See Falconi-Sachs v. LPF Senate Square, LLC , 142 A.3d 550, 556 (D.C. 2016) ; see also In re APA Assessment Fee Litig. , 766 F.3d 39, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Third, "[a]lthough the phrases restitution and quantum meruit are sometimes used interchangeably in regard to the measure of recovery, since both refer to unjust enrichment, restitution is properly limited to recovery where there is an express contract." Lee v. Foote , 481 A.2d 484, 486 n.4 (D.C. 1984). "[A]n action for restitution is an alternative remedy to an action for damages when there has been a repudiation or material breach of the contract." Ingber v. Ross , 479 A.2d 1256, 1263 (D.C. 1984).

However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has recognized that, in the narrow circumstance "[w]hen an express contract has been repudiated or materially breached by the defendant, restitution for the value of the non-breaching party’s performance is available as an alternative to an action for damages on the contract." Lee v. Foote , 481 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam); accordHarrington , 983 A.2d at 346–48 ; seeShtauber v. Gerson , No. 16-961, 239 F.Supp.3d 248, 256, 2017 WL 972088, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2017). Consequently, depending on the facts, a non-breaching plaintiff who is a party to a contract may seek relief for the reasonable value of the services rendered rather than for contract damages.

Mem. Op., ECF No. 54 [hereinafter Mem. Op.], at 27-28; see also Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam); Harrington v. Trotman, 983 A.2d 342, 346-48 (D.C. 2009). Although ACC uses the term quantum meruit to seek the reasonable value of its services on its contract claim, technically speaking, that is not what it demands, at least under District of Columbia law.

"[T]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals has recognized that, in the narrow circumstance ‘[w]hen an express contract has been repudiated or materially breached by the defendant, restitution for the value of the non-breaching party's performance is available as an alternative to an action for damages on the contract.’ " Am. Civ. Constr., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (quoting Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam) ). This narrow exception is inapplicable here.

However, the D.C. Court of Appeals has "in certain instances where the parties had a contract, allowed recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment or restitution when the claimant suffered from the other party's breach of the contract." Harrington , 983 A.2d at 347–48 (emphasis in original) (citing, among others, Lee v. Foote , 481 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam) ("When an express contract has been repudiated or materially breached by the defendant, restitution for the value of the non-breaching party's performance is available as an alternative to an action for damages on the contract.")). Because Shtauber has alleged that Gerson materially breached the contract, at this stage he may seek damages for unjust enrichment as an alternative to damages on the contract.

Under District of Columbia law, restitution is available for partial performance by a plaintiff of services under an express contract which has been breached by the defendant. Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 486 (D.C. 1984); see also Harrington v. Trotman, 983 A.2d 342 (D.C. 2009). The Court will therefore calculate the amount owed to Winmar for Al Jazeera's breach of contract by determining the value of the work in place at the time of Winmar's termination.

Thus, the failure of ISI to pay the contract balance due on the Reeves project, i.e., $70,285, constitutes a breach of the contract, entitling CEI to that balance. Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 486 n. 3 (D.C. 1984). CEI is also entitled to $26,655 for the additional work performed. Id.

We are aware that we have, in certain instances where the parties had a contract, allowed recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment or restitution when the claimant suffered from the other party's breach of the contract. See Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam) ("When an express contract has been repudiated or materially breached by the defendant, restitution for the value of the non-breaching party's performance is available as an alternative to an action for damages on the contract."); Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256, 1263 (D.C. 1984) (allowing restitution when ordinary relief for breach of contract is not adequate, and remedies are not cumulative to provide double recovery); see also International Tours Travel, Inc. v. Khalil, 491 A.2d 1149, 1155 (D.C. 1985) ("The equitable doctrine of unclean hands only applies where there is misconduct by the plaintiff in the same transaction that is the subject of his claim.").

Even excluding consideration of Super. Cl. Dom. Rel. R. 54(c), paragraph 11.6 of the Agreement, which provides for "the giving of any relief," likely satisfies the requirement under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 8(a)(3) for "a demand for judgment for the relief or remedy the pleader seeks." See Lee v. Fooie, 481 A.2d 484, 487 n. 8 (D.C. 1984) ("The legal label for the relief sought is not controlling so long as the complaint complies with Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 to put defendant on notice regarding the nature of the claim.") (internal citation omitted). See generally Taylor v. District of Columbia Water Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 50 (D.C. 2008) ("This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.") (internal citation omitted).

The purpose of a pleading is to put the opposing party on notice of the nature of the pleader's claims. See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C. 1985); Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 487 n. 8 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam). Given the parties' understanding, as reflected in the Joint Pretrial Statement, that the plaintiff had alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII, the University can assert no plausible claim of surprise or prejudice if the complaint is construed as including a claim under Title VII regarding the initial reduction in 1993 of the plaintiff's salary.