Opinion
CV 16-00837-RSWL-PLAx
06-02-2016
BENNETT and MARY LEVINSON, Plaintiffs, v. TRANSUNION LLC; EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS INC.; INNOVIS DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; and DOES 1-10, Defendants.
ORDER re Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [22] and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [23]
Currently before the Court are Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s ("Wells Fargo") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [22] ("Motion to Dismiss") and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [23] ("Motion to Strike"). Wells Fargo filed both Motions on April 25, 2016. Plaintiffs Bennett and Mary Levinson ("Plaintiffs") opposed both Motions on April 27, 2016 [25, 26], and Wells Fargo replied on May 10, 2016 [28, 29]. The Court, finding these matters appropriate for resolution without oral argument, took them under submission on May 19, 2016 [33].
Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to these Motions, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: both Motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend, as provided herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs are residents of Los Angeles, California. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 1.
Defendants Transunion LLC ("Transunion"), Equifax Information Services LLC ("Equifax"), Experian Information Solutions Inc. ("Experian"), and Innovis Data Solutions, Inc. ("Innovis") (collectively, the "CRAs") are business entities doing business in the state of California as credit reporting agencies which receive negative credit information about consumers, and then publish such information in credit reports available to their subscribers. Id. at ¶ 2.
Defendant Wells Fargo is a creditor which, among other activities, reports allegedly delinquent debts to credit reporting agencies as a "furnisher" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("FCRA"). Id.
At some point, Plaintiffs obtained a Wells Fargo Home Equity Line of Credit (account #xxxx1998) and a checking account with Defendant Wells Fargo. See id. at ¶ 8.
In February 2015, Plaintiffs discovered that Wells Fargo reported them late on their Home Equity Line of Credit for the months of February 2012, April 2012, December 2012, and January 2013. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that these reports were in error, and that they subsequently disputed these reports to the CRAs. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 12, 15-18.
Throughout the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo erroneously reported late payments for the following months: February 2012, April 2012, November 2012, December 2012, January 2013, September 2014, March 2015, and April 2015. See FAC ¶¶ 8-9, 11-12.
In addition to falsely reporting Plaintiffs late on their home equity line of credit, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo failed to promptly provide accurate records of payment allocation. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiffs allege that after Plaintiffs requested that the CRAs investigate and remove erroneous late payments from Plaintiffs' credit reports, one or more of the CRAs sent dispute notices to Wells Fargo, which triggered Wells Fargo's obligations to Plaintiffs under the FCRA. Id. at ¶ 23.
Plaintiffs claim that Wells Fargo and the CRAs violated the FCRA and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Civ. Code § 1785.1 et seq. ("CCRAA") by: (1) "willfully and negligently failing . . . to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information in the [consumer] report [concerning Plaintiffs]"; (2) "willfully and negligently failing to correct, after receiving ample notice, information about the Plaintiffs which defendants knew, or should have known, was incomplete and/or inaccurate"; (3) "willfully and negligently failing to correct and/or delete the incomplete and inaccurate information in Plaintiffs' file after conducting an investigation"; and (4) "willfully and negligently failing to conduct an adequate investigation of Plaintiffs' complaints, and . . . failing to implement corrective actions once the outcome of such investigations were known, or should have been known, to the defendants." Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo and the CRAs "deliberately [have] inefficient procedures for correcting their credit files, because they know that a certain number of consumers will either be intimidated or too frustrated to continuously fight back against . . . collection activities for invalid debts. Defendants . . . know that . . . consumers would rather pay than fight[,] [and] defendants know that their systems intimidate consumers so they'll pay debts even if not valid[.]" Id. at ¶ 27.
Plaintiffs further allege that Wells Fargo willfully and negligently violated the CCRAA by: (1) "willfully and negligently furnishing to credit reporting agencies information about Plaintiffs" which Wells Fargo "knew, or should have known, was incomplete or inaccurate due to a mixed file error"; and (2) "willfully and negligently failed in [its] obligations to reinvestigate and correct the derogatory marks in plaintiffs' credit reports," with knowledge that Wells Fargo's policies and practices "hinder and obstruct adequate and meaningful reinvestigations." Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.
As a result of these violations, Plaintiffs claim to have suffered "actual damages, pain and suffering, punitive damages, penalties, costs and attorney fees," "loss of wages," and "damage to credit reputation." Id. at ¶¶ 26, 32. Plaintiffs seek general and special damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Id. at 9:13-20.
Wells Fargo has moved to dismiss both of Plaintiffs' causes of action under the FCRA and CCRAA, and has moved to strike Plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages, "pain and suffering" damages, and attorney's fees.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
1. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of one or more claims if the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal can be based on a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991). The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual grounds to support a plausible claim to relief, thereby entitling the plaintiff to offer evidence in support of its claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted). / / /
2. Motion to Strike
The Court may strike a pleading that contains "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "[A] motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the prayer for relief when the damages sought are not recoverable as a matter of law." Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1479 n. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1996). B. Discussion
1. Motion to Dismiss
a. FCRA Claim
Congress enacted the FCRA to counteract unfair and inaccurate reporting practices that undermine consumer confidence. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2002). The FCRA imposes duties on lenders, like Wells Fargo, who furnish information to credit reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2.
Section 1681n(a) of the FRCA provides in relevant part: "Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000," plus punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. Section 1681o similarly provides: "Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer," plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
Section 1681s-2(a) provides, in part, that "[a] person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate." 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A).
Section 1681s-2(b), on the other hand, governs the duties of furnishers of credit information only when they receive notice from credit reporting agencies of a dispute; "notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger furnishers' duties under subsection (b)." Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Once the furnisher receives notice from the credit reporting agency of "a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by" the furnisher, the furnisher must:
(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;
(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;
(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency;
(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and
(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly-
§ 1681s-2(b). Any investigation by a furnisher under this provision must be "reasonable." Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157.(i) modify that item of information;
(ii) delete that item of information; or
(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.
A consumer report that is "technically accurate" may be deemed "incomplete or inaccurate" under subsection (b) if the furnisher omitted information that "creates a misleading impression," such as the debt is disputed. Id. at 1163. Therefore, "the failure to report a bona fide dispute," i.e. "a dispute that could materially alter how the reported debt is understood," "gives rise to a furnisher's liability under § 1681s-2(b)." Id.
i. Plaintiffs' claim against Wells Fargo for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation is actionable under 15 U .S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
Wells Fargo first argues that Plaintiffs' FCRA claim fails because no private right of action is available under the FCRA against a credit furnisher for allegedly supplying false credit information. Mot. Dismiss 4:21-5:5.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the FCRA provides a private right of action against a furnisher of credit reporting information that violates the duties imposed by § 1681s-2(b), but not for violating the duties imposed by § 1681s-2(a). Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009); Nelson, 282 F.3d at 1059-60.
Plaintiffs' cause of action arises out of Wells Fargo's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of Plaintiffs' credit reporting dispute, which falls under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim against Wells Fargo is actionable.
ii. Plaintiffs adequately allege that Wells Fargo received notice of the dispute from the CRAs.
Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs' FCRA claim fails because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that Wells Fargo received notification of their dispute from the CRAs, and therefore Wells Fargo's duties under section 1681s-2(b) were not triggered. Mot. Dismiss 5:6-7:13. Plaintiffs allege that "one or more of the credit bureaus sent dispute notices to Wells Fargo, thereby activating Wells Fargo's obligations to Plaintiffs under the [FCRA]." FAC ¶ 23.
This allegation is sufficient to allege that Wells Fargo received notice of the dispute from the CRAs. The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether Plaintiffs will prevail in the action, but whether Plaintiffs are entitled to offer evidence in support of their claim. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511. Plaintiffs' allegations of notification are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and the issue of actual notification is one to be explored in discovery.
iii. Plaintiffs adequately allege that Wells Fargo willfully or negligently violated its obligations under 1681s-2(b).
Wells Fargo next argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Wells Fargo acted unlawfully. Mot. Dismiss 8:4-12. Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify what statutory language was purportedly violated, and Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations that Wells Fargo willfully or negligently violated the FCRA are unsupported by any specific facts. Id. at 8:8-12.
Plaintiffs' FAC, however, alleges several actions by Wells Fargo as constituting willful and negligent violations of the FCRA, including, Wells Fargo's failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the information in the consumer report concerning Plaintiffs; failure to correct information about Plaintiffs which Wells Fargo knew or should have known was incomplete or inaccurate; failure to correct or delete incomplete and inaccurate information in Plaintiffs' file after conducting an investigation; and failure to conduct an adequate investigation of Plaintiffs' complaints and failure to implement corrective actions once the outcome of the investigations were known. See FAC ¶ 25. Plaintiffs also allege that they contacted Wells Fargo regarding the erroneous late payments, id. at ¶ 8, suggesting that Wells Fargo was aware of the inaccuracies, or at least the disputes, yet Wells Fargo knowingly refused to sufficiently investigate the dispute and correct the problems reported by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs lastly allege that Wells Fargo deliberately maintains inefficient procedures for investigating and correcting disputes because it knows that a certain number of consumers will pay rather than fight. Id. at ¶ 27.
These allegations go beyond merely reciting the required element of willfulness or negligence in violating the FCRA, and are sufficient to give Wells Fargo notice of the grounds upon which Plaintiffs' FCRA claim rests. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" and a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss).
iv. Plaintiffs do not adequately plead facts to support their claim of actual injury.
Finally, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs do not plead facts to suggest that they suffered actual injury as a result of Wells Fargo's inaccurate reporting and failure to investigate Plaintiffs' complaints. Mot. Dismiss 8:13-21.
FRCA § 1681n provides for the following damages for willful noncompliance with the FCRA: actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. For negligent noncompliance with the FRCA, section 1681 o provides for actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 o.
Even though Plaintiffs do not need to plead or prove actual injury to be entitled to statutory damages for willful violations of the FCRA, Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2010), Plaintiffs' allegations of damages are not sufficient to state a claim of actual injury. In Dewi v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 12-2891 ABC (SHx), 2012 WL 10423239, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012), the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled actual injury by alleging the following injuries: a combined higher interest rate that plaintiff had to pay on at least one credit card, a reduction in plaintiff's line of credit, a withdrawn job opportunity, and loss of wages and damage to plaintiff's credit reputation. 2012 WL 10423239, at *6. Here, however, Plaintiffs provide no factual support for the conclusion that they have suffered actual damages. Plaintiffs' claim of actual injury is the type of "label and conclusion" that is insufficient to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs' FCRA claim WITH TWENTY (20) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND so that Plaintiffs may provide sufficient factual grounds to support their claim of actual injury. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiffs request judicial notice of the court order in Dewi. Pls.' Request for Judicial Notice 1:7-19, ECF No. 27. The Court considers Dewi as persuasive authority, however, judicial notice of Dewi is not necessary. Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice.
b. CCRAA Claim
Section 1785.25(a) of the CCRAA states that "[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate." Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). Section 1785.25(f) requires furnishers who receive notice of a dispute to complete an investigation and to review relevant information. Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(f). Section 1785.25(g) provides that "[a] person who furnishes information to a consumer credit reporting agency is liable for failure to comply with this section, unless the furnisher establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the failure to comply with this section, the furnisher maintained reasonable procedures to comply with those provisions." Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(g). Section 1785.31 provides various remedies for a violation of the CCRAA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31.
i. Plaintiffs' allegations under CCRAA § 1785 .25(a) are not preempted by the FCRA.
Wells Fargo argues that certain provisions of the CCRAA are preempted by the FCRA, and Plaintiffs' CCRAA claim fails because Plaintiffs do not specifically state which provisions of the CCRAA were violated. Mot. Dismiss 10:23-11:4.
Section 1785.25(g) of the CCRAA provides a private right of action to enforce CCRAA § 1785.25(a), and CCRAA § 1785.31 provides various remedies. The FCRA expressly exempts § 1785.25(a) from preemption and the Ninth Circuit has held that both sections 1785.25(g) and 1785.31 are also exempted from preemption by the FCRA. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1170-72. To the extent that Plaintiffs allege a violation of section 1785.25(f), however, that section is preempted by the FCRA. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2010). Section 1785.25(c) is also preempted by the FCRA. Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Section 1785.25(c) requires the furnisher to include a notice stating that the information is disputed by the consumer when the furnisher provides information to CRAs that is subject to a continuing dispute between the affected consumer and the furnisher. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(c). Plaintiffs' FAC does not include any allegations that would fall under section 1785.25(c).
Here, Plaintiffs' allegations that Wells Fargo violated the CCRAA when it received notice of Plaintiffs' dispute, and thereafter failed to complete an investigation and to review relevant information, are preempted by the FCRA. See FAC ¶¶ 25, 31. Plaintiffs remaining CCRAA allegations fall under section 1785.25(a), and are not preempted.
ii. Plaintiffs sufficiently state a claim for relief under CCRAA § 1785 .25(a).
Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs' FAC does not cite specific statutory violations, and is without sufficient factual allegations to put Wells Fargo on notice of the details of the allegedly improperly reported information that it provided to the CRAs. Mot. Dismiss 9:17-23.
Plaintiffs' CCRAA claim does not fail merely because Plaintiffs do not cite the specific statutory provision which was violated. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss."); see also, e.g., Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2004); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 745 (9th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, Plaintiffs do more than simply allege that Wells Fargo improperly reported Plaintiffs' default. Plaintiffs' second cause of action under the CCRAA incorporates all preceding paragraphs of the FAC, and Plaintiffs state the details of the information that were improperly reported in paragraphs 8 through 21 of the FAC. See FAC ¶¶ 8-21 (alleging that Wells Fargo erroneously reported late payments on Plaintiffs' Wells Fargo Home Equity Line of Credit for the months of February 2012, April 2012, November 2012, December 2012, January 2013, September 2014, March 2015, and April 2015). Plaintiffs also allege that the erroneous information was the result of a "mixed file error." Id. at ¶ 30. As explained above with regard to Plaintiffs' FCRA claim, Plaintiffs' allegations of "willfulness" and/or "negligence" are sufficient. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' allegations in their second cause of action are sufficient to state a claim under CCRAA § 1785.25(a).
iii. Plaintiffs' allegations of actual injury are insufficient.
Wells Fargo lastly argues that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead facts to support a claim for actual damages. Mot. Dismiss 10:5-15.
Actual damage is required to state a claim under the CCRAA. Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732, 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Quinlan v Citimortgage, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00986-MCE-EFB, 2011 WL 5299311, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31.
As explained above, Plaintiffs' bare allegation that they are entitled to "actual damages, loss of wages, damage to credit reputation, pain and suffering, costs and attorney fees" is without sufficient facts to demonstrate any particular injury resulting from Wells Fargo's purported CCRAA violation.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' CCRAA claim, but allows Plaintiffs TWENTY (20) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND to plead facts to support their claim of actual injury.
2. Motion to Strike
Wells Fargo moves to strike Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages, "pain and suffering" damages, and attorney's fees. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
a. Punitive Damages
Section 1681n(a)(2) of the FCRA expressly entitles Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages for willful violations of the FCRA. Likewise, section 1785.31(a)(2)(B) of the CCRAA entitles Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages for willful violations of the CCRAA. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1171. "Willfulness" in this context may be shown by reckless conduct, see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007) (interpreting § 1681n), and therefore, Wells Fargo's argument that Plaintiffs must allege facts to show "malice, oppression, or fraud" is misplaced. Dewi, 2012 WL 10423239, at *8. Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege willful violations of the FCRA and CCRAA, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages. / / / / / /
CCRAA § 1785.31 is not preempted by the FCRA. Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1171
b. "Pain and Suffering" Damages
Under §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, a plaintiff may collect "actual damages," which may include damages for pain and suffering. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). Section 1785.31(a)(1) of the CCRAA expressly provides that a plaintiff may recover damages for "pain and suffering," "when applicable."
However, a plaintiff must support its claim for pain and suffering "with something more than [its] own conclusory allegations." Dewi, 2012 WL 10423239, at *8 (quoting Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1206 (D. Nev. 2002)). A plaintiff must support its claim for pain and suffering with specific claims of genuine injury, such as emotional distress or physical injury. See id. at *8-*9.
Here, Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue emotional distress damages, however, the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to allege any specific claims of genuine injury. Plaintiffs' identification of the general category of "pain and suffering" is insufficient to state a plausible entitlement to damages. Thus, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo's Motion to Strike "pain and suffering" damages, but allows Plaintiffs TWENTY (20) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND the FAC to allege facts to support their "pain and suffering" damages claim.
c. Attorney's Fees
Sections 1681n and 1681 o of the FCRA and section 1795.31(a)(1) of the CCRAA allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. The allegations in the FAC are not sufficient to support claims of actual injury under the FCRA or the CCRAA, and the Court allows Plaintiffs TWENTY (20) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND to cure this deficiency in the FAC. In addition, Plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages and attorney's fees will not be stricken, but Plaintiffs' request for "pain and suffering" damages is STRICKEN WITH TWENTY (20) DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 2, 2016
RONALD S.W. LEW
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge