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holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(e) was not violated when the district court, rather than the court clerk, rejected documents for filing
Summary of this case from Koch v. LockyerOpinion
No. 06-56253.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
July 26, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-06-03856-R.
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Plaintiff Matt Lechner sued Capital Research Brokerage, Inc. ("Capital Research") and Capital Group Companies ("Capital Group") for alleged acts surrounding a California Department of Personnel Administration's decision to invest with Capital Research. In the District of Connecticut, the district court granted Capital Research's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Capital Group's motion for transfer to the Central District of California. Plaintiff did not appeal those orders. In the Central District of California, the district court granted Capital Group's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiff appeals pro se, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1. Plaintiff argues that his due process rights were violated because Capital Group lied about its contacts with the state of Connecticut and refused to communicate solely via e-mail. To the extent Plaintiff argues that Capital Group violated its disclosure obligations, we will not entertain the argument because he did not raise it before the district court. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) ("As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.").
2. Plaintiff next argues that the district court violated his due process rights when the court clerk refused to accept filings of his that failed to conform to local rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) constrains the court clerk from refusing filings, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(e) ("The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented . . . solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices."), the district court, not the court clerk, rejected each of Plaintiff's filings. "The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties' motion practice and enforcing local rules that place parameters on briefing," Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002), and "[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants," King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff argues that the district court rejected his filings "improperly and capriciously," but each rejection specifically identified the local rules that each filing violated. On appeal, Plaintiff does not provide a copy of the rejected filings, nor does he attempt to explain how the district court's rejections either were improper or capricious. On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
3. Plaintiff also argues that the district court violated his due process rights when it denied his ex parte request for a 90-day continuance to seek counsel. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision regarding the enlargement of time. Jenkins v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
95 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1996). To reverse, we "must be left with the definite and firm conviction that the court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion." United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's desire for counsel was understandable; the district court rejected a filing of his for the fourth time less than two weeks before his opposition to Capital Group's motion for judgment on the pleadings was due. But Plaintiff did not file his ex parte request until one month later, two weeks after the deadline had passed for him to file an opposition. In addition, aside from a bare assertion that he had "obtained the names of a number of counsel," Plaintiff failed to allege or demonstrate diligence in his search for an attorney in the two months after the case was transferred to California. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding no excusable neglect.
4. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it granted Capital Group's Rule 12(c) motion. We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings. Walsh v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a plaintiff's complaint "need only give 'the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). "[A] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges an agreement for Plaintiff to consult with Capital Group on its investment proposal to the California Department of Personnel Administration, compensation for which was contingent on the Department's selecting the proposal. The complaint further alleges that Capital Group both failed to submit its proposal on time and secretly partnered with Capital Research to submit the proposal under Capital Research's name, for which Capital Group would receive a rebate and Plaintiff would receive nothing. The Department ultimately selected Capital Research's proposal. The complaint alleges six causes of action: breach of contract, tortious interference with business relations, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, a violation of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Those allegations give Capital Group fair notice of what Plaintiff's claims are and the grounds on which they rest. And contrary to Capital Group's assertions, they state claims upon which relief can be granted.
In ruling to the contrary, the district court merely stated that "Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, in its entirety, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
However, under both California and Connecticut law, a claim of tortious interference with business relations requires that a defendant interfere with a plaintiff's business relationship with a third party.See, e.g., Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 880 A.2d 106, 120 (Conn. 2005); Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 743 n. 1 (Cal. 1995). Plaintiff alleges that Capital Group interfered with its own agreement with him. As a matter of law, therefore, he cannot make out a claim of tortious interference with business relations.
The district court did not decide, and we do not reach, whether California or Connecticut law should apply to Plaintiff's claims.
In addition, in his claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Plaintiff alleges that the proposal submitted by Capital Group and Capital Research "is a 'Security' within the meaning of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act." The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "CUTPA does not apply to deceptive practices in the purchase and sale of securities." Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 510 A.2d 972, 977 (Conn. 1986). No set of facts could be proved consistent with Plaintiff's allegations that would allow him to recover under Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act.
We therefore affirm the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff's claims for tortious interference with business relations and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. We reverse and remand the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and violation of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act.
5. We carefully considered Plaintiff's remaining claims. None is persuasive.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.