Brentwood in this case gave up its right to engage in certain types of speech, and may not assert such a right now. See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's decision not to reach the issue of whether a labor union's free speech rights had been violated where the district court had first determined that the union waived its First Amendment protections in a collective bargaining agreement). Brentwood in short gave up its right to speak in violation of TSSAA's game rules (including its anti-recruiting rules) as consideration for access to TSSAA leagues and tournaments, and to benefit from TSSAA's enforcement of its rules against competitors.

However, any such waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Marsh, 105 F.3d at 111; see Lake James Community Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Burke County, 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106, 119 S.Ct. 874, 142 L.Ed.2d 775 (1999); United States v. Local 1804-1, 44 F.3d 1091, 1098 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1995); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993); Erie Telecommunications, 853 F.2d at 1094; Sambo's Restaurants, 663 F.2d at 690. Moreover, the waiver must be established by "clear and compelling" evidence.

As Defendants did not assert that Coalition lacks standing, the court held “[t]he Coalition on Homelessness unquestionably has standing to pursue all forms of relief sought through this lawsuit.” It then denied the motion to dismiss the individual Plaintiffs for lack of standing, citing Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others.” Coal. on Homelessness v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-CV-05502-DMR, 2023 WL 3637032, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2023)

Nevertheless, there is a "general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs ... that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others." Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a plaintiffs burden shifts depending on whether the defendant asserts a facial or a factual challenge.

Nevertheless, there is a "general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs ... that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others." Leonard v. Clark , 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a plaintiff's burden shifts depending on whether the defendant asserts a facial or a factual challenge.

And because LatNet has standing, we need not address whether the individual Plaintiffs also have standing. See Secretary of the Interior v. California , 464 U.S. 312, 319 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 656, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984) ("Since the State of California clearly does have standing, we need not address the standing of the other [plaintiffs], whose position here is identical to the State's."); Leonard v. Clark , 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others."). We therefore proceed to the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.

Section 680A.300 causes Restrepo's injury by precluding her from participating in Nevada's insurance market on substantially equal terms with resident agents, and a favorable decision invalidating the statute redresses that injury. Therefore, Restrepo has standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 680A.300, and having found standing, we do not consider whether the Council also has standing. Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others."). B. Mootness

In Leonard v. Clark, the Ninth Circuit upheld a provision in a collective bargaining agreement limiting the First Amendment expression of a labor union. 12 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994).

See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff [with standing], we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.”); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others.”)

In the Court's January 25, 2022 Order, Plaintiffs were all determined to have standing based on the legal proposition that "the standing of one plaintiff was sufficient to encompass all plaintiffs." (Doc. 35 at 9-10 (citing Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977)); see also Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The general rule applicable to federal court suits with multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others."). Under this same analysis, nothing persuades the Court that Plaintiffs no longer have standing.