations can survive a motion to dismiss. Even under the lenient standard set by the Ninth Circuit, such a pleading is not sufficient to withstand dismissal.
In an employment discrimination lawsuit alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), the Supreme Court has held that a complaint need only include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit extended the holding in Swierkiewicz to claims alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 675 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending Swierkiewicz to discriminatory complaints under the Fair Housing Act). Because Lewis's complaint is factually deficient, her complaint does not afford Bayer appropriate notice of the claims or the grounds upon which they rest.
In Swierkiewicz, the Court held that the petitioner's complaint easily satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) because it gave the defendant fair notice of the bases for petitioner's claims. Swierkiewicz, 355 U.S. at 514. In finding the complaint adequate, the Court noted that the complaint included the statutory grounds for the claim, "events leading to [the complainant's] termination . . ., relevant dates, and . . . ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with [the] termination." Id. Similarly, in Edwards, the Ninth Circuit allowed "admittedly opaque allegations of discriminatory retaliation" to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1061-63. The Edwards complaint contained only germane facts that "[d]efendants . . . retaliated against plaintiff for engaging in protected acts . . . including a disproportionate number of women seemingly targeted by Defendants . . . who met together to speak about having noticed the disproportionate figure," and provided a separate attachment stating that an agent of the Defendant was "[un]evenly enforcing housing code provisions." Id.
Unlike the complaints in Swierkiewicz or Edwards, Lewis's complaint fails to provide comparable factual support demonstrating that she is entitled to relief. Lewis's complaint merely states that she is an African American female, that Bayer employed her as a Purification Production Technician, that Bayer terminated her employment because of her race, color, or gender, and that Bayer subjected her to a hostile and abusive work environment. (Compl. at 3.) The complaint then cites statutory provisions, quotes the relevant language, but alleges no facts to support violations of those provisions. ( Id.) Lewis's claims are merely statements of her conclusion that she was discriminated against based on her race and gender and subject to a hostile and abusive environment. Even under the liberal reading by the Ninth Circuit of Swierkiewicz, Lewis's complaint fails to state grounds upon which her claim rests and therefore can be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Maduka, 675 F.3d at 912.
Accordingly, Lewis's factually bare allegations of racial and gender discrimination are legally insufficient to survive a motion for failure to state a claim. Therefore, this Court GRANTS Bayer's motion to dismiss with leave to amend with respect to Lewis's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims for relief.
C. Clam for relief under the California Constitution is Dismissed with Leave to Amend.
In Lewis's eighth claim for relief under Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution, Lewis alleges that Bayer wrongfully subjected her to unequal working conditions affecting her employment status and further, that Bayer retaliated against her in violation of public policy. (Compl. at 7.) Article I, Section 8 provides: "A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin." Cal. Const. art. I, § 8. This provision can provide a policy basis for a claim in violation of public policy as a result of employment discrimination because of certain classifications, including race and sex. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 90 (1990); Phillips v. St. Mary Reg'l Med. Ctr., 96 Cal. App. 4th 218, 230 (2002). However, Lewis's complaint does not adequately provide notice Bayer of the nature of the claim or the grounds upon which it rests. Further, the complaint is made more convoluted by nebulous references to California's Labor Code and the National Labor Relations Act. (Compl. at 7.) Accordingly, this Court hereby GRANTS Bayer's motion to dismiss with leave to amend with respect to Lewis's eighth claim for relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Bayer's motion to dismiss with respect to all eight of Lewis's claims for relief with leave to amend. Lewis shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days consistent with the terms of this Order.IT IS SO ORDERED.