Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2174, SECTION "N"
February 26, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order (Rec. Doc. No. 9); (2) the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 270 (the "Union") (Rec. Doc. No. 4); and (3) United Parcel Service, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 5). Although the Court has reconsidered its November 20, 2003 Order (Rec. Doc. No. 8), as requested by Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, it nonetheless finds that Defendants' motions should be GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff, Anthony Lee, was fired from his position as a sorter for defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) on April 22, 2002. Plaintiff, a member of the Union, contested his termination under Articles 7 and 52 of the Union's collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with UPS in accordance with the grievance procedure established by that agreement. Plaintiff contended that UPS, in terminating him, had failed to abide by Article 44 of the CBA, which addresses handling of packages weighing more than seventy pounds.Plaintiff's grievance was submitted to the Southern Region Area Parcel Grievance Committee (SRAPGC) on June 20, 2002. After the SRAPGC panel deadlocked, the grievance was submitted to the SRAPGC Deadlock Committee on August 22, 2002. The Deadlock Committee granted Plaintiff's grievance under Article 7, but denied it under Article 52. Thus, the Deadlock Committee upheld Lee's termination, but awarded him back pay from the time of his discharge until the time his termination was upheld.
On April 21, 2003, Lee filed the present suit against UPS and the Union, alleging their negligence in connection with his termination. According to Lee, the alleged negligence included, but was not necessarily limited to "failure to state a reason for [his] termination," and "any and all negligent and/or intentional acts" of UPS and the Union "which may be obtained by discovery or which may be revealed at trial of the case." In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff further complains that his "termination was upheld by the SRAPGC Deadlock Panel without giving reasons and without explanation of why UPS did not follow the mandates of Article 44 sections 1-4 as it had previously agreed."
See Petition at ¶ 6.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ I.
Defendants filed the motions at issue on September 23, 2003. At Plaintiff's request, the Court, on October 16, 2003, continued the hearing on Defendants' motions until November 26, 2003. Thereafter, because Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants' motions on or before November 18, 2003, as required by Local Rule 7.5E, the Court granted Defendants' motions as unopposed on November 20, 2003. On December 5, 2003, Plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration and two oppositions to the Defendants' motions.
See Uniform Local Rules for the United States District Courts for the Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana.
In support of their motions for summary judgment, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs' claims can only be asserted in a "hybrid § 301/fair representation action," and are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not file suit within six months of the date on which notice of the SRAPGC Deadlock Committee's decision was mailed to him, and because Plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation.
In opposing Defendants' motion, and in requesting reconsideration of the Court's November 20, 2003 Order, Plaintiff does not specifically contend that (1) his suit is timely under the six-month statute of limitations on which Defendants rely; (2) his claims are not in the nature of a "hybrid action," or (3) that he can establish a fair representation claim against the Union. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that a different statute of limitations would apply if he were to pursue relief against only UPS, and that further discovery is necessary to determine whether he should pursue his action against UPS and the Union, or whether he should seek relief from UPS alone. He additionally argues generally that dismissal of his action is inappropriate because he requires discovery in order to address Defendants' motion properly, and because Defendants have not explained "how they can act in direct contradiction of a binding agreement," i.e., Article 44, sections 1-4, of the CBA.
See Memorandum in Support of Anthony Lee's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order at unnumbered page 2.
Id.; see also Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at 1-2; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at unnumbered pages 3-4. On October 16, 2003, the Court granted a continuance of the original October 15, 2003 hearing date so that Plaintiff could conduct discovery (Rec. Doc. No. 7). According to Plaintiff, he then propounded discovery requests on November 9, 2003. On November 17, 2003, UPS told Plaintiff they it would respond on December 15, 2003. UPS transmitted a general denial of Plaintiffs discovery request on November 18, 2003. After the undersigned granted Defendants' motions as unopposed on November 20, 2003, Plaintiff apparently tendered a "Motion to Compel Discovery and for Continuance" for filing on November 25, 2003. See Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order, Exhibit 4.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at unnumbered pages 3-4.
Law and Analysis
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is properly granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Roberts v. Cardinal Services, Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5Th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1357 (2002). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).The Fifth Circuit's decision in Daigle v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 794 F.2d 974, 977-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 648 (1986), explained "hybrid § 301/fair representation actions" in the following manner:
A § 301 breach of contract and fair representation suit comprises two distinct causes of action, one against the employer, and the other against the union. Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides an employee with a federal cause of action against his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. The two causes of action are "inextricably interdependent", and have come to be known as a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation suit. United Parcel Service. Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981). The interdependency arises from the nature of the collective bargaining agreement. If the arbitration and grievance procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the employee may not sue his employer under § 301 until he has exhausted the procedure, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Further, he is bound by the procedure's result unless he proves the union breached its duty of fair representation. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Thus, the "indispensable predicate" for a § 301 action in this situation is a fair representation claim against the union. Mitchell. 451 U.S. at 62, 101 S.Ct. at 1564. As the Supreme Court stated in DelCostello:
To prevail against either the company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. The employee may, if he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one, the other, or both.
462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291 (citations omitted). In essence the hybrid § 301/fair representation suit is brought "in order to set aside a final and binding determination of a grievance, arrived at through the collectively bargained method of resolving the grievance. It is, therefore, a direct challenge to the private settlement of disputes under the collective bargaining agreement." Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 67, 101 S.Ct. at 1566 (Stewart J., concurring); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291.
On the other hand, if the collective bargaining agreement does not provide that the grievance and arbitration procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of contract claims, the employee may sue his employer in federal court under § 301, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183, 87 S.Ct. 903, 913, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), and the state statute of limitations applicable to contract breaches applies. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 704, 86 S.Ct. at 1113; Smith v. Kerrville Bus. Co., 748 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1984). In such an instance, a fair representation suit against the union would still be governed by the DelCostello six-month statute of limitations.
In DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2285 (1983), the Supreme Court determined that the six-month statute of limitations found in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), applies to hybrid actions. See also Smith v. Int'l Org. of Masters. Mates, and Pilots, 296 F.3d 380, 382-83 (5th Cir.) (summary calendar) (deciding that the six-month limitations period also applies to a fair representation claim against a union that is not joined to a § 301 claim against the employer), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1088, 123 S.Ct. 691 (2002); Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 622-23 (5th Cir. 1994); Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977-78.
Here, Plaintiff purports to assert state law negligence claims against UPS. Such claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) if application of state law requires the interpretation, i.e., depends upon the meaning, of a collective bargaining agreement. See Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs claims are premised upon the propriety of his discharge under the terms of the CBA between UPS and the Union, and actions taken by UPS and/or the Union as part of the grievance process established by the CBA. As such, the claims asserted against UPS require interpretation of the CBA and, thus, are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
Article 51 of the CBA establishes a procedure for settling employee grievances, which may or may not involve arbitration. Decisions reached at each level of that grievance procedure are final and binding. Accordingly, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff's suit is a hybrid § 301/fair representation action, and is subject to a six-month limitations period.
See Article 51 of the Teamsters Southern Regional and United Parcel Service Supplemental Agreement to the National Master United Parcel Service Agreement, Exhibit B to the Union's motion.
Id. Plaintiff has not objected to Defendants' assertion that the grievance/arbitration procedures established by the CBA are mandatory, final, and binding.
As Defendants contend, Plaintiff's suit was not filed until more than seven months after the SRAPGC Panel's decision was first mailed on August 26, 2002. In addition to the August 26, 2002 letter, a second letter, including a copy of the SRAPGC Panel's decision and notice that Plaintiffs case had been closed, was mailed on October 1, 2002. Even using the later date, Plaintiff's suit was filed a few weeks past the six-month limitations period. Thus, because Plaintiff's suit was filed more than six months after notice of the SRAPGC Deadlock Committee's decision was mailed to him, his action is untimely under the six-month statute of limitations recognized in DelCostello.
See Union's motion, Exhibits 2 and 3.
The six-month limitation period begins to run when the employee knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the basis of his claim. See Landry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n lnt'l Union, AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244 (1990); Tyler v. Int'l Ed. of Electrical Workers, 2000 WL 17839, *3-4 (E.D. La.1/11/00).
Furthermore, even if timely, Plaintiff's claim against UPS will not survive if he cannot establish a fair representation claim against the Union. A union's implied duty of fair representation in handling or refusing to handle a union employee's grievance is breached when the union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 1911 (1990). Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient to state a claim for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Id. As presently stated, Plaintiff's submissions do not adequately demonstrate how a reasonable trier of fact could find that the Union's duty of fair representation has been breached.
Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants have not explained how they can act in direct contradiction of Article 44 offers little more than additional explanation of the substance of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants as plead in the petition. In any event, to the extent that this assertion otherwise presents a genuine issue of material fact, and would preclude summary judgment on a breach of fair representation claim, the Court finds Plaintiff's action to be untimely.
Under certain circumstances, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will allow a party to avoid summary judgment, at least temporarily, because of a need for discovery. Specifically, Rule 56(f) allows courts to refuse an application for summary judgment, or order a continuance to allow for discovery, when the party against whom a motion for summary judgment has been filed properly demonstrates that he requires discovery in order to present facts essential to his opposition. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). To secure such relief, however, that party must indicate why discovery is necessary and how that discovery will create a genuine issue of fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656-58 (5th Cir. 1996); Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993). Vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed but unspecified facts, however, are not sufficient. Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442. Further, if it appears that the discovery in question will not produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, the court can grant summary judgment. Id.
In this instance, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden under Rule 56(f). Although he represents that he has propounded discovery requests to Defendants, and that those requests have not been answered, Plaintiff has offered no indication of what information or documents that he seeks to discover, much less adequately explained how that discovery is essential to successful opposition of Defendants' motions. This is true with regard to the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims and any breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union.
The case of Carpenters Local Union No. I846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. La. 1984), on which Plaintiff relies in arguing that a different statute of limitations will apply if he proceeds against only UPS, likewise offers him no assistance. Although the court there applied a state law limitations period to breach of contract claims asserted against an employer, that case is distinguishable from the present one in that it involved a suit by the union, not an employee. 609 F. Supp. at 1303. Furthermore, the court there determined that the grievance and arbitration procedure included in the CBA did not apply to the dispute at issue. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (E.D. La. 1984) (related case explaining application of state limitation period rather than federal six-month statute). Hence, the case was analogous to one where the CBA does not contain a final and binding grievance and arbitration procedure. Under those circumstances, application of a state law limitations period may be appropriate in a suit against an employer. See Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977-78; Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary calendar). Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that his dispute with his employer regarding his termination was covered by the grievance procedure found in Article 51 of the CBA, or that the grievance procedure is mandatory, final, and binding.
The opinion cited by Plaintiff explains that a discussion of when the federal six-month statute of limitations is applicable is found in the companion memorandum opinion published at 609 F. Supp. 1299 (D.C. La. 1984). See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846, 609 F. Supp. at 1304 n. 1.
In sum, neither the allegations of Plaintiff's petition nor his summary judgment materials are sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the timeliness of Plaintiff's action or a breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union. In addition, Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that discovery would allow him to make either showing.
Conclusion
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order (Rec. Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED. Notwithstanding the Court's reconsideration, however, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment filed by the Union (Rec. Doc. No. 4) and United Parcel Service, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 5) are GRANTED.