There are almost as many definitions for terms such as "common drunk" or "habitual drunkard" as there are courts that have attempted to formulate them. See, e.g. , Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions , 857 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) ("The ordinary meaning of ‘habitual drunkard’ is a person who regularly drinks alcoholic beverages to excess."); Tatum v. State , 32 Ala.App. 128, 22 So.2d 350, 351 (1945) ("A common drunkard is a person whose general rule of life is that of drunkenness ... sobriety being the exception."); Sowder v. Commonwealth , 261 Ky. 610, 88 S.W.2d 274, 275 (1935) (approving a jury instruction that defined "habitual drunkard" as a person who "has a fixed habit of frequently getting drunk, though not oftener drunk than sober, and though sober for weeks at a time"); Commonwealth v. Whitney , 71 Mass. 85, 87–88 (1855) (defining "common drunk" as a person who is "an habitual drunkard [and] is so to the disturbance of the public peace and good order"). Moreover, several courts have concluded that such terms simply are not amenable to any meaningful definition, given the variety of differing definitions assigned to common terms of this nature.

Because Petitioner's equal protection fails under the ordinary rational basis test, this case provides no reason to question that longstanding approach.” 857 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). Six years

There is "nothing irrational about that legislative choice, which furthers the legitimate governmental interest in public safety." Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). Nor does it matter that the statute targets certain types of offenders and not others.

The veracity of this claim is undermined by the fact that Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that their site plans are subject to regulation under the Act. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Because Petitioner has engaged in conduct that is clearly covered, he 'cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'" (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 19)).

The veracity of this claim is undermined by the fact that Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that their site plans are subject to regulation under the Act. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Because Petitioner has engaged in conduct that is clearly covered, he 'cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'" (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 19)).

Consequently, the Court finds that it is conceivable that the No Feeding Ordinance was enacted for the legitimate purpose of advancing public safety. Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). The Complaint (Doc. 1-3) also does not contain factual allegations regarding how the No Feeding Ordinance is not rationally related to advancing public safety.

The Court also notes, without firmly deciding the question at this time, that the equal protection claim would likely be subject to rational basis review. SeeLedezma-Cosino v. Sessions , 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017).

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980). See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017); Hernandez-Mancilla v. Holder, 633 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2011) ("We review equal protection challenges to federal immigration laws under the rational basis standard . . . ."). "A legislative classification must be wholly irrational to violate equal protection."