Opinion
No. 4:99CV3011.
April 24, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR EAJA FEE
This case comes before me on the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, hereinafter the "EAJA." In particular, the plaintiff seeks an award of $4,342.62 in fees, based on 32.59 hours at a rate of $133.25 per hour, and an award of $213.16 in costs. The defendant does not challenge the plaintiff's right to fees in some amount, but it does object to the number of hours the plaintiff's counsel spent on researching and briefing the memorandum in support of the complaint. The defendant does not contest the hourly rate set forth by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not filed a reply to the defendant's challenge.
In determining a proper award of attorney fees, I must assess the reasonableness of the request based on the facts of the case at issue. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). As the Supreme Court has explained, "The district court should . . . exclude from [the] fee calculation hours that were not reasonably expended." Id. at 434 (internal quotations and citation omitted). So, if the preparation time is "excessive," the number of compensable hours may be reduced. See, e.g., Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's reduction of hours from 69.7 to 46.05); Vanover v. Chater, 946 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D.Mo. 1996) (42 hours excessive where case was routine and lacked novel legal issues).
The plaintiff's counsel submits a detailed billing record accounting for her time on this case. The defendant objects to almost four-fifths, that is, 25.5 hours, of this total. In particular, the defendant argues that this was a simple and "straightforward" case — that is, the case did not involve some difficult or complex issue of law or fact — and, therefore, the plaintiff's counsel, who has specialized in social security work, should have completed her work in fewer hours. In other words, the defendant argues that the time spent by the plaintiff's counsel was excessive for this case. I do not agree. The fact is that this was not a straightforward case, as the defendant maintains in his motion and, I need look no further that the defendant's own actions for justification. The defendant, who has a great deal of experience in this area, failed to recognize the need for remand. Indeed, he contested remand and argued, in a sixteen-page response brief, that his decision was without fault, and that it was supported by both the applicable law and facts of this case. In short, if the law and facts of this case were so straightforward, then I believe that the defendant himself would have acknowledged the shortcomings in his analysis and reconsidered his decision on his own. Instead, the plaintiff was forced to appeal the defendant's decision to me. In addition, I am unable to ignore the fact that the administrative record in this case was over 600 pages long, and it was filled with psychological evaluations, physical evaluations, progress reports, and the like, as well as several administrative decisions. A thorough review of this voluminous record was, without a doubt, most time consuming. So, in light of the enormous size of the administrative record, as well as the defendant's position, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the entire 25.5 hours of his counsel's time associated with the brief, a brief that was over thirty pages, well-detailed and very helpful.
Since the defendant has no objections to other time expended by the plaintiff's counsel on this case, I conclude that the plaintiff's counsel is entitled to collect the full 32.59 hours, at the requested rate of $133.25, from the defendant.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs is granted in the amount of $4,342.62, plus court costs in the amount of $213.16.