Levine v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n

6 Citing cases

  1. Tinsley v. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 27333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)

    The Appellate Division, Second Department stated: "[T]he public policy of the state is to encourage the licensing and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses." Levine v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 136 AD3d 1037, 1039 (2nd Dept. 2016). The court, in Miller v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365, 370 (D.C. 1972), stated: "[T]he Department's apparent policy of denying vendors' licenses to ex[-]convicts . . . may frustrate entirely the legislative goal of vocational rehabilitation in our penal institutions.

  2. Tinsley v. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n

    58 Misc. 3d 941 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    The Appellate Division, Second Department stated: "[T]he public policy of the state is to encourage the licensing and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses." Levine v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 136 A.D.3d 1037, 1039, 26 N.Y.S.3d 180 (2nd Dept.2016). The court, in Miller v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365, 370 (D.C.1972), stated: "[T]he Department's apparent policy of denying vendors' licenses to ex[-]convicts ... may frustrate entirely the legislative goal of vocational rehabilitation in our penal institutions.

  3. Tinsley v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 3053 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    Moreover, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the determination dated November 22, 2017, had a rational basis in the record and was not arbitrary and capricious (see CPLR 7803[3]). While, generally, it is unlawful to deny a license or employment on the ground that an applicant has previously been convicted of one or more crimes (see Correction Law § 752), the record demonstrates that the TLC properly considered all relevant factors and rationally concluded that the petitioner's prior convictions were directly related to the license sought and would pose an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of the public and, therefore, that both of the exceptions to the general rule were applicable (see id. §§ 752, 753; Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 93 N.Y.2d 361; Matter of Locklear v New York City Tr. Auth., 183 A.D.3d 739, 740; Matter of Levine v N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Commn., 136 A.D.3d 1037, 1039). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

  4. Locklear v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.

    183 A.D.3d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    The determinations had a rational basis in the record and were not arbitrary and capricious (see CPLR 7803[3] ). While generally, as the petitioner states, it is unlawful to deny employment on the ground that an applicant has previously been convicted of one or more crimes (see Correction Law § 752 ), the record demonstrates that the New York City Transit Authority properly considered all relevant factors and rationally concluded that employing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of its customers and that, therefore, one of the two exceptions to the general rule was applicable (see Correction Law §§ 752, 753 ; Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 93 N.Y.2d 361, 690 N.Y.S.2d 503, 712 N.E.2d 669 ; Matter of Coleman v. New York City Dept. of Educ. Div. of Human Resources, 154 A.D.3d 537, 61 N.Y.S.3d 889 ; Matter of Levine v N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm., 136 A.D.3d 1037, 1039, 26 N.Y.S.3d 180 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the respondents' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 7804(f) to dismiss so much of the petition as sought to annul the determinations, deny that branch of the petition, and dismiss that portion of the proceeding.

  5. Espinal v. Cnty. of Nassau

    172 A.D.3d 1064 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    In a judgment entered February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, granted so much of the petition as sought to restore the petitioner's eligibility certification and appointment and his employment as a Sewage Treatment Operator, with back pay and benefits, and to restore the petitioner to the eligible list for the position of Industrial Waste Control Specialist I. Judicial review pursuant to CPLR 7803(3) of a determination made without a formal hearing is limited to whether the determination was arbitrary or capricious or without a rational basis in the administrative record, and once it has been determined that an agency's conclusion has a sound basis in reason, the judicial function is at an end (seeMatter of Peckham v. Calogero , 12 N.Y.3d 424, 431, 883 N.Y.S.2d 751, 911 N.E.2d 813 ; Matter of Levine v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Commn. , 136 A.D.3d 1037, 1038–1039, 26 N.Y.S.3d 180 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Under the Civil Service Law, the state civil service department or appropriate municipal commission may investigate the qualifications and background of an eligible individual after he or she has been appointed, and may revoke a certificate of appointment and direct the termination of employment, "upon finding facts which if known prior to appointment, would have warranted his [or her] disqualification, or upon a finding of illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial nature in his [or her] application, examination or appointment ... provided, however, that no such certification shall be revoked or appointment terminated more than three years after it is made, except in the case of fraud" ( Civil Service Law § 50[4] ).

  6. Graves v. City of N.Y.

    53 Misc. 3d 895 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)   Cited 2 times
    In Matter of Graves v City of New York (53 Misc 3d 895 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County 2016]), the court concluded that a Corizon employee who was issued a security license by the DOC was a member of a law enforcement agency, and thus not protected by Correction Law §§ 752 and 753.

    chool Dist., 50 Misc.3d 1214(A), 2016 WL 398307 [Sup.Ct., Suffolk County 2016] (school bus driver position); Acosta v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 16 N.Y.3d 309, 946 N.E.2d 731, 921 N.Y.S.2d 633 [2011] (administrative assistant position at a nonprofit private organization that contracted with the DOE to provide special education services to disabled preschoolers); Gorelik v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 128 A.D.3d 624, 10 N.Y.S.3d 85 [1st Dept.2015] (application for master fire suppression piping contractor license); City of New York v. City Civil Service Com'n, 141 Misc.2d 276, 532 N.Y.S.2d 626 [Sup.Ct., New York County 1988] (position of provisional Eligibility Specialist); Polednak v. Levitt, 167 A.D.2d 274, 561 N.Y.S.2d 775 [1st Dept.1990] (position as City traffic device maintainer); City of New York v. New York City Civil Service Com'n, 30 A.D.3d 227, 817 N.Y.S.2d 254 [1st Dept.2006] (position of watershed maintainer within the City's Department of Environmental Protection); Levine v. N.Y.C. Taxi and Limousine Com'n, 136 A.D.3d 1037, 26 N.Y.S.3d 180 [2d Dept.2016] (application for license to operate for-hire vehicle); Reyes v. New York City Dept. Of Consumer Affairs, 8 Misc.3d 1009(A), 2005 WL 1552628 [Sup.Ct., New York County 2005] (home improvement license); Rampolla v. Banking Dept. of State, 31 Misc.3d 161, 916 N.Y.S.2d 492 [Sup.Ct., New York County 2010] (mortgage loan originator license); Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Env. Conservation, 98 N.Y.2d 758, 751 N.Y.S.2d 827, 781 N.E.2d 892 [2002] (landfill owner's application for a permit to expand a municipal solid waste disposal facility). This critical distinction renders petitioner's caselaw materially distinguishable (cf. King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 [1st Dept.1993] (overturning the board's decision where “record clearly reveals that the denial of petitioner's [parole] application was a result of the Board's failure to weigh all of the relevant considerations”); Formica Construction Inc. v. Mintz, 65 A.D.3d 686,