Brentwood in this case gave up its right to engage in certain types of speech, and may not assert such a right now. See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's decision not to reach the issue of whether a labor union's free speech rights had been violated where the district court had first determined that the union waived its First Amendment protections in a collective bargaining agreement). Brentwood in short gave up its right to speak in violation of TSSAA's game rules (including its anti-recruiting rules) as consideration for access to TSSAA leagues and tournaments, and to benefit from TSSAA's enforcement of its rules against competitors.

Because the cognovit note deprives the debtor of notice that he is being sued, and of his right to a hearing, courts demand "clear and convincing evidence" that the written waiver was "voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made." Overmyer, at 185-86, 187 (assuming without deciding that the same standard of proof applies to waiver in the civil context as in criminal cases, and citing criminal cases); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187; Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2892 (1991)). The question of waiver is factual.

However, any such waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Marsh, 105 F.3d at 111; see Lake James Community Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Burke County, 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106, 119 S.Ct. 874, 142 L.Ed.2d 775 (1999); United States v. Local 1804-1, 44 F.3d 1091, 1098 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1995); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993); Erie Telecommunications, 853 F.2d at 1094; Sambo's Restaurants, 663 F.2d at 690. Moreover, the waiver must be established by "clear and compelling" evidence.

As Defendants did not assert that Coalition lacks standing, the court held “[t]he Coalition on Homelessness unquestionably has standing to pursue all forms of relief sought through this lawsuit.” It then denied the motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs for lack of standing, citing Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others.” Coal. on Homelessness v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-CV-05502-DMR, 2023 WL 3637032, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2023)

See Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal. App. 4th 853, 869, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (2002) (action for injunctive relief to enforce confidentiality agreement did not violate first amendment because defendant waived free speech rights). See also Lake James Community Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. Burke, 149 F.3d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding valid contractual waiver of first amendment rights), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106, 119 S. Ct 874, 142 L Ed. 2d 775 (1999); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963, 112 S. Ct 430, 116 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1991); Forbes v. Milwaukee, United States District Court, Docket No. 05-C-591 (E.D. Wis. January 4, 2007) (same); Kovacs v. Jim, United States District Court, Docket No. 4:03-CV-33 (W.D. Mich. July 31, 2003) (same); Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Sup. 1227, 1233-34 (D.R.I. 1995) (same); Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley School District, 981 P.2d 600, 603-604 (Colo. 1999) (same); Messina v. Dept. of Job Service, 341 N.W.2d 52, 61 (Iowa 1983) (same); Verizon New England, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 866 A.2d 844, 849 (Me. 2005) (same); Trump v. Trump, 179 App. Div. 2d 201, 205-206, 582 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (same), appeal dismissed, 80 N.Y.2d 892, 600 N.E.2d 634, 587 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1992); Estate of Barber v. Sheriff's Dept, 161 N.C. App. 658, 664-65, 589 S.E.2d 433 (2003) (same); cf. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184-87, 92 S. Ct. 775

To the extent Romeril had the right to publicly deny the SEC's allegations against him, he waived that right by agreeing to the no-deny provision as part of a consent decree.See also, e.g. , Leonard v. Clark , 12 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) ("First Amendment rights may be waived" as part of settlement as long as that "waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent."); In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp. , 129 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1942) ("Certainly, one who has been a party to a proceeding wherein a consent decree has been entered and who has been a party to that consent, is in no position to claim that such decree restricts his freedom of speech. He has waived his right and given his consent to its limitations within the scope of that decree."); accord Snepp v. United States , 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (per curiam) (rejecting claim that provision in employment agreement obligating employee to submit any proposed publication for prior review constituted unconstitutional "prior restraint on protected speech," where employee voluntarily entered into agreement); Ronnie Van Zant, Inc. v. Cleopatra Recs., Inc. , 906 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) ("[P]arties are free to limit by contr

And because LatNet has standing, we need not address whether the individual Plaintiffs also have standing. See Secretary of the Interior v. California , 464 U.S. 312, 319 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 656, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984) ("Since the State of California clearly does have standing, we need not address the standing of the other [plaintiffs], whose position here is identical to the State's."); Leonard v. Clark , 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others."). We therefore proceed to the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.

If a conviction is constitutionally required, the fact that two of the six plaintiffs were convicted suffices to establish standing for all. See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended. Thus the City's argument that Appellants lack standing because a conviction is required fails on the facts as well as the law.

"Constitutional rights may ordinarily be waived [only] if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1252 (1991); see also D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). In the absence of such an evidentiary showing, "[a] waiver of constitutional right is 'not to be implied and is not lightly to be found.'"

See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff [with standing], we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.”); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others.”)