Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9963.
April 15, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-03-07048 CR.
Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. Tamara E. de Lucia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Thomas Leichty was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. On appeal, Leichty argues that Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence. In his first motion, Leichty argued that he was illegally arrested and that his subsequent statement should be suppressed. But Judge Wolverton found that the police had probable cause to arrest Leichty. We uphold that finding.
AS 11.41.410(a)(1).
In his second motion to suppress, Leichty argued that his statement to the police should be suppressed because his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. We uphold Judge Wolverton's denial of this motion.
Why we uphold Judge Wolverton's finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Leichty
Officer Leonard Torres testified at the evidentiary hearing on Leichty's first motion to suppress. Torres stated that he was on patrol when he was approached by a young woman, later identified as B.A., who ran up to his car, crying hysterically. B.A. told Torres that she had just been raped by three men and directed Torres's attention to three men who were running away from the scene; she stated that these men were her assailants.
Torres was able to apprehend one of the three men who were running away. This man was later identified as Thomas Leichty. When Torres brought Leichty back to his patrol car, B.A. identified him as one of her attackers, although she was not sure whether Leichty was one of the two men who actually penetrated her.
Leichty was taken to the police station, where Detective John Vandervalk advised Leichty of his Miranda rights. Leichty waived his Miranda rights and made incriminating statements. The State indicted Leichty for the sexual assault of B.A., and Leichty filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that he had been subjected to an illegal arrest.
Judge Wolverton denied the motion to suppress. In his findings, he noted that B.A. reported the rape and pointed to the three men who were running away and identified them as the perpetrators. Shortly thereafter, Torres apprehended Leichty, and B.A. identified Leichty as one of the three people involved in the rape. Judge Wolverton recognized that B.A. was distraught and was "unable to explain the defendant's precise role in the sexual assault." But Judge Wolverton concluded that, even taking these factors into consideration, Torres had probable cause to arrest Leichty.
"Probable cause for an arrest exists when the officer is aware of facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, that are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed." In the present case, Officer Torres was aware of circumstances that supported a reasonable belief that Leichty was criminally involved in the recent rape of B.A. The fact that B.A. could not be sure whether Leichty was one of the two men who actually had intercourse with her did not undermine the fact that Torres had probable cause to arrest Leichty. Officer Torres was therefore aware of information that supported a reasonable conclusion that all three of the suspects who ran from the scene were criminally responsible for the rape of B.A.
Saucier v. State, 869 P.2d 483, 484 (Alaska App. 1994) (citations omitted).
Judge Wolverton did not err in finding that Leichty's Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
Leichty argues that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligent, and that his statement was not voluntary because he was in an alcoholic blackout at the time he gave his statement to Detective Vandervalk. Following an evidentiary hearing, and after reviewing the videotape of Detective Vandervalk's interview of Leichty, Judge Wolverton found that Leichty "was lucid and responsive and that there was . . . no evidence of alcoholic blackout. . . ."
We have reviewed the transcript of the interrogation, as well as the videotape, and agree with Judge Wolverton's assessment. During the interview, Leichty appeared alert and responsive. When Detective Vandervalk told Leichty that he was going to read him his Miranda rights, Leichty responded that he had "heard `em a lot." Leichty gave his date of birth and Social Security number. He described his activities of the evening, including observing the rape of B.A. Leichty did claim that he had little memory of many aspects of the rape because he was drunk and had blacked out earlier in the evening. But, as Judge Wolverton pointed out, there was simply no evidence that Leichty was in a blackout at the time of the interview. To the contrary, Leichty appeared to be lucid and responsive. We accordingly conclude that Judge Wolverton did not err in finding that Leichty knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his statements to the police were voluntary.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.