Opinion
No. 17,962.
Filed February 14, 1950.
1. APPEAL — Presentation in Lower Court of Grounds for Review — Motion for New Trial — Grounds for Motion — Verdict Contrary to Law — Negative Verdict — Uncontradicted Evidence Must Show Appellant Entitled to Relief. — On appeal by a defendant from a judgment denying relief on his cross-complaint where a specification for the motion for a new trial was that the verdict was contrary to law, the verdict was negative, and appellant may only assert it was contrary to law because he was denied relief to which he was entitled under the uncontradicted evidence. p. 80.
2. AUTOMOBILES — Injuries From Operation — Action — Appeal — Record — Evidence — Did Not Warrant Reversal as Matter of Law. — On appeal by a defendant from a judgment denying relief on his cross-complaint, the evidence, as disclosed by the record, was not conclusive as to permit the Appellate Court to say as a matter of law that it entitled appellant to relief denied him by the verdict. p. 80.
3. APPEAL — Record — Objection to Instruction Not in Record — Question Waived by Petition for Time To File Brief. — Where, on appeal, the appellee attempted to assert that appellant's objection to an instruction given by the trial court was not in the record, by filing a petition for an extension of time to file its brief, appellee waived its right to present this question. Rules of the Supreme Court, 2-16. p. 81.
4. AUTOMOBILES — Injuries From Operation — Action — Instructions — Instruction as to Care Required of Motorist — Instruction Not Subject to Objection. — In an action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, an instruction that, if the jury should find from all the evidence that defendant and cross-complainant, by the exercise of ordinary care either by turning his automobile to the right or stopping when he saw an accident was imminent, could have avoided the accident, he would be guilty of negligence, was not subject to the objection that it told the jury that the exercise of ordinary care required defendant to turn or stop, because the instruction left the question of what conduct amounted to negligence as a matter of fact for the jury to determine. p. 81.
5. AUTOMOBILES — Injuries From Operation — Action — Failure of Plaintiff To Avoid Accident — Effect. — If a party by the exercise of ordinary care in any particular could have avoided an automobile accident, he would not be entitled to recover for injuries sustained therefrom. p. 81.
6. APPEAL — Presentation in Lower Court of Grounds for Review — Objections to Instructions Not Made to Trial Court — No Questions Presented. — Objections to instructions which were not made to the trial court may not be considered by the Appellate Court on appeal. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1-7. p. 81.
7. EVIDENCE — Judicial Notice — Judge of Circuit Court. — The Appellate Court would take judicial notice of the identity of a circuit court judge. p. 83.
8. TRIAL — Verdict — Reception of Verdict — Regular Judge May Receive Verdict in Case Tried by Another If No Objection. — A regularly constituted judge of a court of general jurisdiction may properly receive the verdict in a case tried by another judge when there is no objection to such procedure. p. 83.
From the Starke Circuit Court, Robert E. Thompson, Special Judge.
Action by G. A. Truck Lines, Inc., against Royal L. Lease for damages to plaintiff's tractor trailer resulting from a collision with defendant's automobile, and defendant cross-complained for personal injuries and damage to his automobile. From a judgment against plaintiff on its complaint and against defendant on his cross-complaint, the latter appeals.
Affirmed. By the court in banc.
Draper, C.J., not participating.
Royal L. Lease and George W. Douglas, both of Valparaiso, for appellant.
Draper Eichhorn, of Gary, for appellee.
Appellee brought this action for damages against appellant for damages to its tractor trailer which was being operated by its employee and was in an accident with an automobile owned by appellant. The accident occurred on State Highway 2 about seven miles Northeast of Valparaiso. Appellant in addition to his answer under the rules to the complaint of appellee filed his cross-complaint against appellee for personal injuries and damage to his automobile.
Trial to jury resulted in a verdict against the appellee on its complaint and against the appellant on both paragraphs of his cross-complaint. Judgment accordingly.
The error assigned here is the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial. We will consider the specifications of that motion in the order which they are presented.
The judgment herein appealed from was against the appellant who contends the verdict is contrary to law because it was not sustained by sufficient evidence. The verdict of which 1. appellant complains was negative and therefore appellant may only assert it was contrary to law because he was denied relief which he was entitled to under the uncontradicted evidence. Wilson, Admx. v. Rollings (1938), 214 Ind. 155, 14 N.E.2d 905; Wadler v. Mogul Rubber Corp. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 152, 62 N.E.2d 472.
It would serve no good purpose to summarize here the conflicting evidence in this case. From our examination of the record, it does not disclose such conclusive evidence that 2. would permit us to say as a matter of law that it entitled appellant to relief denied him by the verdict.
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in giving to the jury appellee's tendered Instruction No. 14, which is as follows:
"You are instructed that if you believe from all of the evidence in this case that the defendant and cross-complainant, Royal Lease, by the exercise of ordinary care either by turning his automobile to the right or stopping the same when he saw that an accident was imminent, could have avoided the accident which resulted in the alleged damage to him, he is guilty of such negligence as would prevent his recovery in this action and your verdict should be against the cross-complainant upon his cross-complaint."
The objection of appellant to this instruction in the trial court is as follows:
". . . it tells the jury that the exercise of ordinary care required the defendant to either turn his car to the right or stop the same when he saw that an accident was imminent. It is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the exercise of ordinary care required him to so turn or stop his car. The instruction is so worded that that is not its meaning. The jury could readily believe that that was its meaning and be confused by the giving of said instruction."
Appellee attempts to assert here that appellant's objection to his instruction is not in the record, but appellee having filed a petition for time to file its brief, has waived the right 3. to present this question. Gamble v. Lewis (1949), 227 Ind. 455, 459, 85 N.E.2d 629, 632.
We do not approve the form of this instruction. However, we do not believe it was erroneous for the reasons set out in the above objection — which was the only objection made to the 4-6. trial court. In our opinion it does not tell the jury that the exercise of ordinary care required the appellant to either turn his car to the right or stop the same. In our opinion the instruction in effect told the jury that if they found from all of the evidence in this case that by the exercise of ordinary care appellant, by turning to the right or stopping when he saw the accident was imminent, could have avoided the accident, he was guilty of such negligence as would bar his recovery. It may well be the instruction was not complete, but that was not the grounds stated in the objection. In our opinion this instruction left the question of whether such conduct was negligence as a matter of fact for the jury to determine. We cannot see how appellant was harmed by this instruction because it is the well settled law that if a party by the exercise of ordinary care in any particular could have avoided the accident, he would not be entitled to recover. Brooks v. Muncie, etc., Traction Co. (1911), 176 Ind. 298, 95 N.E. 1006. Appellant has attempted to raise other objections here to this instruction, but since they were not made to the trial court, we may not consider them. Rule 1-7, Rules of the Supreme Court.
Finally, appellant contends by the fifth specification of his motion for a new trial of "Irregularity in the proceedings of the court in this, to-wit: that the court permitted the verdict to be received by the Hon. Don N. Laramore who had not presided at said trial and had no jurisdiction therein, which said verdict was received, entered of record and the jury discharged by the said Don N. Laramore, in the absence of Hon. Robert E. Thompson, Special Judge, who presided at said trial."
Appellant's special bill of exceptions discloses the following facts:
"That on the 6th day of April, 1949, said cause of action was being tried in the Starke Circuit Court; that the Hon. Robert E. Thompson was presiding as Special Judge, and that said cause was being tried with a jury; that said cause was submitted to said jury at approximately 2:25 o'clock P.M. on said date and that said jury retired to the jury room to deliberate and remained in said jury room until about 5:10 o'clock P.M., when by agreement of the attorneys for the respective parties made in the presence of the respective parties, said jury was called into the court room and in open court in the presence of the parties and their counsel was instructed by the Hon. Robert E. Thompson, Special Judge then presiding, that if the said jury reached a verdict, by, say ten o'clock, that the Hon. Don N. Laramore, the regular judge of the Starke Circuit Court, would receive the verdict, otherwise an envelope would be furnished for said jury to return a sealed verdict; that counsel for each of the parties herein, and the respective parties in person were present and did not object. That said Hon. Don N. Laramore accordingly was left in charge; that at approximately 10:00 o'clock P.M. on said date, a verdict was delivered to Hon. Don N. Laramore in the court room of the Starke Circuit Court who received and entered said verdict of record and discharged said jury, without any objection or offer of objection in the absence of Special Judge Hon. Robert E. Thompson who was the presiding Judge at said trial. Neither of the parties or counsel were present when the verdict was returned, but counsel for defendant was advised when the jury was ready to return its verdict, and such counsel requested Judge Laramore to proceed to receive the verdict in his absence."
The record discloses and we take judicial knowledge of the fact that the Hon. Don N. Laramore was Judge of the Starke Circuit Court. A regularly constituted Judge of a court of 7, 8. general jurisdiction may properly receive the verdict in a case tried by another Judge, when same is done without objection. Spurlock v. State of Ind. (1916), 185 Ind. 638, 114 N.E. 209.
We are of the opinion this cause was fairly tried, a just result reached, and no reversible error has been shown.
Judgment affirmed.
Draper, C.J., not participating.
NOTE. — Reported in 90 N.E.2d 351.