When such evidence is rejected by a trial judge, he is deemed to have the training, experience, and discipline of faculties so as to avoid being influenced by any prejudicial effects therefrom. . . . To reverse this trial on the basis that the trial judge, in his capacity as trier of fact, was so prejudicially influenced by his encounter with the incriminating portions of the [codefendants'] confession[s] . . ., would be to cast aspersions on the entire foundation of the judge's role in any court proceeding. Brown, 223 So.2d at 339 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted); see also Leeb v. Read 190 So.2d 830, 832-33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (applying the Prince principle to hold that evidentiary errors made during a bench trial did not affect the substantial rights of the complaining party). Brown stands in opposition to the position of Petion that a uniform standard of review should be applied to preserved errors.

This standard was first articulated in Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189, 192 (Alaska 1965). It has since been followed in Maddocks v. Bennett, 456 P.2d 453, 454 (Alaska 1969), and West v. Administratix of Estate of Nershak, 440 P.2d 119, 121 (Alaska 1968). In re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442 (1965); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla.App. 1960). In regard to this witness' opinion testimony, the trial court indicated that he had

The trial court's findings in this non-jury trial are given the weight of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support them. See Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). We find that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the letters from evidence.

It is well settled that an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact where there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. See Markham v. Fogg, 458 So.2d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 1984); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) ("It is established in Florida that an appellate court is not warranted in disturbing the trial judge's findings in a non-jury law case unless they are clearly erroneous."). Here, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that this club is not really private.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Knabb v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 144 Fla. 110, 197 So. 707 (1940); Burnett v. Brito, 478 So.2d 845, 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Britt, 393 So.2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mogul v. McClaskey Realty, Inc., 309 So.2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 324 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1975); Kitsos v. Stanford, 291 So.2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 307 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1974); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Restatementof Contracts § 61; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242 comment (d).

Affirmed. See Prince v. Aucilla River Naval Stores Co., 103 Fla. 605, 137 So. 886 (1931); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).

Although the trial court improperly let the troopers testify as to their opinions as to the appellant's intent, see Thomas v. State, 317 So.2d 450, 451-52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1976); Farley v. State, 324 So.2d 662, 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1976), this error was harmless in light of the other substantial evidence in the case and the fact that this was a nonjury trial. See Adan v. State, 453 So.2d 1195, 1197 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Capitoli v. State, 175 So.2d 210, 213 n. 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Finally, Williamson challenges his sentence as a habitual offender, which is a departure from the guidelines sentence Williamson would otherwise receive.

Rejecting each of the defendant's contentions on this appeal from an adverse judgment entered after a non-jury trial in a personal injury action, we hold that (a) the determination of liability is supported by the evidence, Majeske v. Palm Beach KennelClub, 117 So.2d 531 (Fla.2d DCA 1959), cert. denied, 122 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1960); Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); 9 Fla.Jur.2d Carriers §§ 111, 126 (1979); (b) the damage award is not beyond the province of the trier of fact, Bould v. Touchette, 349 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1977); and (c) no harmful error has been demonstrated in the admission or striking of various items of evidence. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1981); Prince v. Aucilla Naval Stores Co., 103 Fla. 605, 137 So. 886 (1931); Landin v. Oerting, 61 Fla. 652, 55 So. 843 (1911); Leeb v. Read, 190 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Sec. 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1981). Affirmed.

A more informal trial is permissible before a court than before a jury. See Leeb v. Read, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d 830, and authorities cited therein. The admission of the opinion which the court expressly ruled had no effect as res judicata or estoppel by judgment was not prejudicial error.

All of the questions raised on appeal turn on factual issues and from a review of the record we find contained therein competent, substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court who tried the case without a jury. Under such circumstances we are not entitled to substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. First Atlantic National Bank of Daytona Beach v. Cobbett, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 870; Tucker v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., Fla.App. 1967, 199 So.2d 522; Leeb v. Read, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d 830. WALDEN, C.J., OWEN, J., and GOODING, MARION W., Associate Judge, concur.