Opinion
Case No. 1:20-cv-12
09-09-2020
VICTOR KEENAN LEMMONS, JR., Plaintiff v. DAVID RUDD, et al., Defendants
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that Plaintiff Victor Keenan Lemmons' claims against Defendant Jeremy Lightner be dismissed, with prejudice, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No. 4, Lemmons' claims are subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is "frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed. Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the instant case, Lemmons' claims against Lightner, an Erie County Assistant District Attorney, should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e) because they "seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Lemmons' only factual allegation concerning Lightner is that he "filed a motion to revoke the Plaintiff's bond" in a pending criminal matter. ECF No. 6 ¶ 14. Lemmons maintains that this "usurped time to detain the Plaintiff superseding and contravene[ing] his Sixth Amendment (Right to a Speedy Trial)" and that Lightner "colluded with federal authorities to detain Plaintiff until federal authorities [were] ready to file criminal charges triggering a mere 'ruse'." Id. ¶ 30.
The doctrine of absolute immunity protects prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-20 (1976). "More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the right not to stand trial." Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for acts "within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410. "Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's 'advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation." Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that Lightner's actions are protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Lemmons' lone allegation concerning Lightner relates entirely to his conduct during a bond modification proceeding. Courts have consistently held that such acts fall within the scope of a prosecutor's duties while pursuing a criminal prosecution. See Thomas v. Stanek, 2015 WL 757574, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2015) (finding the doctrine applies because "[w]henever [the prosecutor] objected to Plaintiff being freed on bond, he was acting as an advocate for the Commonwealth and, thus, his decision is protected by absolute immunity."); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987) ("advocating a particular level of bail" is covered by absolute immunity); Pinaud v. Cty. of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). The Court reaches the same conclusion here.
Indeed, the Court dismissed almost identical allegations against Lightner based on the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in Lemmons' prior civil action at Lemmons v. County of Erie, Pennsylvania, 2020 WL 4041551 (W.D. Pa. July 17, 2020). --------
To the extent that Lemmons' vague reference to "collusion" with unidentified federal authorities was intended to state a conspiracy claim, that claim must also be dismissed. As an initial matter, Lemmons has not alleged any facts in support of this claim. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a plaintiff must present "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made" as well as "the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose") (internal quotations and quoting sources omitted). Moreover, Lemmons' conspiracy claim, like his civil rights claim, appears to be based entirely on Lightner's advocacy as an Assistant District Attorney during Lemmons' criminal proceedings. As such, Lightner's actions are again shielded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Patterson v. City of Philadelphia, 2009 WL 1259968, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2009) ("The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity precludes conspiracy-based claims as well.") (collecting cases). Dismissal is appropriate.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that all of Lemmons' claims against Lightner be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, because Lemmons' claims are plainly barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, any attempt at amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Bressi v. Gembic, 2018 WL 3596859, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2018) (denying leave to amend where claims "clearly and universally lack merit and are legally frivolous"). The Clerk should be directed to terminate Lightner from this action, with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: September 9, 2020