Opinion
A115515
4-22-2008
NORBERT A. LEWANDOWSKI et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STEVEN MURDOCK, Defendant and Appellant.
Steven Murdock appeals from an interlocutory judgment in a partition action. He contends (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial, and (2) the courts finding of breach of fiduciary duty and award of punitive damages are not supported by substantial evidence. We will reject these arguments and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We need not provide a detained statement of facts given the nature of the issues that have been raised. It should suffice to say that in 1997, appellant Steven Murdock and respondents Norbert and Shirley Lewandowski formed a partnership for the purpose of purchasing a residential property located in Dublin. Under the terms of the agreement, appellant owned 25 percent of the partnership equity, while respondents owned 75 percent. The property was a rental and appellant, with respondents consent, moved in as a tenant.
A more detailed statement of facts is set forth in Lewandowski v. Murdock— A117331, a companion case that is being filed this same date.
Relations between the partners were amicable until 2003 when appellant began to claim that he owned 75 percent of the partnership equity and that respondents owned only 25 percent. Appellant had many explanations for the change, but his primary justification appears to have been that his rental payments somehow increased his equity share.
Respondents wrote to appellant and asked him to justify his claim. Appellant failed to respond.
Respondents then filed a complaint against appellant alleging causes of action for, inter alia, partition, an accounting, dissolution of partnership, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The case was tried to a judge who entered an interlocutory judgment stating that respondents owned 75 percent of the Dublin property and that appellant owned only 25 percent. The court also ruled that partition was appropriate and ordered the property be sold. In addition, the court ruled appellant had acted fraudulently and that respondents were entitled to punitive damages.
Appellant filed a motion asking the court to vacate the judgment and to grant a new trial. He apparently stated he recently had been diagnosed with Alzheimers disease, and argued the court should reevaluate its decision in light of that fact. Before the court could rule, appellant filed this appeal. Subsequently, the court denied appellants motion for new trial.
We say apparently, because, as we will set forth below, appellant has not properly provided us with a copy of his motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for New Trial
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial. We cannot address this argument because appellant has committed a fundamental and dispositive procedural error.
Appellant filed his motion for new trial and supporting documentation in the trial court under seal in order to protect his privacy. When appellant filed this appeal, that pleading, and the supporting documentation, were not included in the clerks transcript that was prepared. Appellant noted the omission and he filed a motion with this court to augment the record with the motion for new trial and supporting documentation. We denied the request because appellant failed to follow the procedures mandated by the California Rules of Court and the First District Local Rules. Appellant never tried to correct his mistake. Therefore, appellants motion for new trial and the supporting documentation are not part of the record on this appeal.
One of the most fundamental rules on appeal is that an appellant must provide a record that is adequate to permit appellate review. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) If an appellant fails to do so, his argument may be rejected. (Id. at pp. 1295-1296.) Here, because appellant has not provided us with a copy of his motion for new trial or the supporting documentation, we have no grounds to conclude the trial court erred. We reject his argument on that basis.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Noting the trial court based the punitive damage award at least in part on his testimony at trial, appellant contends that testimony was not "substantial evidence" but was instead, "merely the distorted mental process of an intelligent man whose reality is impaired through no fault of his own."
The problem with this argument is that, again, it is premised on documents that we cannot properly consider. Appellant bases his arguments on two categories of documents: (1) those that were submitted in support of his motion for new trial, and (2) a declaration and mental evaluation prepared by Dr. Bruce Reed that was submitted in support of a later filed motion to vacate the judgment. We cannot consider the first category of documents because, as we have stated, they are not part of the record on appeal. We cannot consider Dr. Reeds declaration and mental evaluation because those documents were not even prepared until January 2007, five months after the judgment was entered in this case, and four months after appellant filed his notice of appeal. Another fundamental rule of appellate review is that "error on the part of the inferior court cannot be predicated by reason of any matter occurring subsequent to its rendition of the judgment, and it is equally evident that it would be irrelevant for the appellate court to entertain any evidence of such subsequent matters." (Peoples Home Sav. Bank v. Sadler (1905) 1 Cal.App. 189, 193-194, See also Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.)
Appellant has failed to present a record that is adequate to support the argument he has advanced. We must reject his argument on that basis.
III. DISPOSITION
The interlocutory judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
NEEDHAM, J.
STEVENS, J.