There are almost as many definitions for terms such as "common drunk" or "habitual drunkard" as there are courts that have attempted to formulate them. See, e.g. , Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions , 857 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) ("The ordinary meaning of ‘habitual drunkard’ is a person who regularly drinks alcoholic beverages to excess."); Tatum v. State , 32 Ala.App. 128, 22 So.2d 350, 351 (1945) ("A common drunkard is a person whose general rule of life is that of drunkenness ... sobriety being the exception."); Sowder v. Commonwealth , 261 Ky. 610, 88 S.W.2d 274, 275 (1935) (approving a jury instruction that defined "habitual drunkard" as a person who "has a fixed habit of frequently getting drunk, though not oftener drunk than sober, and though sober for weeks at a time"); Commonwealth v. Whitney , 71 Mass. 85, 87–88 (1855) (defining "common drunk" as a person who is "an habitual drunkard [and] is so to the disturbance of the public peace and good order"). Moreover, several courts have concluded that such terms simply are not amenable to any meaningful definition, given the variety of differing definitions assigned to common terms of this nature.

Because Petitioner's equal protection fails under the ordinary rational basis test, this case provides no reason to question that longstanding approach.” 857 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). Six years

We review de novo whether the statute is constitutional. Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions , 857 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Marquez-Reyes does not argue that he engaged in constitutionally protected speech, such that applying the statute to him would violate the First Amendment.

There is "nothing irrational about that legislative choice, which furthers the legitimate governmental interest in public safety." Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). Nor does it matter that the statute targets certain types of offenders and not others.

would have fair notice" from the statute that Petitioner faces expedited removal to his native country pursuant to § 1228(b)(1). Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

And the definition does not violate equal protection because it is not irrational to base a child's dependency on age and marital status. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Congress rationally could have determined that older children and married children are sufficiently independent that they do not require preferential treatment.

The veracity of this claim is undermined by the fact that Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that their site plans are subject to regulation under the Act. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Because Petitioner has engaged in conduct that is clearly covered, he 'cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'" (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 19)).

The veracity of this claim is undermined by the fact that Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that their site plans are subject to regulation under the Act. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Because Petitioner has engaged in conduct that is clearly covered, he 'cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'" (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 19)).

We review de novo the constitutionality of the appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the BIA. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). ANALYSIS

"The ordinary meaning of 'habitual drunkard' is a person who regularly drinks alcoholic beverages to excess." Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).