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holding plaintiff's late-filed expert testimony and report "inadmissible and cannot be used to create a triable issue of fact."
Summary of this case from Strong v. FoodsOpinion
No. C 03-02542 WHA.
September 7, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FEDERAL CLAIMS AND DISMISSING REMAINING STATE-LAW CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
In this civil-rights action, plaintiff Marquita Lee contends that Officer A.J. Winter used excessive force and arrested her without probable cause. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims, which also seek to impose municipal liability and recover for various violations of state law. Finding no triable issue of fact, this order GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims and dismisses plaintiff's state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are not in dispute. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 23, 2002, officers of the Novato Police Department responded to multiple 911 calls regarding a gang fight at an apartment complex on 1558 Center Place Road in Novato, California (Winter Dep. 53-54; Inferrera Dep. 20; Jeffries Dep. 15; Snyder Dep. 22). The apartment complex was located in a high crime area (Winter Dep. 62-63). The officers had been dispatched to the complex on a number of prior occasions for weapon and drug offenses, burglaries in progress and domestic violence (Winter Dep. 62-63; Snyder Dep. 21; Jeffries Dep. 28-29).
At approximately the same time, Keerena Ward and plaintiff Marquita Lee were traveling in a vehicle driven by Jacqueline Santiago (Lee Dep. 92-93). Ms. Santiago then drove to the apartment complex so that Ms. Ward could meet her boyfriend ( id. at 93). Ms. Ward's boyfriend was staying at the complex with a friend ( id. at 93-94). Ms. Santiago pulled into a parking lot located at 1556 Center Road (Santiago Dep. 34). She did not park in a parking place; instead, she stopped in the middle of the lot ( id. at 47). According to plaintiff, Ms. Santiago and plaintiff remained in the vehicle sitting in the two front seats while Ms. Ward went to see her boyfriend ( id. at 37). In contrast, Officer Sophia Inferrera testified that upon arriving on the scene she observed three persons rapidly descend a staircase from the apartment complex and then jump into Ms. Santiago's sport-utility vehicle (Inferrera Dep. 32, 34-35).
It is undisputed, however, that all three women were in the vehicle when Ms. Santiago attempted to reverse out of the parking lot (Lee Dep. 98-99). Officer Inferrera pulled her vehicle beside Ms. Santiago's vehicle (Inferrera Dep. 32). Officer Inferrera testified that, as she was exiting her vehicle, she "thought they were going to hit me because they were backing up so quickly" ( ibid.). Along with Officer Inferrera, Officers A.J. Winter, David Jeffries, and Sasha Snyder reported to the scene (Winter Dep. 54; Jeffries Dep. 24; Snyder Dep. 22). The officers flashed their lights and turned on their sirens (Santiago Dep. 64). The officers ordered the driver to turn off the vehicle's engine (Lee Dep. 105). This order was repeated several times ( ibid.). Ms. Santiago turned off the engine ( id. at 106). The officers then ordered the occupants to exit the car, and Ms. Ward and Ms. Santiago exited the vehicle (Santiago Dep. 71). Ms. Santiago testified that it took plaintiff "longer" to exit the vehicle than her two friends ( ibid.). Officer Inferrera testified that plaintiff did not exit the vehicle until "a minute or two" after Ms. Santiago or Ms. Ward had done so (Inferrera Dep. 48).
The officers then ordered the women to the ground (Santiago Dep. at 74). Ms. Ward and Ms. Santiago complied ( id. at 75). Plaintiff did not comply (Jeffries Dep. 34). Officer Winter, in uniform, walked toward plaintiff with his gun drawn (Winter Dep. 90-91; Lee Dep. 117, 122). Officer Winter could not see plaintiff's hands and could not determine whether she was carrying a weapon (Winter Dep. 90). Based on his training and personal experience, Officer Winter knew that gang members usually carried weapons ( id. at 63). Officer Winter repeatedly instructed plaintiff to get on the ground (Lee Dep. 120). In her opposition, plaintiff concedes that she eventually started to kneel down but, upon seeing Officer Winter coming towards her, she "sprung" back to her feet (Opp. 7). Officer Winter then repeated his instruction to get on the ground (Lee Dep. 122). Plaintiff still did not comply ( ibid).
Officer Winter saw plaintiff's hands and determined that she was not armed (Winter Dep. 91). Accordingly, he re-holstered his weapon ( ibid.). Officer Winter then approached plaintiff intending to force her to the ground ( ibid.). Officer Winter testified that plaintiff then "pulled her hand away" and started to move away from Officer Winter and towards the other officers ( id. at 91-92). Officer Winter utilized an "arm-bar" procedure to take plaintiff to the ground ( id. at 109). Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to California Penal Code Section 148, which prohibits resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in discharge of his duties ( id. at 184-85.). Plaintiff was transported to the Marin County Jail and released at 7:00 p.m. that same day (Lee Dep. 152). The injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff in connection with the incident are discussed below.
Plaintiff was on probation at the time of the incident here at issue (Lee Dep. 83). She had previously been convicted for driving while intoxicated ( ibid.). As a result of the instant arrest, the Marin County Court held a probation-revocation hearing (Def. Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 1). The state court heard testimony from Officers Winter and Inferrera and from Ms. Santiago and plaintiff ( ibid.). Plaintiff testified that she "might have backed up" from Officer Winter as he attempted to restrain her ( ibid.). The state court found that plaintiff had resisted Officer Winter and sustained the petition for the revocation of probation ( ibid.). The court extended plaintiff's probation for one year, imposed a ten-day jail sentence, and suspended five days of that sentence ( ibid.).
This order GRANTS defendants' request to take judicial notice of the transcript of plaintiff's parole-revocation hearing. The request meets the standard set forth in Federal Rules of Evidence 201.
ANALYSIS
1. LEGAL STANDARD.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Id. at 56(e). The requirement of materiality means that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Ibid.
Noteworthy here, "police misconduct cases almost always turn on a jury's credibility determinations" and thus summary judgment in excessive force cases should be granted "sparingly." Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). As discussed more fully below, however, this is not the situation here. The material facts are not in dispute and the Court is not being called on to make any credibility determinations. As such, this case can be properly decided on the record presented.
2. EXCESSIVE FORCE.
A. Legal Standard.
Claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop or other "seizure" of his person are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). Determining whether the level of force is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396. The reasonableness inquiry "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Ibid. The government's interests are elucidated by evaluation of three factors: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Ibid. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
B. Nature of the Intrusion.
The first consideration is the nature of Officer Winter's intrusion into plaintiff's Fourth Amendment interests. Plaintiff's excessive-force claim is based on two separate actions: Officer Winter's act of approaching plaintiff with his gun pointed at her and Officer Winter's act of taking plaintiff to the ground.
It cannot be disputed that pointing a gun at a suspect during a seizure is a serious intrusion into the suspect's personal security and can potentially constitute excessive force. Any harm resulting from plaintiff's being taken to the ground, however, is much less serious.
At the time of her arrest, plaintiff did not complain of any injury or pain (Lee Dep. 133). Once in the police vehicle with Officer Inferrera, plaintiff complained of wrist pain because of the handcuffs but did not complain of back or knee pain ( id. at 142). Plaintiff did not request medical attention while in jail ( id. at 152). At her deposition, however, plaintiff testified that she suffered bruises, back pain, and pain in her left knee as a result of being taken to the ground by Officer Winter ( id. at 40, 45). The bruises had gone away two weeks after the incident, and she experienced no further back pain thereafter ( id. at 48). At the time of her deposition, plaintiff experienced intermittent pain in her left knee, for which she took Motrin ( ibid.). Plaintiff also testified that she had injured her left knee in 1987 while running track, and that the injury consistently caused her pain up until 2002 ( id. at 33-34). Plaintiff testified that she experienced pain in her left knee about as often as she did before the incident ( id. at 48). Plaintiff did not seek medical treatment in connection with any injuries received as a result of Officer Winter's conduct ( id. at 46).
Plaintiff thus alleges no continuing physical injury other than intermittent pain in her knee, which she addresses with an over-the-counter pain killer. Moreover, because plaintiff did not seek medical treatment of any kind in connection with the incident, plaintiff cannot establish that the knee pain is not the product of her earlier sports-related injury, rather than the take-down. Plaintiff also testified that, as a result of the incident, she has had recurring nightmares and began seeing a psychologist ( id. at 50-51). It should be noted, however, that plaintiff waited until January 2004, nearly a year and a half after the incident and well after the instant suit was filed, to seek out a mental health professional ( id. at 51).
A careful examination of the government's interest, as elucidated by the Graham factors, is thus warranted. As discussed below, this order finds that the circumstances attending the August 23, 2002, incident rendered Officer Winter's use of force reasonable.
C. Government Interests.
i. Severity of the Crime.
It is not disputed that the officers were being dispatched to address a gang fight in the middle of the night. Under such circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to assume that they would be encountering large groups of individuals that were likely armed. It is also undisputed that the apartment complex to which the officers were being dispatched at 2:00 a.m. was located in an area with a high incidence of crime. Officers that had been called to this specific complex in the past to respond to weapons offenses, drug offenses, and different crimes of violence. It was thus reasonable for the officers to assume that potentially serious criminal activity was in progress.
Plaintiff insists that the responding officers "admitted seeing no criminality, no fighting, no gangs, no men, no drugs and no one violating the law" and that there was "no urgency, emergency, or exigent circumstances since the officers had completely blocked the women's vehicle in the parking lot so any escape was impossible" (Opp. 12). Plaintiff, however, does not contest that the officers arrived only minutes after being dispatched. At least according to Officer Inferrera, when the officers arrived at the scene, three individuals were rapidly descending a staircase to the complex. These three then jumped into Ms. Santiago's vehicle parked in an empty lot. Moreover, it is undisputed that the officers saw a vehicle quickly reversing out of the lot. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the officers to assume that serious criminal activity may have just occurred.
The decision to prevent that vehicle from leaving the lot was also reasonable, for it prevented the occupants (whom the officers believed were fleeing a crime scene) from leaving the area. Nor did the situation become any less urgent once the vehicle had been prevented from leaving the lot, for the officers had no way of determining whether or not the occupants of the vehicle were armed.
Plaintiff argues that the officers "never received reliable reports of any conduct giving rise to any possible crimes higher than a misdemeanor" ( ibid.). This argument is not supported by the uncontested facts. As plaintiff concedes in her opposition, the officers believed they were being dispatched to address a gang fight, a situation that could have potentially involved serious criminal activity. Because "[t]he reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene," Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, this order must evaluate Officer Winter's actions from the perspective of a reasonable officer that believed he was being dispatched to address criminal activity of an extremely serious nature.
Plaintiff attempts to confuse the issue by pointing to transcripts of other 911 calls allegedly made the same night and in connection with the same disturbance at the apartment complex. These transcripts are largely incomplete. Plaintiff contends that because the other 911 calls only describe, for example, "screaming and yelling," the officers' should not have anticipated that they were responding to serious criminal activity. This argument is undercut by the transcripts themselves, however, which reveal that at least one 911 call describing a gang fight at the apartment complex at the night of the incident (Schnebly Decl. 1).
Plaintiff maintains nonetheless that "[a] reasonable officer would have respected the Constitutional Rights of these citizens" (Opp. 12). In support, plaintiff cites only to the declaration of Mr. Frank Saunders, a retired police officer, who asserts that the officers in this incident acted unreasonably. This Court's case management order gave the parties until May 28, 2004, to designate expert witnesses and serve full expert reports on any issue on which a party had the burden of proof. Mr. Saunders' declaration and report both regard the reasonableness of the officers' conduct, an issue for which plaintiff clearly bears the burden of proof. Plaintiff, however, did not serve Mr. Saunders' report until June 11, 2004, two weeks after the deadline (Osman Decl. ¶ 6).
On June 29, 2004, defendants moved to exclude Mr. Saunders' testimony and expert report because plaintiff had failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) in addition to the case management order in effect in this case. Plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants' motion on July 15, 2004. Concluding that defendants' objection was more properly the subject of a motion in limine, the Court issued an order on July 17, 2004, denying the motion to exclude without prejudice. That order noted, however, that if plaintiff used Mr. Saunders' testimony or report to oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court would then rule on any objection properly made to such evidence. Now in opposition to defendants' summary-judgment motion, plaintiff refers to Mr. Saunders' report. Defendants have filed objections to Mr. Saunders' testimony. Plaintiff did not respond to the mentioned objections.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.
The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court's exclusion of expert testimony where the plaintiff failed to designate an expert and provide expert reports by the dates set forth in the district court's case management order, never explained its failure to comply, and never sought an extension of time from the district court. Quevedo v. Trans-Pacific Shipping, Inc., 143 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1998)
In its opposition to defendants' earlier motion to exclude Mr. Saunders' testimony and report, plaintiff asserted that the two-week delay was justified because "travel and other commitments relating to various legal functions both within and outside of California, were the principal reason for the document's delayed production." This order finds that the proffered reason does not excuse the late disclosure. Neither does plaintiff's claim that defendants refused to stipulate to a continuance does not change the outcome, for plaintiff could have requested an extension from the Court directly.
Even if there was substantial justification for plaintiff's delay, which this order holds there was not, plaintiff's delay resulted in substantial harm to defendants. Plaintiff argues that "[d]efendants were not prejudiced because they were never prevented from disclosing an opposition or a reply report." This order disagrees. Defendants were substantially prejudiced by plaintiff's late submission, which again was not served until two weeks after the deadline. Plaintiff did not file its expert report until the day opposition expert testimony was due. The delay gave Mr. Saunders an opportunity to review defendants' expert report and then respond to the arguments made therein. Plaintiff's opening expert report was thus essentially an opposition report. Defendants were thus denied an opportunity to file opposition reports in compliance with the case management order.
Because plaintiff's failure to comply with the case management resulted in substantial prejudice to defendants, Mr. Saunders would not be allowed to testify in court if this case were to proceed to trial. Both his expert report and declaration are therefore inadmissible and cannot be used to create a triable issue of fact.
Defendants also argue that the declaration and the report are being submitted for the improper purpose of providing legal conclusions regarding the objective reasonableness of the responding officers' conduct. Because Mr. Saunders' expert report and declaration are inadmissible on other grounds, this order does not address that argument. Defendants also object to the introduction of the declaration of plaintiff's attorney, Charles Bonner. Many of the documents to which defendants object, however, are self-authenticating and thus do not require personal knowledge of plaintiff's counsel. On that ground, defendants' motion is DENIED. Defendants' objection to Exhibit 11 of Mr. Bonner's declaration ("photographs of the scene") is also DENIED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the danger of prejudice is minimal.
ii. Threat to the Officers.
Officer Winter's testimony as regard to the threat posed by plaintiff is clear. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not comply with the officers' repeated instructions to get on the ground. It is undisputed that, as he approached plaintiff, Officer Winter could not see her hands. He could not, therefore, determine whether or not she was armed. Officer Winter's gun was drawn and pointed at plaintiff during this time. Once he could see that she did not have a weapon in her hands, however, Officer Winter re-holstered his gun. That Officer Winter re-holstered his gun is not in dispute and is significant. Officer Winter acted reasonably, using the necessary level of force to ensure his own safety and that of the other officers, and decreasing the level of force when appropriate.
Plaintiff argues that when Officer Winter determined that plaintiff did not have a weapon in her hand he should have asked plaintiff questions instead of attempting to restrain her (Opp. 13). The appropriate inquiry, however, is not whether Officer Winter should have employed a less-intrusive alternative. Rather, the issue is the reasonableness of Officer Winter's actions. "[A]s the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the appropriate inquiry is whether the officers acted reasonably, not whether they had less intrusive alternatives available to them . . . Requiring officers to find and choose the least intrusive alternative would require them to exercise superhuman judgment." Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the circumstances, Officer Winter made a reasonable decision to restrain plaintiff to effect compliance with the officers' instructions, determine whether or not she was carrying a weapon on her person, and to secure a potential crime scene.
iii. Resisting or Evading Arrest.
It is undisputed that plaintiff exited the vehicle only after repeated instructions to do so. At no time did plaintiff comply with the officers' demand that she get on the ground. Eventually, she did start to get into a kneeling position only to "spring" back to her feet. It is uncontested that as Officer Winter attempted to restrain plaintiff she pulled away from him and started to move toward the other officers. Thus, plaintiff's argument that she "was not actively resisting arrest" is simply unsupported by the record.
D. Conclusion.
This order concludes that summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's excessive-force claim. Considering the severity of the crime at issue, the potential threat posed by plaintiff, and plaintiff's act of resisting arrest, Officer Winter's use of force was reasonable. Faced with a potentially armed, noncompliant suspect that was in a vehicle quickly leaving the scene of a possible gang fight, he acted to ensure his own safety and that of his fellow officers. Once he was able to determine that the suspect had no weapon in her hands, he re-holstered his own gun. In his subsequent attempt to restrain the suspect, she resisted. Officer Winter responded by taking the suspect to the ground in such a way as to cause no lasting injury. The government's interest in protecting the safety of law-enforcement officers and addressing violent crime here outweighs the intrusion on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment interests.
* * *
Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff attempts to analogize the present case to recent Ninth Circuit excessive-force decisions, particularly Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002), and Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). Excessive-force claims are however, fact-specific and the Santos and Robinson decisions are readily distinguishable on their facts.
Unlike the present case, the Santos plaintiff suffered a broken vertebrae that rendered him immobile for an extended period of time. Santos, 287 F.3d at 853-854. Moreover, the responding officers in Santos admitted that the plaintiff "did not pose a significant or immediate safety risk." Id. at 854. Nor was there evidence that the plaintiff actively resisted arrest: "under any account of the events he did not struggle with the officers but in fact evinced a willingness to submit to their assertion of authority." Ibid. Finally, the alleged crime was "not at all serious . . . [a]t most, [the plaintiff] appeared guilty of public intoxication." Ibid.
The factual circumstances surrounding the application of force in Robinson also bear little resemblance to those in the present case. The instant officers were not, as in Robinson, being dispatched to a "semi-rural" area in the middle of the day to address a crime that was "at most a misdemeanor." Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1014. Moreover, the Robinson plaintiff never resisted or evaded arrest. Instead, he came out from his house to meet the officers, walking 135 feet in a "peaceful" manner. Id. at 1010. The officers thus had ample opportunity to determine that the plaintiff was not armed. Ibid. Still, when the plaintiff identified himself, the officers drew their guns and pointed them at the plaintiff's head. Ibid. And, even after the plaintiff had complied with their instructions to put his hands over his head, the officers continued to point their guns — one officer going so far as to thrust his gun to within three feet of the plaintiff's head. Ibid.
The contrast to the present case is clear. Not only was plaintiff herein stopped leaving the scene of a serious crime, she was uncooperative throughout the interaction with the officers. Moreover, Officer Winter re-holstered his gun as soon as he could see plaintiff had no weapon in her hand. Neither of these decisions warrant a contrary conclusion in plaintiff's favor.
3. FALSE ARREST.
Plaintiff's second claim, made under Section 1983, alleges false arrest "in violation of plaintiff's right to be free of an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to be free of a deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment."
As a threshold matter, there is no substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal arrest or prosecution except upon probable cause. Relief is only available under the Fourth Amendment. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268-75 (1994). A claim of false arrest is cognizable under Section 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967). An individual's warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, however, if the officers had probable cause to believe the individual had committed or was about to commit a crime. Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1998).
Here, the officers had ample cause to believe that plaintiff had committed a crime. Officers were dispatched at 2:00 a.m. to a high crime area to address multiple 911 calls regarding a gang fight. They had been to the specific complex before and encountered serious criminal activity. They arrived at the scene only minutes after being dispatched there and saw a vehicle reversing quickly out of the lot adjacent to the complex.
Plaintiff does not point to any contrary evidence to establish a triable issue of fact. Indeed, plaintiff devotes a single sentence in her opposition to the false-arrest claim: "[t]he Graham analysis above compels the conclusion that the arrest of Ms. Lee, a law-abiding citizen was false and a violation of her Fourth Amendment entitling her to assert a claim for violation of section 1983." The Graham excessive-force analysis, however, is used to determine whether the government's interest in an law-enforcement officer's use of force outweighs the intrusion into a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment interests created by such force. This order already has found that Officer Winter did not use excessive force. Nor is the Graham analysis a substitute for an inquiry into the existence of probable cause.
On this record, no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's arrest was made without probable cause. This order finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's false-arrest claim.
4. CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF NOVATO AND NOVATO POLICE DEPARTMENT.
Plaintiff's third claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleges that "[b]y means of their unlawful detention of plaintiff and the malicious charges they placed against her, defendants' conspired to interfere with plaintiff's civil rights and deprived plaintiff of her liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Plaintiff alleges that the City of Novato and the Novato Police Department "are liable in respondeat superior" for Officer Winter's conduct.
First, the liability of municipalities under Section 1983 "is contingent on a violation of constitutional rights." Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 2004). As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against the City of Novato and the Novato Police Department thus must fail. Second, local governing bodies can be sued directly under Section 1983 only where the alleged unconstitutional conduct is the result of an official policy, pattern, or practice. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1997). The Court has reviewed the record presented and finds no evidence to support the argument that Officer Winter's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the result of such a pattern or practice.
Plaintiff's claim under Section 1985 is also without merit. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff fails to identify the subsection of Section 1985 under which she is proceeding. Section 1985(3), however, prohibits conspiring for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of the rights and privileges belonging to a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff's opposition neither makes allegations nor points to evidence regarding a conspiracy to interfere with plaintiff's civil rights. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's third claim.
Defendants challenge plaintiff's first three claims on other grounds. First, defendants argue that Officer Winter is entitled to qualified immunity. Because this order finds that Officer Winter's conduct was objectively reasonable, it does not address the qualified-immunity issue. Second, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Defendants argue that a criminally convicted and incarcerated plaintiff must obtain a favorable termination of the conviction before seeking damages under Section 1983 where the civil suit, if proved, could invalidate the conviction. Because plaintiff's parole was revoked as a result of her arrest in this incident, her claims are barred by Heck, or so the argument goes. Because this order finds no constitutional violation, however, this argument is also not addressed.
5. DISMISSAL OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS.
Plaintiff's complaint also seeks relief for various violations of state law including intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligent employment, negligent training, and malicious prosecution. This court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Section 1367(c) provides that:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
To decline jurisdiction in circumstances like this, a district court must first identify the dismissal that triggers the exercise of discretion and then explain how declining jurisdiction serves the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity. See Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that "[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of the factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1998); see also San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court not required to provide explanation when declining jurisdiction under Section 1367(c)(3)).
At all costs unlike other cases this Court has not invested substantial time in supervising this case. In fact, other than ruling on the federal claims in this order, the Court has invested no time on the case. Therefore, there will be no duplication of effort to remit the remaining claims to state court. This order thus dismisses plaintiff's state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this order GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's federal claims and DISMISSES plaintiff's state causes of action.