Ledlow v. Pride Offshore, Inc.

Full title: JOSEPH W. LEDLOW v. PRIDE OFFSHORE, INC

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Mar 30, 2000

Civ. No. 98-3114, SECTION "T"(3) (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2000)

Opinion

Civ. No. 98-3114, SECTION "T"(3).

March 30, 2000.

G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR., District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion to Withdraw Request for Jury Trial filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Joseph W. Ledlow. This matter was set for hearing on March 15, 2000. The parties waived oral argument and the matter was submitted for the Court's consideration on the briefs only. The Court having considered the memoranda filed, the record, the law and applicable jurisprudence is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.

ORDER AND REASONS

On October 22, 1998, the plaintiff filed a "Maritime Complaint" in this Court asserting a cause of action under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Additionally, the complaint sets forth that the plaintiff is a resident and domiciliary of Mississippi while defendant, Pride Offshore, Inc., is a Delaware corporation registered to do business in Louisiana. The plaintiff contends that the injuries he allegedly sustained while working aboard the jack-up drilling rig known as the "Pride Colorado" resulted in damages of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00). The plaintiff demanded a trial by jury in his complaint, but now seeks to withdraw that request.

Plaintiff contends that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) ¹ grants petitioner the right to "elect" to proceed in admiralty without a jury trial. As such, he seeks to make his election of a trial without a jury. Defendant however argues that because the complaint is based upon diversity jurisdiction as well as pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law, defendant has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Defendant does not contest that had this suit been based solely on the Jones Act, only the plaintiff would have had the right to demand a trial by jury and the Seventh Amendment would not apply. However, diversity jurisdiction is present in this case. As such, Federal Rule 39(a)(1)² requires that a jury demand withdrawal be done only with the consent of all parties. Because Pride Offshore, Inc. does not consent to the withdrawal, it submits that the motion to withdraw the jury request should be denied.

1 Rule 9(h) states: "A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims."

2 Rule 39(a)(]) provides: "When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury . . .

In Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972),rehearing 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied 423 U.S. 839, 96 S.Ct. 69, 46 L.Ed.2d 58 (1975), the Fifth Circuit had to address a similar problem as presented in this case. In Johnson, the petitioners filed suit alleging both diversity of citizenship and Jones Act jurisdiction electing a trial by jury. The complaint was later amended to provide that the cause was brought under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Court. As such, the Court grappled with reconciling the Seventh Amendment with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 38, and 39. The Court stated that Rule 38 clearly affirms that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury in federal civil cases "shall be preserved to the parties inviolate" Id., Rule 38(a). The Court went on to state that:

the procedure set forth in Rule 39(a) for transferring an action from a district court's jury docket to its nonjury docket gives explicit recognition to the quasi-constitutional privilege of the party who did not originally demand trial by jury to rely upon the jury trial demand made by the adverse party.

Id. As such, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred when it transferred the actions from its jury docket to its nonjury docket without first obtaining the defendant's Rule 39(a) consent to the transfers. Id.

In 1986, the Fifth Circuit again had to decide the jury trial issue in Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986). In Rachal, the petitioner filed a complaint alleging a Jones Act claim and general maritime claims and demanded a jury trial. The complaint was later amended to state an action only in admiralty, which would eliminate his right to a jury trial. The Court stated:

When there is diversity jurisdiction in Jones Act cases, both parties have an independent basis for a jury trial if the plaintiff has chosen to pursue his Jones Act claim through the "saving to suitors" clause in a civil action.

Id. In Rachal, there was no diversity of citizenship present, so the Court concluded that the plaintiffs only right to a jury trial arose under the Jones Act. As such, the defendant did not have a right to a jury trial. Any jury trial right that the defendant had arose only because the plaintiff demanded a jury trial. As the Seventh Amendment was not involved in that case, defendant could insist on a jury trial only to the extent that the plaintiff was prohibited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from withdrawing his jury demand. Id. The Fifth Circuit distinguished the facts in Rachal from those presented in Johnson. It was stated:

the Johnson court clearly applied Rule 39(a) to protect the defendant's existing right to a jury trial, conferred through diversity and through the plaintiffs' choice of a civil action when they filed their initial complaints.

In this case, however, when the initial complaint was filed and the plaintiff chose a civil action, the only right to a jury trial belonged to the plaintiff under the Jones Act . . . Rule 39(a) does not create the right to a jury, but rather preserves a right established by some other source.

Id. Although the circumstances presented in this matter are analogous to those in Johnson, the Court relies upon the discussion presented in Rachal in reaching its decision.

Ledlow did not specifically invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction, yet his complaint sets forth facts which show diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy in excess of the jurisdictional limit. Moreover, plaintiffs memorandum in support provides that plaintiff filed a petition for damages under "the Jones Act; under the general maritime law for wages, made and secure; and upon diversity of citizenship and requisite jurisdictional amount." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support (emphasis added). Therefore, this case is factually distinguishable from Rachal, since diversity jurisdiction exists.

In the complaint, Ledlow demanded a jury trial which was available to him under both the Jones Act and diversity jurisdiction. While plaintiff may "elect" not to proceed with a jury trial under the Jones Act, the defendant cannot be deprived of its Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, which it is entitled to under diversity jurisdiction, now that Ledlow has had a change of heart. Rule 39(a) is intended to protect the party who, relying on another party's jury demand, waives his own right by not demanding a jury. As such, the procedures set forth in Rule 39(a) must be met in order for the matter to be withdrawn from the jury. As the defendant does not consent to the withdrawal of the jury demand, the motion of the plaintiff must be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw Request for Trial by Jury, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Joseph W. Ledlow, is hereby DENIED.