Opinion
Civil Action 1:13-CV-02353
11-08-2021
TAJI JEMAL LEE, Petitioner, v. JOHN KERESTES, et al., Respondents.
KANE, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
Presently before the Court is a motion to reopen and vacate filed by Petitioner Taji Jemal Lee (“Lee”), requesting that the Court reopen and vacate the Court's prior denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 123, at 1, 5). On September 11, 2013, Lee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). At all times relevant to this action, Lee has been incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution, Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy”), located in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 1). In his petition, Lee challenges his July 18, 2006, judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, sentencing him to a total of 30-60 years in prison. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 88, at 31-45). On February 24, 2020, the District Court adopted the undersigned's recommendation to deny Lee's petition, concluding that all eighteen of the potential grounds for relief presented by the petition were either procedurally defaulted, non-cognizable on federal habeas review, plainly meritless, or failed to provide a basis for relief on the merits. (Doc. 113, 61; Doc. 119, at 1). Additionally, the District Court overruled Lee's objections to the recommendations, denied the Petition, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. (Doc. 119, at 6). In the instant motion, Lee requests that the Court reopen the case and vacate the Court's prior denial of his petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and the Hazel-Atlas doctrine. (Doc. 123, at 1, 5); seeHazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1994).
In addition to the petition, a federal habeas court may take judicial notice of state court records. Minney v. Winstead, No. 2:12-CV-1732, 2013 WL 3279793, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2013); see also Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 714 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the publicly available dockets of Lee's criminal and collateral post-conviction proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-333-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-334-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-335-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-336-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-793-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 2119 MDA 2006 (Pa. Super. Ct.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No.1472 MDA 2012 (Pa. Super. Ct.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 2005 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Ct.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 512 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 224 MAL 2008 (Pa.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 866 MAL 2012 (Pa.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 123 MAL 2015 (Pa.); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 254 MAL 2017 (Pa.).
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Lee's motion to reopen and vacate be DENIED. (Doc. 123).
I. Background and Procedural History
On May 25, 2006, after a four-day trial, a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County found Lee guilty of 26 drug-related offenses, including possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, delivery of a controlled substance, criminal conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and criminal use of a communications facility. (Doc. 88, at 25-26). During trial and appellate proceedings, Attorney Ronald McGlaughlin (“Attorney McGlaughlin”) represented Lee. Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-333-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.) (“Lee 1”); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-334-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.) (“Lee 2”); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP- 14-CR-335-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.) (“Lee 3”); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-336-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.) (“Lee 4”); Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-14-CR-793-2005 (Centre Cty. C.C.P.) (“Lee 5”). After filing post-sentence motions, which were denied by the trial court on November 22, 2006, Lee appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on December 7, 2006. (Doc. 88, at 46-61; Doc. 88, at 71-75); Lee 1; Lee 2; Lee 3; Lee 4; Lee 5. The Superior Court affirmed Lee's judgment of sentence on January 16, 2009, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Lee's petition for allowance of allocator on January 15, 2009. (Doc. 91, at 1-21; Doc. 93, at 1).
Lee filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 11, 2013, and filed a “supplemental amendment” on January 18, 2018, challenging his July 18, 2006, conviction and sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 88, at 31-45). On September 20, 2013, Lee filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court denied, finding that, based on the certified inmate account statement, Lee had access to sufficient assets to pay the required $5 filing fee. (Doc. 5; Doc. 8, at 2). On July 10, 2018, the Commonwealth filed an answer to Lee's petition, asserting that all of Lee's claims are either procedurally barred, non-cognizable, or without merit. (Doc. 74).
In total, Lee presented eighteen grounds for relief in his petition. (Doc. 113, at 9-11). On April 8, 2019, the undersigned recommended that the Court dismiss all eighteen potential grounds for relief for being either procedurally defaulted (grounds one, three, five, eleven, sixteen, and seventeen), non-cognizable on federal habeas review (grounds two and eight), plainly meaningless (grounds nine and fifteen), or failing to provide a basis for relief (grounds four, six, seven, ten, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, eighteen). (Doc. 113, at 61). On February 24, 2020, the Court adopted the undersigned's recommendations and dismissed Lee's petition with prejudice. (Doc. 119, at 1). The Court did not issue a certificate of appealability and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. (Doc. 119, at 6). On March 9, 2020, Lee filed a notice of appeal, which the District Court denied because “[j]urists of reason would agree, without debate, that all of [Lee's] claims are meritless, inexcusably procedurally defaulted, or noncognizable on habeas review, for the same reasons provided by the District Court in adopting the magistrate judge's report.” (Doc. 120, at 1; Doc. 122, at 1).
On April 26, 2021, Lee filed the instant motion, requesting that the Court reopen and vacate the Court's prior denial of his petition pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and the Hazel-Atlas doctrine. (Doc. 123, at 1, 5); Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3).
II. Discussion
A. Rule 60(b)(3) Motion
Rule 60(b) “permits a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) motions provide “extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary justifying circumstances are present.” Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). Specifically, Rule 60(b)(3) provides:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, order, or Proceeding. on motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(3) fraud (whether previously intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time - and for reasons [of fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, ] no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3).
Lee's motion is untimely. (Doc. 123, at 1-2). The Order denying Lee's petition was entered on February 24, 2020. (Doc. 119). Lee filed the instant motion to reopen on April 26, 2021, which is more than a year after the Order denying his petition was entered. (Doc. 123). Because “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made . . . no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order, ” it shall be recommended that Lee's motion to reopen be denied as untimely. (Doc. 123); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1); Richards v. Centre Cty. Transp. Auth., 540 Fed.Appx. 83, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of motion brought under Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) on the basis that it was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1) because the motion was filed three years after judgment was entered).
Lee argues that his motion is timely due to “extraordinary circumstances” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), of “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” (Doc. 123, at 3). The Third Circuit has held equitable tolling may be established if “(1) the [respondent] has actively misled the [petitioner], (2) if the [petitioner]has ‘in some extraordinary way' been prevented from asserting his rights, [] (3) if the [petitioner]has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum[, ]” or (4) if the petitioner “received inadequate notice of [his] right to file suit, where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending, or where the court has misled the [petitioner] into believing that [he] has done everything required of [him].” Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). In any of these circumstances, the petitioner must also establish that he “exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.” Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d. Cir. 1998) (citing New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, equitable tolling does not apply to the time period within which an appeal must be filed. SeeMoolenaar v. Gov't of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 n. 5 (3d Cir.1987).
Here, Lee argues that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing. (Doc. 123, at 4). Although Lee diligently pursued his claims with consistent timely filing since commencing this case, Lee seeks to reopen the case fourteen months after the Court filed the Order dismissing and closing the case. (Doc. 119; Doc. 123). Lee claims that due to the lockdown put in place as a protective measure during the COVID-19 pandemic, he could not access the prison law library until November, 2020. (Doc. 123, at 5). Additionally, Lee alleges that his original motion to reopen and vacate was “misplaced” by SCI-Mahanoy correctional officers on February 18, 2021, after officers conducted an investigatory search of Lee's possessions. (Doc. 123, at 5). However, relief under Rules 60(b)(1)-(3) is time barred. “Motions under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be brought within one year of the entry of a final judgment. An appeal does not toll this time period.” Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1346 n. 5 (emphasis added); Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). As such, Lee has failed to allege an exception to the timing requirement for relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
Even if Lee were to properly allege some exception to the Rule 60(b)(3) time limitation due to prison delay, Lee still had a full year to timely file the instant motion. In fact, Lee was able to file a notice of appeal fourteen days after the Order was filed. (Doc. 120). Had Lee moved to reopen his case in or about May of 2021, the time period for filing a motion under Rule 60(b)(3) would not have expired. The Court did not mislead Lee, Lee has not been prevented from asserting his rights “in some extraordinary way, ” he has not timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum, nor has he received inadequate notice of his right to file suit. See Brewington v. Klopotoski, et al., No. 09-CV-3133, 2012 WL 1071145, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012) (denying petitioner's request for equitable tolling of his Rule 60(b)(3) motion because “[d]ismissal of the first habeas petition did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”); cf.Urcinoli v. Cathel, 546 F.3d 269, 273-77 (3d Cir. 2008) (equitable tolling appropriate when district court dismissed exhausted claims in a mixed habeas petition that were already beyond the statute of limitations); see alsoJones, 195 F.3d at 159.
Accordingly, Lee has filed his motion to reopen and vacate the Court's prior decision beyond the one-year limitations period. (Doc. 123); Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). Thus, it is recommended that Lee's motion be denied as untimely. (Doc. 123).
B. Hazel-A tlas Doctrine
Under the Hazel-Atlas doctrine, Lee asks the Court to exercise its authority independent of Rule 60(b)(3) to reopen the case and vacate the decision to deny his petition. (Doc. 123, at 5); see 322 U.S. 238. In Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general rule “that judgments should not be disturbed after the term of their entry has expired.” 322 U.S. at 248. The Court held that federal courts have an inherent power to “set aside their judgments after the expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered . . . under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud.” Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 244. “In order to meet the necessarily demanding standard for proof of fraud upon the court we conclude that there must be: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.” Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005). Furthermore, “a determination of fraud on the court may be justified only by ‘the most egregious misconduct direct to the court itself,' and that it ‘must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.'” Herring, 424 F.3d at 38687 (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir. 1976)). Such “egregious misconduct” may include “bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of evidence by counsel.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 390 (citing Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d at 195).
In the motion, Lee asserts that “the legitimacy of the judgment is called into question because of the intentional wrongdoing of the prosecution.” (Doc. 123, at 6). Lee claims that he “appendixed (5) pages of transcripts” in support of his Brady claim, ” however, “[w]hen the state[']s attorney filed the Commonwealth's answer to petitioners habeas corpus petition, the Commonwealth informed the court that the appendixed and referenced transcripts were not part of the certified record, and that the alleged claim was meritless because the withheld evidence did not exist.” (Doc. 123, at 10). Lee alleges that “[i]n response the district rubber stamped the Commonwealth's misrepresentation of the facts with the support ad statutory authorization of 29 U.S.C. 32254(e)(1).” (Doc. 123, at 10). Lee claims he “sent formal request to the court administrator and judge petitioning the courts to supplement the certified record pursuant to [Rule 1926 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure], yet they still were not included. The Commonwealth's attorney knew this, and had the district court reviewed any of the record, it too would have known this.” (Doc. 123, at 11-12) (citations omitted). Lee alleges that the judgment is “inherently unreliable” because “the certification of the record focused on the Commonwealth attorney's intentionally false and willfully blind disregard for the truth [that] the evidence did not exist.” (Doc. 123, at 7). “This deceit was the defect in the federal proceeding that caused the fraud upon the court.” (Doc. 123, at 7).
The documents cited in Lee's motion and briefs do not show a fraud upon the court by anything approaching clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. SeeHerring, 424 F.3d at 386-87 . Lee claims that the prosecution deceived the Court by purposefully preventing the inclusion of the grand jury transcript to be part of the certified record. (Doc. 123, at 9). The Third Circuit recognizes that “an attorney's deliberate attempt to mislead the court may be such a fraud as will permit the reopening of a judgment.” Bandai America Inc. v. Bally MidwayMfg. Co., 775 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 1985). For example, in Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme Court confronted “a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals.” 322 U.S. at 245. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to relief because “indisputable proof” revealed that the respondent had prevailed in the underlying patent litigation in part because the respondent and its attorneys had written an article that supported its patent claims, fraudulently published it as the purported work of a disinterested expert, caused the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals to rely on the article in upholding the respondent's patent, and then undertook substantial efforts to hide the fraud from the petitioner's investigators. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 240-43, 250-51.
More recently, in Herring, the Third Circuit considered whether a fraud upon the court had been proven based on allegedly fraudulent statements regarding the government's claims of privilege in sworn affidavits submitted in the underlying tort litigation by government attorneys. 424 F.3d at 391. The Third Circuit agreed that, in the original litigation, “the Supreme Court depended upon [the attorneys'] ‘experience, expertise and truthfulness' in its decision to reverse and remand” and noted that [petitioners]' claim alleged “a particularly serious type of perjury because of the high degree of faith the court placed in the truth of [the attorneys'] representations.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 390-91. The court reiterated that “proof of perjury is not enough to establish a fraud upon the court, ” but, in Herring, it was a “necessary element” that needed to be met before considering “the additional rigors of proving fraud upon the court.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 391. Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that the Herring petitioners failed to make out a claim for perjury, which defeated their claim for fraud upon the court. Herring, 424 F.3d at 391-92.
Lee's allegations are unlike the fraud that was found in Hazel-Atlas or alleged in Herring. Lee claims that the prosecution deceived the Court by purposefully preventing the inclusion of the grand jury transcript to be part of the certified record. (Doc. 123, at 9). The alleged fraudulent conduct that Lee relies upon does not contest factual allegations in the petition or reveal a pattern of deceit. “Falsities in such statements may subject a party or its attorney to sanctions, but litigants are well-equipped to test the veracity of such statements through the adversarial process using such tools as discovery and cross-examination.” Advanced Multilevel Concepts, Inc., et al. v. Bukstel, et al., No. 11-CV-3718, 2014 WL 6907973, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014). Moreover, the fraud claims that Lee now raises are not new. (Doc. 123, at 13). Lee has previously raised claims of fraud in his motion to supplement the record. (Doc. 117, at 12). In his supplement, Lee requested that the Commonwealth be ordered to provide the Court with the transcript of his grand jury proceedings, in support of his Brady ineffective assistance claim. (Doc. 117, at 1-2; Doc. 118, at 1); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). However, the Court denied Lee's motion to supplement the record because its review of the petition is restricted to evidence “on the record that was before the state court.” (Doc. 119, at 5) (citing Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011)); see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
Although the instant motion does appear to allege a defect in the federal habeas proceedings, Lee does not explain how any such defect influenced the Court in finding that all eighteen of his petition claims were either procedurally defaulted, non-cognizable on federal habeas review, or plainly meritless. (Doc. 119, at 1); seeHerring, 424 F.3d at 386-87. There is no evidence that the Court was in fact deceived by or adversely relied on the prosecution's actions or omissions. SeeHerring, 424 F.3d at 386-87 . Additionally, the Court denied that any assertion of Lee's supplemental evidence would have changed the outcome of the case. (Doc. 118, at 1). Lee has not met the demanding burden to prove a fraud upon the court and, thus, has not demonstrated a need to reopen the proceedings under the HazelAtlas doctrine. Herring, 424 F.3d at 386-87; see 322 U.S. at 244 . Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court deny Lee's motion to reopen the case. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6); Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 244.
C. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Lee's motion to reopen and vacate be DENIED. (Doc. 123).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated November 8, 2021. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.