Opinion
No. 2022-05341 Index No. 516805/20
12-20-2023
Wingate, Russotti, Shapiro, Moses & Halperin, LLP, New York, NY (David M. Schwarz of counsel), for appellant. Lydecker, Melville, NY (Michael R. Rawlinson and Ling Ding of counsel), for respondent Kellian Quallo. James G. Bilello, Hicksville, NY (Alina Vengerov of counsel), for respondent Ebony McCain.
Wingate, Russotti, Shapiro, Moses & Halperin, LLP, New York, NY (David M. Schwarz of counsel), for appellant.
Lydecker, Melville, NY (Michael R. Rawlinson and Ling Ding of counsel), for respondent Kellian Quallo.
James G. Bilello, Hicksville, NY (Alina Vengerov of counsel), for respondent Ebony McCain.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., ANGELA G. IANNACCI, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Debra Silber, J.), dated June 29, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Kellian Quallo and Ebony McCain.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
In December 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, Ebony McCain and Kellian Quallo (hereinafter together the defendants) to recover damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained in September 2017 when a vehicle in which she was a passenger, which was owned and operated by McCain, and a vehicle operated by Quallo collided at an intersection in Brooklyn controlled by stop signs in each driver's direction. The plaintiff moved, among other things, for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants. In an order dated June 29, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.
Although the right of a plaintiff to summary judgment on the issue of liability in a negligence action is not restricted by potential issues of comparative negligence which may exist as between the defendant drivers (see Anzel v Pistorino, 105 A.D.3d 784, 786; Medina v Rodriguez, 92 A.D.3d 850, 851), a plaintiff still "must establish, prima facie, that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries" (Detoma v Dobson, 214 A.D.3d 948, 949). Moreover, although the parties do not dispute that the plaintiff here has no comparative fault, the plaintiff's lack of comparative fault is not a consideration in determining whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing on the issue of the defendants' liability (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312; Detoma v Dobson, 214 A.D.3d at 949).
Here, the plaintiff's submissions failed to establish negligence as a matter of law by either of the defendants. In support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted the transcripts of the deposition testimony of the defendants, which contained conflicting testimony as to whether McCain or Quallo had the right-of-way to proceed through the intersection (see Detoma v Dobson, 214 A.D.3d at 949). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the issue is more than the apportionment of fault between the defendants, since the trier of fact could find that one of them was not negligent in the happening of the accident (see id.; Phillip v D & D Carting Co., Inc., 136 A.D.3d 18, 25).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants.
DUFFY, J.P., IANNACCI, CHRISTOPHER and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.