Opinion
No. 05-08-00966-CV
Opinion Filed November 12, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-08-05467-A.
Before Chief Justice WRIGHT and Justices RICHTER and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this forcible detainer case, Stacey Ledbetter appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Fannie Mae, also known as the Federal National Mortgage Association. In one issue, Ledbetter asserts the trial court erred by granting possession of the premises to Fannie Mae because Fannie Mae's petition did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 741. Specifically, Ledbetter argues Fannie Mae's petition failed to allege a right to immediate possession of the premises and failed to describe the land or premises that was the subject of the suit. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a); 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Fannie Mae filed its original petition for forcible detainer in justice of the peace court, alleging Ledbetter was in possession of real property described as follows:
BEING LOT 16, IN BLOCK B, REPLAT OF LOTS 15B, AND 15C, BLOCK B, OF SANTA FE VILLAGE — SECTION ONE, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE MAP THEREOF RECORDED IN VOLUME 93192, PAGE 4302, OF THE MAP RECORDS OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS.
hereinafter referred to as the "Property" and more commonly referred to as 1206 MISSION STREET DUNCANVILLE, TEXAS 75137[.]
The justice of the peace court found Fannie Mae was entitled to possession of the Mission Street premises, and Ledbetter appealed to County Court at Law Number 1. The trial court ordered that Fannie Mae was entitled to possession of the premises and awarded attorney's fees to Fannie Mae. This appeal ensued.
In her sole issue, Ledbetter contends the trial court erred by granting possession to Fannie Mae because Fannie Mae's petition failed to "allege a right to immediate possession" of the premises and failed to "describe the land or premises, the possession of which is claim [sic]." Ledbetter raised neither of these complaints in the trial court and, therefore, has waived these arguments on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co., 192 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
Even if Ledbetter had preserved her complaints, her contentions are without merit. Rule 741 requires that a petition for forcible detainer "shall describe the lands, tenements or premises, the possession of which is claimed, with sufficient certainty to identify the same, and it shall also state the facts which entitled the complainant to the possession" of the premises. Tex. R. Civ. P. 741. Fannie Mae's original petition for forcible detainer described the premises using both the legal description and the street address. Ledbetter does not explain how the property description in the petition was lacking, nor does she contend she was misled or confused by the identifying information. We conclude that both the address and the legal description in the petition sufficiently identified the premises at issue to meet rule 741's requirements. Mitchell, 192 S.W.3d at 883; Powelson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 125 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
As to Ledbetter's assertion the petition failed to allege a right to immediate possession of the premises, the petition stated that Ledbetter defaulted on the mortgage on the premises and the premises were posted for foreclosure; Fannie Mae purchased the property at the non-judicial foreclosure sale and received a Trustee's Deed; Ledbetter was given notice to vacate the premises pursuant to the Texas Property Code; and Ledbetter refused to vacate the premises. These facts are sufficient to demonstrate Fannie Mae's entitlement to possession of the premises. Mitchell, 192 S.W.3d at 883; Powelson, 125 S.W.3d at 812.
We overrule Ledbetter's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.