Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co.

17 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Heyward

    98 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1938)   Cited 5 times
    Observing that "an enquiry into the very existence of the municipality is in general reserved to the State itself in a direct proceeding by quo warranto"

    19 R.C.L., Municipal Corporations, § 14; 43 C.J., Municipal Corporations, § 52; Merrell v. St. Petersburg, 74 Fla. 194, 76 So. 699; Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740; Tulare Irrigation District v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 22 S.Ct. 531, 46 L.Ed. 773. There was such a proceeding regarding this town in Mahood v. State, supra, interpreted in Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845, and made the basis of decision in Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., supra, but we think all these cases were misinterpreted in the present proceeding. In the first cited case the Attorney General by quo warranto attacked the organization of this municipality, but only so far as it undertook to include the land east of Biscayne Bay, and it was sought to oust the municipal officers from the exercise of power east of the Bay only. The court said (page 92): "The pleadings all admit that there was a village known as Miami Shores and that the inhabitants of this village proceeded to the organization of a municipal corporation.

  2. Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown Crummer Inv. Co.

    87 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1937)   Cited 3 times

    Appellants insist that, whatever might be the effect of the ouster judgment standing alone, it does not stand alone here. It has been supplemented, they say its effect heightened and made completely comprehensive by the later judgment in the equity suit of Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845, 846, enjoining the issuance of tax deeds to property in the excluded territory. And more in that suit the Supreme Court declared that, as to the territory excluded, the town had never had either de jure or de facto existence.

  3. Goodwin v. Schmidt

    5 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1941)   Cited 7 times
    Paying without obligation, as mere volunteer, not entitled to subrogation

    "In a quo warranto suit brought by the State on the relation of its attorney general in August, 1929, and in a later suit brought by owners of east side lands to cancel tax certificates on their lands, the state Supreme Court held that the statute relied on for creation of the municipality did not authorize inclusion of non-contiguous areas. Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845. And in those suits it was finally adjudged that the east side was not and never had been a part of the incorporated town, and that the town never acquired jurisdiction de jure or de factor over the land east of the bay. A decree of ouster as to the east side land was entered in December, 1931, and tax certificates on lands on that side were canceled. No bondholder was a party to either of these suits.

  4. Ocean Beach Heights v. Invest. Co.

    302 U.S. 614 (1938)   Cited 23 times
    In Ocean Beach Heights, Inc., v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 302 U.S. 614 (58 S Ct 385, 82 L ed 478), an unusual situation was involved.

    In a quo warranto suit brought by the State on the relation of its attorney general in August, 1929, and in a later suit brought by owners of east side lands to cancel tax certificates on their lands, the state supreme court held that the statute relied on for creation of the municipality did not authorize inclusion of non-contiguous areas. Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254; 133 So. 90. Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305; 153 So. 845. And in those suits it was finally adjudged that the east side was not and never had been a part of the incorporated town, and that the town never acquired jurisdiction de jure or de facto over the land east of the bay.

  5. In re Village of Chubbuck

    226 P.2d 484 (Idaho 1951)   Cited 1 times

    A village, in its ordinarily accepted sense, contemplates the entire community as it existed prior to any Petition for formal incorporation, and if the Petition does not reasonably include all, or substantially all, of such community, the Petition does not fulfill the requirements of the law, and particularly when there is before the Board of County Commissioners at the same time and prior to any action upon either Petition a Petition having all other requirements, and in addition thereto includes the area and population which does represent the village as the same existed in the ordinarily accepted sense. State ex rel Wilkie v. Stein, Tex., 26 S.W.2d 182; Board of Supt. of Norfolk Ct. v. Duke, 113 Va. 94, 73 S.E. 456-459; State ex rel. Town of Holland v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 86 N.W. 677, 89 N.W. 501; Waldrop v. Kansas City So. R.R. Co., 131 Ark. 453, 199 S.W. 369, L.R.A. 1918B, 1081; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845; Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; People v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 82 P. 620; State ex rel. Hilton v. City of Brookside, 161 Minn. 171, 201 N.W. 139. The presently constituted Village of Chubbuck, as incorporated under the order of the District Court in case No. 16227, fulfilled all of the requirements of Sec. 50-701 of the Idaho Code, and, therefore, is a legally incorporated village.

  6. Hall v. State

    46 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950)   Cited 2 times

    Although the charter set forth in said Act failed of adoption on referendum, it may still be said that there was a recognition of the right to include such lands in Section 1 of the Act, wherein it is stated that: "The inhabitants of the Town of Fernandina Beach, within the boundaries as now established, under the provisions of Chapter 165 of the Laws of the State of Florida, or as hereafter established in the manner provided by law, shall continue to be a body politic and corporate by the name of the `Town of Fernandina Beach' * * *" The cases relied on by appellees, Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614, 58 S.Ct. 385, 82 L.Ed. 478; Mahood v. State ex rel. Davis, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; and Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845, may be distinguished on their facts from the case at bar. All three of these cases were concerned with the attempted incorporation of a tract of land east of Biscayne Bay within the boundaries of the Town of Miami Shores, which was located west of Biscayne Bay. It was held in the Mahood case that the fact that the municipal boundaries included the expanse of the waters of Biscayne Bay between the two separate tracts of land so divided them that they did not constitute a united and contiguous tract, if, as a matter of fact, the two separate tracts constituted two separate villages or hamlets. It was held to be a question for the jury as to whether or not both tracts actually comprised the village of Miami Shores.

  7. State ex Inf. Taylor v. North Kansas City

    360 Mo. 374 (Mo. 1950)   Cited 77 times

    Application of that section requires that the residential section be awarded to North Kansas City, because that is the government the people of the area want. (19) Kansas City's annexation is legally and practically impossible, because Kansas City is separated from its annexation area by North Kansas City and a city cannot exist in two separate parts. Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614, 58 S.Ct. 385, 82 L.Ed. 478; Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N.W. 561; Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 Pa. 425, 27 L.R.A. 751; State ex inf. Major v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, 134 S.W. 1007; Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 15 S.W. 891, 11 L.R.A. 778. (20) As a matter of geography, only North Kansas City can provide sewerage and drainage facilities for this residential section. (21) Kansas City's annexation is legally impossible for the further reason that it does not have sufficient power to perform the functions of a municipality in Clay County.

  8. North Miami v. Seaway Corporation

    151 Fla. 301 (Fla. 1942)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that "[w]here the levy of an illegal tax may become a cloud upon the title to real estate, payment of the tax to avoid a cloud on the real estate or to avoid the imposition of substantial burdens upon property rights of the owner is not a voluntary payment"

    The sale of tax certificates and the issuance of tax deeds on said lands were permanently enjoined and the Town of North Miami never acquired de jure or de facto jurisdiction of the lands on the east of the bay. See Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845. The Supreme Court of the United States held as against the bondholders of the Town of North Miami that the municipality did not acquire de facto or de jure jurisdiction to levy a tax for bond or municipal purposes on the east side lands. See Ocean Beach Heights, Inc. v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 302 U.S. 614, 58 Sup. Ct. 385, 82 L.Ed. 478.

  9. Baker v. State

    150 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1942)   Cited 13 times

    It is settled law that this Court will take judicial notice of its own records. See Pavlis v. Atlas-Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 126 Fla. 808, 172 So. 57; Padgett v. State, 126 Fla. 57, 170 So. 175; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845; State ex rel. DuPont-Ball, Inc. v. Livingston, 104 Fla. 33, 139 So. 360; Ocala Northern R. Co. v. Malloy, 68 Fla. 430, 67 So. 93; Capital City Bank v. Hilson, 64 So. 206, 60 So. 189, Ann. Cas. 1914B 1211; McNish v. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 So. 176. The jury presenting the indictment and the venire out of which the jury was obtained and the one hearing the testimony and deciding the guilt of the petitioner was drawn under the provisions of Chapter 16058, Acts of 1933, Laws of Florida. This Act has been sustained against numerous attacks made thereon.

  10. Heyward v. Hall

    144 Fla. 344 (Fla. 1940)   Cited 4 times

    Municipal authority was also attempted to be exerted over the described lands on the east side of the Bay until such authority was ousted by quo warranto judgment rendered in 1931 pursuant to the decision in Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90. See also Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown Crummer Investment Co., 302 U.S. 614, 82 L.Ed. 478, 58 Sup. Ct. 608; Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845; United States v. Heyward, 98 F.2d 433. Such judicial ouster of municipal jurisdiction of the Town of Miami Shores and of North Miami by name from the east side of the Bay was a judicial recognition of the continued existence of the Town as a municipality, at least de facto, on the west side of Bay Biscayne.