Opinion
No. 04-06-00364-CV.
Delivered and Filed: December 13, 2006.
From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2005-CI-19572, Honorable Joe Frazier Brown, Jr., Judge Presiding.
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice, Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice, Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice, Rebecca Simmons, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AFFIRMED
Appellant is a former customer support agent for the Texas Attorney General's Child Support Division in Bexar County, Texas. Appellant claimed an angry non-custodial parent verbally threatened her in April 2002, causing her to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim for her mental injury, but the hearings officer determined she had no compensable mental trauma injury and, therefore, she did not have a disability. After exhausting her administrative remedies, appellant brought the underlying lawsuit seeking judicial review of the final order denying her claim. Appellee filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence that appellant received a compensable mental trauma injury on April 5, 2002, the date of the alleged verbal threat, and there was no evidence appellant had a disability resulting from the claimed injury. Two days' later, appellant filed a pro se pleading entitled "Plaintiff's Initial Brief." The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of appellee. This pro se appeal by appellant ensued. We affirm.
On appeal, appellee contends appellant filed no response to its motion for summary judgment; however, appellant's pro se "Plaintiff's Initial Brief" was filed two days after the motion for summary judgment was filed and over one month before the motion was heard. The trial court's final judgment states it considered "the pleadings, motion, response, [and] evidence on file. . .." Thus, we will assume, for the purpose of this appeal, that appellant's "Brief" was before the trial court when it considered appellee's motion.. . .
DISCUSSION
Appellant's claim was decided under the provisions of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, which defines a "compensable injury" as "an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable under this subchapter." See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.011(10) (Vernon 2006). In her "Brief" and on appeal, appellant relies on the Texas Government Code's definition of "occupational disability," which is a "disability from a sudden and unexpected injury or disease that results solely from a specific act or occurrence determinable by a definite time and place and solely from an extremely dangerous risk of severe physical or mental trauma or disease that is not common to the public at large and that is peculiar to and inherent in a dangerous duty that arises from the nature and in the course of a person's state employment." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 811.001(12) (Vernon Supp. 2006). In her "Brief" and on appeal, appellant argues that appellee applied section 811.001(12) to her case in a manner different than it applied that section to other cases. Appellant also argues appellee misinterpreted section 811.001(12) in determining her incapacity did not result from a risk inherent or peculiar to her employment. However, nothing in appellant's "Brief" or her argument on appeal references medical records or expert testimony to support her contention that she suffered from a compensable injury.
Thus, she did not meet her burden of producing summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements of her workers' compensation claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); see S.W. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002).
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.