An action has been defined as a legal demand of one's rights in a court of justice. LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 379 (Wyo. 1994); see also 1A C.J.S. Actions § 2 (1985); Elmo v. James, 282 S.W. 835 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926). Section 14-17-04(2), N.D.C.C., is referring to an appropriate legal demand of one's rights, not the appropriate circumstances under which the demand of rights is asserted.

Generally, this Court has long recognized the strong state policy in legitimacy to avoid disruption of family relationships. Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Wyo. 1994); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The legislature's intent to insure children born during wedlock will not be considered illegitimate is expressed in the statutory presumption of paternity accorded to a man married to the mother at the time of the child's birth.

The appellant is entitled to contest the appellee's paternity pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 14-2-104(b) (1994). See LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 378 (Wyo.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). Section 14-2-104(b) provides:

We review an award of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard. LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo. 1994). A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

[¶ 13] We review a district court's decision on whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 884 P.2d 979, 983 (Wyo.1994) (citing LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo.1994) ). Our touchstone inquiry in determining whether a court abused its discretion is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Dewey v. Dewey, 2001 WY 107, ¶ 18, 33 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Wyo.2001) ; Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998).

We do note that, in accordance with the common law, the couple's legal union at the time of the child's birth is extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage. See People ex rel. R.T.L., 780 P.2d 508, 515 n. 11 (Colo. 1989) ("We acknowledge that the presumption that a child born during wedlock is the legitimate child of the marriage was one of the strongest presumptions known to the common law."); Cicero v. Cicero, 395 N.Y.S.2d 117, 117 (App.Div. 1977) (presumption of legitimacy attached to "issue of the marriage"); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994) ("The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest in law."); see also Godin, 168 Vt. at 522, 725 A.2d at 910 ("Thus, the State retains a strong and direct interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically merely because of a parent's belated and self-serving concern over a child's biological origins."). ¶ 59. Lisa raises three additional reasons why we cannot affirm the temporary visitation award.

Given all of these factors, there is substantially less adverse impact on children in single-parent homes and substantially less stigma for a child whose parents are not married. The district court's lack of concern about elevating the "marital" presumption reflects the impact of these cultural changes, and this Court can find no reason to disagree. The strong policy of legitimacy that attends the marital presumption as set out in LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994), has diminished with the changes in societal values discussed herein. [¶ 19] The Court agrees with the decision of the district court. There are two men, each seeking an adjudication of paternity, and the statutory presumptions asserted by each man must be resolved by considering the "weightier considerations of policy and logic."

Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 1991). [¶ 18] We review district court sanctions imposed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 11 for an abuse of discretion. LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). We recently established several factors that a district court should prospectively consider in imposing W.R.C.P. 11 sanctions.

Global Shipping Trading, Ltd. v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Wyo. 1995) ( quoting Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1177-80 (Wyo. 1986)). The same rule is invoked with respect to sanctions sought under W.R.C.P. 11. Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 517 (Wyo. 1995); Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 884 P.2d 979, 983 (Wyo. 1994); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose the sanctions that are the subject of the appeal in Case No. 98-116, which was consolidated with Case No. 97-330.

We have said many times in a variety of contexts that we need not consider issues not supported by cogent argument. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1995); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441 (Wyo. 1995); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374 (Wyo. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994); Matter of Adoption of BBC, 831 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1992); Secrest v. Secrest, 781 P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 1989); Daulton v. Daulton, 774 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 1989); Edwards v. Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1987); Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34 (Wyo. 1984); Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1984). Particularly noteworthy is this language: