Opinion
A169115
09-26-2024
LEGALMATCH.COM, Plaintiff, Cross- Defendant and Respondent, v. DORIAN L. JACKSON, Defendant, Cross- Complainant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-15-547260)
BROWN, P. J.
LegalMatch.com (LegalMatch) sued Dorian Jackson to recover unpaid subscription fees for its subscription service connecting potential clients to lawyers. Jackson defended and filed a putative class action cross-complaint, alleging that LegalMatch's agreement was illegal because its service constitutes referral activity under Business and Professions Code section 6155, which requires lawyer-referral services to register with the State Bar, and LegalMatch was not registered. (Jackson v. LegalMatch.com (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 760, 764-766 (LegalMatch.com).) We held in a prior appeal that LegalMatch's service did constitute referral activity, and we remanded the case to the trial court to evaluate LegalMatch's argument that Jackson could not invoke the illegality of the service as a basis to deny enforcement of the subscription agreement because he had unclean hands, having also violated Business and Professions Code section 6155 by obtaining clients through LegalMatch's service. (Id. at p. 779.) On remand, the trial court denied Jackson's motion for class certification, and the parties then voluntarily dismissed their claims against each other. After the trial court denied Jackson's request for attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, Jackson once more appeals, contending his victory in LegalMatch.com made him the successful party. We agree with the trial court that in these circumstances Jackson was not successful because he neither obtained any judicial resolution in his favor on the complaint or cross-complaint nor achieved his primary litigation objective of obtaining $14 million on behalf of himself and the putative class. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
In August 2015, LegalMatch filed a limited civil case against Jackson, a lawyer, for $3,000 when he allegedly failed to pay for his subscription to LegalMatch's online service for connecting potential clients to lawyers. Among other affirmative defenses, Jackson alleged that the subscription contract was unenforceable because LegalMatch was violating Business and Professions Code section 6155 by operating a lawyer referral service without registering with the State Bar. Jackson also filed a cross-complaint that, as later amended, alleged individual and class claims for violations of Business and Professions Code section 6155 and the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. &Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq), fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and restitution based on quasi-contract or unjust enrichment. Jackson defined the class as all attorneys who had paid for LegalMatch's services during the preceding four years, which amounted to about 950 class members. Jackson's prayer for relief sought (1) certification of the class; (2) restitution of all money the class members paid; (3) a declaration that LegalMatch's service was unlawful; (4) preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing LegalMatch from operating until it registered with the State Bar; (5) imposition of a constructive trust on the money LegalMatch acquired from the class; (6) general, special, and punitive damages; and (7) attorney's fees under section 1021.5.
The parties stipulated to proceed first with a bench trial limited to the issue of whether LegalMatch operated a lawyer referral service under Business and Professions Code section 6155. LegalMatch disputed that its service was a lawyer referral service under Business and Professions Code section 6155. But LegalMatch further argued that if it was, because Jackson had unclean hands from himself violating the statute (in that he had acquired clients from LegalMatch's unregistered service), he could not rely on the illegality under Business and Professions Code section 6155 as a basis to deny enforcement of the subscription agreement. (LegalMatch.com, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) In July 2017, the trial court ruled that LegalMatch's service was not a referral service and that LegalMatch's unclean hands argument therefore "must fail." We reversed, holding that LegalMatch's operations fell within the scope of Business and Professions Code section 6155's regulation of lawyer referral services. (LegalMatch.com, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.) We remanded to the trial court to determine whether the facts supported LegalMatch's unclean hands argument. (Id. at p. 779 [explaining we construed the trial court to have meant it did not need to address LegalMatch's unclean hands argument when it said the argument "must fail"].) The California Supreme Court denied LegalMatch's petition for review in March 2020.
We grant Jackson's request for judicial notice of LegalMatch's petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
At the end of that month, LegalMatch applied to the State Bar for registration as a lawyer referral service. In May 2020, the State Bar filed a separate lawsuit under section 6155, as well as an ex parte application seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring LegalMatch to cease activity until it was registered. The State Bar's complaint and ex parte application both cited our decision in LegalMatch.com. Jackson filed notices in both cases asserting that the cases were related to each other, but so far as the record reveals, the trial court did not relate the cases. The trial court denied the State Bar's ex parte application because the State Bar failed to show irreparable harm from LegalMatch's ongoing operations while the State Bar considered its registration application. In September 2020, the State Bar approved LegalMatch's application. LegalMatch's service operated in a substantially similar way throughout the litigation between Jackson and LegalMatch until the State Bar approved LegalMatch's application.
We grant Jackson's request for judicial notice of four documents filed in the State Bar's action. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
So far as the record reveals, the trial court never ruled on LegalMatch's unclean hands argument. In March 2023, Jackson moved for class certification. The trial court denied that motion in May 2023. A week later, the parties stipulated to dismiss with prejudice their individual claims against each other and dismiss without prejudice Jackson's class claims. The stipulation allowed either party to apply for an award of costs pursuant to section 1032 and allowed Jackson to apply for public-interest attorney's fees under section 1021.5.
Jackson filed a memorandum of costs under section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). The trial court ruled that Jackson was the prevailing party entitled to about $12,000 in costs because he was the defendant and neither he nor LegalMatch obtained any relief.
Jackson then moved for about $940,000 in attorney's fees under section 1021.5. The trial court denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
"Section 1021.5 authorizes a court to 'award attorneys' fees to a successful party . . . in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.' . . .' "[T]he fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases." '" (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 250 (Vasquez).) A court may award fees under section 1021.5 "only to 'a successful party' and only if the action has 'resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest ....' [Citation.] Three additional conditions must also exist: '(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.'" (Id. at pp. 250-251.) "In deciding whether to award fees, the court 'must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award under a private attorney general theory.'" (Id. at p. 251.)
A party can prove it was a "successful party" under section 1021.5 in two ways. (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 260.) First, under the traditional, non-catalyst theory, a party can establish success in the form of a "judicial resolution" (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 560 (Graham)) or" 'a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties'" (Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 608 (Tipton-Whittingham)). (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 259-260.) A party that obtains some such favorable judicial action can be considered the prevailing party even if the party did not prevail on every claim. (Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1345; Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed.2010) § 2.99.)
Second, "a plaintiff who has not succeeded in obtaining 'a judicial resolution' [citation] or 'a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties' [citation] must obtain attorney fees under the catalyst theory, or not at all." (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 260; see Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards, supra, § 2.111.) To prove it was successful on a catalyst theory, a plaintiff moving for fees "must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense . . .; and (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit." (TiptonWhittingham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 608.) "[T]he plaintiff cannot be a successful party by obtaining just any relief. [Citation.] In catalyst cases, the plaintiff must show its lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendant to provide the primary relief sought in the litigation. [Citations.] Thus, when a plaintiff seeks fees under a catalyst theory, courts generally must conduct the following inquiry: (1) identify the plaintiff's primary litigation objectives, (2) compare the results obtained to determine whether the plaintiff in fact achieved those objectives, and, if so, (3) decide whether the lawsuit was a material factor or contributed in a significant way to those results." (Department of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 556, 572.)
"A reviewing court 'will uphold the trial court's decision to award attorney fees under section 1021.5, unless the court has abused its discretion.'" (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 251.)
We note that the parties support applying independent review because Jackson's request for attorney's fees is based on our published opinion. (See, e.g., Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Democratic Central Com. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.) However, another court has held that this approach is incorrect and that the abuse of discretion standard always applies, but that an appellate court will have a "better understanding of whether the trial court abused its discretion" when a published appellate opinion is involved. (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 575.) We need not take sides in this dispute because we would reach the same conclusions here under any standard of review.
I. Traditional theory
Jackson first takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that he was not a successful party on a traditional, non-catalyst theory because he did not achieve any judicially sanctioned relief. The trial court pointed out that Jackson did not obtain any injunctive relief, damages, or restitution on behalf of himself or the class. The trial court recognized that Jackson's suit did result in our published LegalMatch.com opinion holding that LegalMatch was a lawyer referral service subject to Business and Professions Code section 6155. But the trial court found that decision insufficient by itself to establish that Jackson was a successful party under section 1021.5. The trial court reasoned that the LegalMatch.com opinion did not order LegalMatch to register with the State Bar or to refund any money to Jackson or other attorneys. The trial court also observed that the opinion did not result in a judgment for Jackson on LegalMatch's complaint, since we remanded to the trial court to consider LegalMatch's unclean hands theory.
Jackson admits that he never obtained any judicial ruling giving him any specific relief such as a monetary recovery or an injunction. His claim to success under the traditional theory turns entirely on our LegalMatch.com opinion, so it is necessary to first establish what that opinion did and did not hold. In the trial court, Jackson had alleged in his answer and crosscomplaint that LegalMatch's service was a lawyer referral service under Business and Professions Code section 6155 and LegalMatch was not registered with the State Bar, so that LegalMatch's subscription agreements with Jackson and the putative class were illegal and therefore unenforceable. The trial court decision addressed only the first premise of these allegations, ruling that LegalMatch's service was not a lawyer referral service under Business and Professions Code section 6155. (LegalMatch.com, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 766-767.) LegalMatch.com reversed this ruling, but it went no further than that. (Id. at pp. 764, 767, 776-778.) While LegalMatch.com mentioned Jackson's allegation that LegalMatch was unregistered, our opinion never actually said whether this allegation was correct, because it did not need to. (See id. at p. 766 &fn. 2.) LegalMatch.com did not hold that LegalMatch's service was unlawful, much less whether such illegality was a defense to the complaint or a basis for relief on the crosscomplaint.
Far from ruling on the merits of Jackson's allegations in his answer or cross-complaint, we recognized that LegalMatch had argued that Jackson's unclean hands prevented him from raising the illegality of the agreement as a bar to its enforcement. (LegalMatch.com, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) This argument was based on LegalMatch's assertion that Jackson had used LegalMatch's unregistered service, despite knowing of its illegality. (Ibid.) "Because the 'doctrine of unclean hands is heavily fact dependent' and generally involves a question of fact," and the trial court had not previously addressed LegalMatch's theory in this regard, we remanded to the trial court to resolve it. (Ibid.)
This remand was not a mere formality; there was a legitimate question as to whether Jackson could raise the illegality of LegalMatch's operation to partly or wholly bar it from enforcing its subscription agreement. Whether a party's unclean hands will bar judicial relief turns on factually analogous case law, the nature of the parties' misconduct, and the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries. (Blain v. Doctor's Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1060.) These factors overlap with the analysis of Jackson's claim that the contract was unenforceable for illegality. Contracts that are in violation of statutes are generally unenforceable, but courts may still allow a plaintiff to obtain restitution or even enforce the contract outright if the plaintiff is less blameworthy than the defendant (meaning the parties are not in pari delicto) and there is no overriding public interest reason for voiding the agreement. (Russell City Energy Co., LLC v. City of Hayward (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 54, 70-71 &fn. 9 [in determining whether to enforce an illegal contract, courts have considered whether "the party claiming illegality would be unjustly enriched if the other party were denied recovery, and [whether] the forfeiture from refusal to permit recovery would be harsh in proportion to the character and extent of illegality"]; McIntosh v. Mills (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 333, 344 &fn. 10, 347.)
LegalMatch's unclean hands argument and Jackson's illegality argument therefore both turn on a balancing of each party's wrongdoing and the relationship between the wrongdoing and the parties' claims against each other. Before the parties' stipulated mutual dismissal, LegalMatch had a colorable argument that Jackson was more blameworthy and his misconduct more significant. LegalMatch allegedly believed in good faith that it was not violating the law, while Jackson subscribed to its service even as he alleged in this litigation that it was unlawful, and Jackson's clients were ultimately the ones whom the statute intended to protect. (See LegalMatch.com, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 772 [statute was intended to protect consumers and ensure attorney professionalism].)
LegalMatch.com did not purport to weigh these factors against each other, leaving it to the trial court to take up the issue on remand. Yet it appears the parties never presented this issue to the trial court for resolution. The trial court did deny Jackson's class certification motion in part because it found that LegalMatch's unclean hands and in pari delicto arguments rendered him an inadequate class representative and his claims not typical of the class. But the trial court never ruled on the merits of those defenses themselves, and the parties voluntarily dismissed their claims against each other shortly after the class certification ruling. The merits of Jackson's illegality allegation in support of his answer and cross-complaint and LegalMatch's own unclean hands argument remain unresolved.
Jackson raises several different theories for how LegalMatch.com makes him a successful party, despite the lack of any ruling on the merits of the dispute. None of them is persuasive. Most narrowly, Jackson contends LegalMatch.com gave him the declaratory judgment he sought in his crosscomplaint that LegalMatch's service was unlawful. As our preceding discussion makes clear, this overstates our decision's holding. The Supreme Court distinguishes between traditional and catalyst theories of success by drawing a bright line between winning some form of judicial resolution and indirectly obtaining the benefits a judicial resolution would have provided. (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 260.) Our opinion did not qualify as a judicial resolution because it addressed only a threshold premise of Jackson's illegality theory, not its ultimate merits, and remanded for consideration of LegalMatch's unclean hands argument. A party cannot claim success after prevailing on only one element of a claim or defense while litigation continues on other aspects of the claim or defense, including counterarguments by the opposing party.
To be sure, LegalMatch.com might have made it fairly simple for Jackson to obtain from the trial court a declaratory judgment of unlawfulness, had he supplied proof of LegalMatch's lack of registration (which is apparently not disputed) and asked the court to issue the declaration. But Jackson never pressed his advantage and asked for or obtained such a declaratory judgment. Jackson asserts that the value of the case after the denial of his class certification motion was too low to be worth litigating further. This assertion, however, suggests the declaration itself was of little interest to him in the overall context of the litigation, which becomes significant in the context of the catalyst theory, as we discuss post. For the purposes of the traditional theory, it does not matter why Jackson abandoned his case. If he wanted to establish himself as a successful party under the traditional theory, he needed to obtain" 'a judicial resolution' [citation] or 'a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties'" on at least one of his claims. (Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 260.) Absent a judicial determination of either sort, Jackson's claim to be a successful party boils down to a contention that he is entitled to fees for clearing a single hurdle on the path to achieving a resolution from the court, without having cleared any subsequent hurdles or actually obtaining the judicial resolution itself. This is not sufficient under the traditional theory of success.
Jackson argues that the LegalMatch.com opinion brought about a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties because it placed LegalMatch on the defensive by forcing it to explain why its contract was enforceable. LegalMatch.com may have improved the strength of Jackson's litigation position, but that does not mean it changed his legal relationship with LegalMatch. LegalMatch.com did not alter LegalMatch's obligations to Jackson or the putative class he sought to represent, nor did it entitle anyone to additional benefits from LegalMatch. Such changes could only come after further proceedings in the trial court regarding Jackson's unclean hands and the enforceability of LegalMatch's subscription agreements despite their likely illegality.
Jackson contends that the LegalMatch.com opinion caused LegalMatch to register with the State Bar. He acknowledges that he did not obtain an injunction, but he insists that when LegalMatch registered, he obtained the relief an injunction would have provided. This argument improperly muddles the traditional and catalyst theories of success under section 1021.5. The catalyst theory exists precisely to award fees to a plaintiff when the plaintiff functionally succeeds and the opposing party provides the requested relief under the threat of judicial compulsion but without any actual judicial compulsion. (Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 560, 566-568.) Even if Jackson's victory in LegalMatch.com had the effect of requiring LegalMatch to register or cease operations, the fact remains that Jackson did not obtain the declaratory judgment or injunction itself. Besides, LegalMatch's registration did not provide Jackson the same relief as the injunction he sought. Jackson sought an injunction requiring LegalMatch to cease operations until it registered. In actuality, LegalMatch was able to continue to operate as usual while the State Bar considered its registration application. An injunction therefore would have given Jackson leverage that he did not in fact obtain from LegalMatch.com. This has significant implications for Jackson's claim under the catalyst theory, as we discuss post, but for the traditional theory it simply underscores the point that Jackson did not achieve the judicial resolution he sought.
Jackson points out that "an attorney fee award may be justified even where a plaintiff's legal action does not lead to a favorable final judgment" (Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, 352 (Westside)) and parties"' "may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" '" (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292 (Maria P.)). He also cites the remark in Maria P. that "a section 1021.5 award is not necessarily barred merely because the plaintiff won the case on a preliminary issue." (Id. at p. 1291.) Jackson asserts that the issue of whether Business and Professions Code section 6155 applies to LegalMatch's service was the only significant issue in the case, as demonstrated by the parties' stipulation to a bench trial to resolve it at the outset, and argues he prevailed on it in LegalMatch.com.
Westside and Maria P. are catalyst theory cases, not cases applying the traditional theory. (Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 566 [Westside "endorsed" the catalyst theory]; Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1290-1292 [discussing catalyst theory and citing Westside].) Leaving that aside, the applicability of Business and Professions Code section 6155 was a significant threshold issue, but Jackson's victory on that point in LegalMatch.com did not make him a successful party. This is not a situation where Jackson "won the case" at a preliminary stage based on our LegalMatch.com opinion. (Maria P., at p. 1291.) Nor did LegalMatch.com make Jackson successful on a"' "significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit" '" he sought in his answer or cross-complaint. (Maria P., at p. 1292, italics added.) LegalMatch.com certainly moved Jackson down the path towards obtaining a judicial resolution of the allegations in his answer or cross-complaint. But Jackson never followed that path to its conclusion, so he was not successful under the traditional theory.
II. Catalyst theory
We turn now to Jackson's attack on the trial court's denial of fees under the catalyst theory. The trial court ruled that Jackson failed to establish that his claims were a catalyst motivating LegalMatch to provide the primary relief he sought, which is the first element of the catalyst theory. (TiptonWhittingham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 608.) To determine Jackson's legal objectives, the court looked to the prayer in the cross-complaint, which sought (1) class certification; (2) restitution of money LegalMatch obtained from the class; (3) a declaration that LegalMatch's service was unlawful; (4) preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing LegalMatch from operating its service until it registered with the State Bar; (5) imposition of a constructive trust on the money LegalMatch acquired from the class; (6) general, special, and punitive damages; and (7) attorney's fees.
The trial court concluded Jackson accomplished, at most, only the declaratory relief objective when our LegalMatch.com opinion effectively declared that LegalMatch's service was unlawful. The trial court found this success was relatively insignificant because Jackson's principal objectives included monetary and class-wide relief, which he did not achieve. The trial court found it "strain[ed] credulity" to say that Jackson's putative class action achieved its primary purpose when it did not yield any direct benefit to Jackson or the putative class members. The trial court also found that while LegalMatch registered with the State Bar, which was one of Jackson's goals, it did not do so "in the manner sought by" Jackson's suit. (See Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 560 ["when litigation does not result in a judicial resolution," section 1021.5 authorizes award of attorney's fees "if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation"].) The court noted that Jackson wanted LegalMatch to cease operations until it registered, but LegalMatch engaged in business as usual until the State Bar granted its registration application.
Jackson faults the trial court for looking only at the prayer for relief in his cross-complaint, rather than assessing his litigation objectives from the pleadings more generally. He argues the trial court should have found he wanted to defeat LegalMatch's complaint and that he succeeded in this when LegalMatch dismissed its complaint. He also argues the trial court should have grouped together similar requests for relief in the prayer and disregarded his request for the procedural device of class certification, which would mean he had only three objectives: (1) monetary relief for himself and the class, (2) a declaration that LegalMatch's service was unlawful, and (3) preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing LegalMatch from operating its service until it registered with the State Bar. He contends he achieved two of these objectives, since the LegalMatch.com opinion functions as a judicial declaration of unlawfulness and LegalMatch registered with the State Bar, as an injunction would have required.
Even if we accepted Jackson's reformulation of his objectives, the analysis would not meaningfully change. As Jackson admits, status as a successful party does not turn on achieving a certain percentage of litigation objectives. Instead, it depends on a determination of whether Jackson achieved his primary litigation objective. (Tipton-Whittingham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 608; Department of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.) We agree with the trial court's findings that Jackson was primarily interested in individual and class-wide monetary restitution and did not achieve it.
Jackson points out that he sought only $12,000 in damages, which he says refutes the trial court's finding that he sought substantial monetary relief. But Jackson sought to defeat LegalMatch's complaint for $3,000 and then in his crosscomplaint requested an additional $12,000 for himself and classwide restitution, which, assuming an equal recovery for class members, would have amounted to about $14 million. Had Jackson primarily sought $12,000 in damages for himself, it seems likely the litigation would have resolved quickly after we decided LegalMatch.com and especially after LegalMatch registered with the State Bar in 2020. But the case dragged on for three more years while Jackson amended his complaint and unsuccessfully moved for class certification.
Jackson did functionally prevail on LegalMatch's complaint (in that LegalMatch never obtained the $3,000 it sought), and LegalMatch.com was instrumental in LegalMatch finally registering with the State Bar, as discussed ante. But these modest successes do not change the overall picture of Jackson's goals and success and the primary relief he sought. Jackson's defeat of LegalMatch's $3,000 claim pales in comparison to his loss on the $14 million in class relief that he sought. Even if LegalMatch.com was functionally equivalent to a judicial declaration that LegalMatch's service was unlawful (although not actually such a declaration, as discussed ante) and an injunction that it had to register with the State Bar, Jackson gained little benefit. The trial court discounted the significance of LegalMatch's registration because LegalMatch was able to continue operating while it applied for that registration, whereas an injunction would have required LegalMatch to cease operating until it registered. We infer from this that the trial court viewed Jackson's cross-complaint as seeking an injunction merely as leverage towards achieving the more significant objective of classwide monetary relief. As noted ante, we agree with this interpretation of Jackson's complaint, and it supports the trial court's conclusion that LegalMatch's voluntary registration did not achieve Jackson's primary litigation objectives.
Jackson emphasizes that a declaration that Business and Professions Code section 6155 applies to LegalMatch was the crucial question in the case and that once he prevailed on that issue, he was certain to prevail against LegalMatch's complaint and would have eventually obtained an injunction. He also asserts that without such a declaration he could not have obtained restitution. Whether LegalMatch's service fell within Business and Professions Code section 6155 was a threshold issue, but succeeding on a threshold issue is not the same as achieving primary litigation objectives. As discussed ante, the questions of Jackson's unclean hands and whether the illegality of LegalMatch's service under Business and Professions Code section 6155 made its subscription agreements unenforceable turn on intensely factual considerations that remain unresolved. We also do not share Jackson's faith that he would have eventually obtained an injunction purely because of our LegalMatch.com decision. As the trial court noted, it denied the State Bar's request for an injunction based on LegalMatch.com because of lack of evidence of irreparable harm. Jackson offers no reason to think he would have been more successful.
Jackson finally asserts that a monetary recovery would not have supported a request for fees anyway because it would not have benefited the public, which is another requirement for an award of fees under section 1021.5. The monetary recovery on its own might not have supported the public benefit element of a fees request under that statute, but it would have supported a finding that Jackson was a successful party, which is the element under consideration here.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, J., DOUGLAS, J.[*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.