Opinion
No. 59240.
11-15-2012
In the Matter of L.B., A Minor, L.B., Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order affirming the recommendation of a hearing master to adjudicate appellant, L.B., delinquent for burglary and grand larceny. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William O. Voy, Judge.
Appellant first contends that insufficient evidence supports his delinquency adjudication because the only evidence that he was the person responsible for the charged offenses was unreliable eyewitness testimony. Appellant asserts that all eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliable and in this case the eyewitness identification testimony was not credible and the identification was the result of an unnecessarily suggestive showup.
We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that appellant was the person responsible for the burglary and grand larceny beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ; Vega v. State, 126 Nev. ––––, ––––, 236 P.3d 632, 639 (2010).
The victim testified that she saw appellant “rummaging through” her car. He removed some items then ran away. When appellant turned back, the victim saw his face. Shortly after the event, the victim identified appellant as the person who was in her car and identified him again during the adjudication hearing. From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that appellant was the person who committed the charged offenses. See Stephans v. State, 127 Nev. ––––, ––––, 262 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (“In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence ..., regardless whether the evidence was admitted erroneously.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). The weight and credibility of eyewitness and conflicting testimony is solely within the province of the fact-finder. Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981) ; Wise v. State, 92 Nev. 181, 183, 547 P.2d 314, 315 (1976).
To the extent appellant invites this court to reconsider our prior holdings, see, e.g., Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 498, 960 P.2d 321, 333 (1998) ; Wise, 92 Nev. at 183, 547 P.2d at 315, and conclude that eyewitness testimony alone is insufficient as a matter of law to support an adjudication, we decline to do so. See U.S. v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (rejecting contention that based on “recent developments,” testimony of a single, uncorroborated eyewitness standing alone is insufficient to support a conviction); Crawford v. State, 688 S.E.2d 409, 410–11 (Ga.Ct.App.2009) (arguments regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification pertain to the credibility of the witness and weight to be given the testimony, a province of the jury); Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d 845, 847–50 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (rejecting contention that in light of unreliability of eyewitness testimony, eyewitness' testimony is insufficient to sustain a conviction). Further, while we recognize that eyewitness testimony may in some instances be unreliable, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1967) ; White v. State, 112 Nev. 1261, 1266, 926 P.2d 291, 294 (1996) (Rose, J., dissenting), we do not agree that it cannot serve as the basis for an adjudication that comports with due process, see Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 716, 728 (2012).
Appellant also contends that the hearing master abused his discretion by allowing a police officer to testify regarding statements made by another juvenile apprehended at the scene of the offense. Appellant contends this testimony was admitted in error because it was hearsay, see NRS 51.035, 51.065(1), its admission violated his right to confrontation, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), and its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, see NRS 48.035(2). We conclude that any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1189, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008), and we
ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED.