Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-D-1404-S
July 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is a Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Perdue Farms on May 29, 2001. Plaintiff Donald Leigh issued a Response June 12, and a Reply followed June 19. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that the motion is due to be granted in part and the state law claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The court reviews the record and makes factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986), but enters judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
This case requires the application of the procedural requirements for bringing a Title VII suit. Plaintiff Donald G. Leigh is a white male, who worked a variety of jobs at a Perdue Farms chicken plant before his termination February 4, 1999. Leigh brings two counts of reverse discrimination under Title VII. He also brings a state law claim of retaliation under § 25-5-11.1 of the Alabama Code.
Doc. Nos. 1, 10.
Several months after his termination, Leigh contacted EEOC and spoke with an unnamed agent. Leigh then jotted down some general comments about his employment dispute, and he sent them to the agency via registered mail on July 1, 1999. Leigh waited about a year, then called EEOC's offices in Birmingham. An agent looked through the files, said Leigh's letter was lost, and asked Leigh to send a second missive. Leigh sent the second letter around July 19, 2000.
Resp. at 26-27.
The dispositive issue presented is whether Leigh has shown that he filed a timely, verified EEOC charge prior to bringing suit. Title VII provides that EEOC charges "shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(b). "All courts who have heard this issue since 1972 have held that verification is an absolute condition precedent to suit." Vason v. City of Montgomery, 86 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1133 (M.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd, 240 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Employment litigation is full of "strict statutes and most biting laws." However, the Supreme Court has "stressed that `procedural requirements by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.'" Strickland v. Wayne Farms-Southland Hatchery, 132 F. Supp.2d 1331, 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984)). This is because firm adherence to procedural requirements is the best way to guarantee the even-handed administration of justice. See id.
We have strict statutes and most biting laws." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 1, sc. 3.
The court will ignore EEOC's apparent decision to the contrary and assume, without finding, that Leigh's July 1999 letter constituted a timely-filed charge. Even so, the court finds no evidence that the charge was verified. Leigh's Complaint does not allege compliance with this condition precedent, he does not contend that he tried to amend his charge to correct this deficiency, cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (b), and his Response brief does not address this crucial matter in any material way.
Mot. Ex. 44 (dismissal notice).
Leigh has not designated specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. Therefore, the court finds that Leigh cannot now raise his Title VII claims in federal court. See Vason, 240 F.3d at 907. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and the state claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice. See Wright v. Department of Corr., 31 F. Supp.2d 1336, 1346 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
IV. ORDER
It is CONSIDERED and ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED on Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Count III be and the same is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All outstanding motions be and the same are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. A judgment follows.