Opinion
C.A 2:20-cv-03862-RMG-MGB
11-15-2021
SHERRY LAWTON, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [1] Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Sherry Lawton (“Plaintiff”), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding for further consideration.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff initially filed applications for DIB and SSI on March 30, 2018, alleging a disability onset date of October 17, 2017. (R. at 24.) Plaintiff was 53 years old on her alleged disability onset date. (R. at 32.) Plaintiff claimed disability due, inter alia, herniated neck disks, “tingling/burning under feet, ” blood clots in leg, breast cancer stage 2, tendonitis in right shoulder, arthritis, “sciatica on each side, ” and vision problems. (R. at 303.) Plaintiff has a high school education and past relevant work as a picker, nurse aide, telephone operator, brazier, and an electrical accessories assembler. (R. at 32, 304.) Her applications were both denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 24.) After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision on January 8, 2020, in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 24-34.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, (R. at 1-5), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2019.
(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 17, 2017, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
(3) The claimant has the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, impingement syndrome of the right shoulder, breast cancer, status post left-sided mastectomy, peripheral neuropathy, and lymphedema of the left arm (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can frequently engage in bilateral overhead reaching. She can frequently engage in reaching (in all other directions) and handling with her non-dominant left upper extremity. She can tolerate occasional exposure to vibration and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery. She remains
capable of tasks consistent with a reasoning development level of 2 or less as defined in the DOT. She can occasionally interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.
(6) The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a picker and electrical accessories assembler. These jobs do not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
(7) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 17, 2017, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).(R. at 24-34.)
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act also provides that SSI disability benefits shall be available for aged, blind, or disabled persons who have income and resources below a specific amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. “Disability” is defined in the Act as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (DIB context); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (SSI context).
“[T]he definition of disability is the same under both DIB and SSI. . . .” Morgan v. Saul, 9:19-CV-1390-BHH-BM, 2020 WL 3318630, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. June 3, 2020) (citing Emberlin v. Astrue, No. 06-4136, 2008 WL 565185, at *1 n.3 (D.S.D. Feb. 29, 2008)).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (DIB context); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (SSI context). If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (DIB context); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (SSI context).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, ” the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherry-pick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence of Plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Anne Hutchinson and Dr. Willie B. Louis. (Dkt. No. 9.) The undersigned agrees that the ALJ failed to evaluate these treating physicians' opinions in accordance with the applicable regulations and, therefore, this matter should be remanded so the ALJ can properly assess this opinion evidence.
A. Consideration of Opinion Evidence
Under the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, the ALJ must consider each medical opinion and prior administrative medical finding in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (“We will articulate in our determination or decision how persuasive we find all of the medical opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in your case record.”). For benefits applications filed on or after March 27, 2017 (such as Plaintiff's), the SSA has enacted substantial revisions to the regulations governing the evaluation of opinion evidence and prior administrative medical findings. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). Under the new regulations, ALJs need not assign an evidentiary weight to medical opinions or prior administrative findings and need not give special deference to treating source opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (providing that ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical sources”). Instead, ALJs consider medical opinions and prior administrative findings using five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) the medical source's relationship with the claimant; (4) the medical source's specialization; and (5) other factors, such as the medical source's familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or understanding of the disability program's policies and evidentiary requirements. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c), 416.920c(b), (c).
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c has replaced the “Treating Physician Rule” for claims filed after March 27, 2017; see also Marshall v. Berryhill, Case No. 16-cv-00666-BAS-PCL, 2017 WL 2060658, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2017). Under the Treating Physician Rule, a treating physician “opinion must be given controlling weight unless it is based on medically unacceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or is contradicted by the other substantial evidence in the record.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 107 (emphasis in original).
Supportability and consistency are the most important of the factors, and the ALJ must explicitly address how he considered these factors in evaluating each medical opinion and prior administrative finding. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2). The ALJ is not required to explain the consideration of the other three factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 426.920c(b)(2). For supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are, ” the “more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). Similarly, for consistency, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical findings(s) is with evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources, ” the “more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Although these amended regulations do away with the idea of assigning “weight” to medical opinions, the ALJ's reasons for finding the opinion of a medical source unpersuasive still must be supported by substantial evidence. The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.” Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869 (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Arakas, 983 F.3d at 98. Moreover, “an ALJ continues to have an obligation to include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Pearce v. Saul, No. CV 0:20-1623-PJG, 2020 WL 7585915, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2020) (internal quotations omitted); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).”). Similarly, remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated. Mascio, 780 F.3d 636-37. The ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.” Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (citation omitted).
B. Treating Physicians' Opinions and the ALJ's Decision
The record includes two “Medical Statement[s] Regarding Physical Abilities and Limitations” completed by Plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Louis and Dr. Hutchinson. (R. at 996, 1046.) The record shows Dr. Hutchinson provided consistent care as Plaintiff's treating oncologist for Plaintiff's breast cancer from March 2018 through June 2019. (See, inter alia, R. at 575-76, 1010-12.) The record shows Dr. Louis provided consistent treatment as Plaintiff's primary care physician from October 2018 through August 2019. (See, inter alia, R. at 858, 1031.)
Dr. Louis completed his medical statement on August 29, 2019, and Dr. Hutchinson completed her medical statement on August 30, 2019. (R. at 996, 1046.) Both statements are “circle the answer” forms, and the treating physicians circled identical limitations. More specifically, both physicians opined that Plaintiff could stand at one time for 60 minutes, sit at one time for 2 hours, and could work for 6 hours a day. They indicated Plaintiff could lift 10 pounds on an occasional basis and 5 pounds on a frequent basis. They indicated Plaintiff could occasionally bend, stoop, use her left hand for manipulation, and raise her left arm over her shoulder level. They indicated that Plaintiff could frequently use her right hand for manipulation and raise her right arm over shoulder level. They indicated that Plaintiff would occasionally need to elevate her legs during an 8-hour workday. In her medical statement, Dr. Hutchinson specified that this limitation was “due to history of blood clots.” (R. at 996.) Both physicians opined that Plaintiff's impairments or treatment would cause her to be absent from work for a full day about 3 days a month, and that Plaintiff's impairments, pain, and or effects of medication would cause her to be off task at work for 20 percent of the workday. (R. at 996, 1046.)
In his decision, the ALJ found these treating physicians' opinions were “collectively not persuasive, ” stating:
The August 2019 “circle the answer” residual functional capacity forms provided by Drs. Willie Louis and Anne Hutchinson (Exhibits 30F and 31F) are collectively not persuasive. Despite their status as treating sources, their forms advise that the claimant cannot even sit, stand, or walk for a full day and would be absent and off-task at levels that remain wholly unsupported by the relatively benign records. For certain, their own records do not support such limitations, many of which remain speculative in nature and others (such as the use of the right hand and the need to elevate her legs) that are not supported at all by the impairments at issue. These restrictions are out of proportion to the records made available.(R. at 32.) The ALJ does not expressly mention these physicians anywhere else in his decision.
C. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his assessment of the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians by, inter alia: (1) failing to adequately address the factors of consistency and supportability under § 404.1520c and § 416.920c; and (2) improperly discounting these opinions as “speculative.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 32-35.) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ's assessment of this opinion evidence is supported by substantial evidence because: (1) the ALJ properly found these opinions were “wholly unsupported by the relatively benign records, ” which the ALJ discussed earlier in his decision; and (2) the ALJ properly noted that the physicians' own treatment record did not support such extreme functional limitations. (Dkt. No. 10 at 17-21.)
Here, the undersigned agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to properly address the supportability of this opinion evidence under § 404.1520c and § 416.920c, and therefore, remand is appropriate. While the Commissioner cites treatment records from Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis to support the ALJ's assessment, the ALJ did not cite these specific treatment records anywhere in his opinion. (Dkt. No. 10 at 19.) The Court may not consider the Commissioner's post-hoc rationalizations for the ALJ's decision-making. See Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Commissioner's argument in part because it consisted of “a post[-]hoc rationalization”) (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)); Alexander v. Colvin, No. 9:14-2194-MGL-BM, 2015 WL 2399846, at *6 (D.S.C. May 19, 2015) (rejecting Commissioner's argument as “only a post hoc rationalization for upholding the decision, since that is not actually what the ALJ did”).
Indeed, the ALJ did not mention Dr. Louis' treatment records anywhere in his decision. And the ALJ only briefly referenced Dr. Hutchinson's treatment records in his discussion of the objective medical evidence, as follows:
She is status-post breast cancer, left-sided mastectomy performed in April 2018 (Exhibit 9F). . . . Her March 2018 cancer notes describe her as “fully active, [and] able to carry on all pre-disease performance without restriction” (Exhibit 9F/12). Records from this same timeframe indicate that she was then asymptomatic as related to the cancer, so this statement is persuasive insofar as it relates to the cancer alone as of this time.(R. at 30-31.)
Notably, the ALJ emphasized that the “March 2018 cancer notes” and the “records from this same timeframe” provided persuasive evidence of Plaintiff being “asymptomatic. . . . insofar as it relates to the cancer alone as of this time.” (R. at 31 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff's treatment with Dr. Hutchinson extended well beyond March 2018 and the ALJ did not address any of those records. Further, as previously noted, the ALJ did not address any of Dr. Louis' treatment records. Records from both physicians, dating closer to the time they issued their opinions, contain notations that arguably could support some of the limitations they opined. For example, on March 5, 2019, records from Dr. Louis note that Plaintiff is “still having swelling in [sic] pain in both feet. . . . [Plaintiff] questions if pain from back could be raising issue with feet.” (R. at 861.) On June 25, 2019, Dr. Hutchinson noted Plaintiff “continues to report neuropathy. She has pain primarily after standing for long periods. She also complains of left upper extremity lymphedema. . . .” (R. at 1011.)
Because the ALJ did not explain how the treatment records of Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis failed to support their opinions, and he appeared to cherry-pick his limited summary of these records, the undersigned cannot determine whether the ALJ's conclusions about these opinions are supported by substantial evidence. See Arakas, 983 F.3d at 98 (“In evaluating a disability claim, ‘[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.'” (quoting Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869)); see also Cloninger v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-00508-KDB, 2021 WL 3885921, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 31, 2021) (remanding for failure to properly assess opinion evidence under current regulations because, inter alia, the ALJ failed to identify how the opinion is “inconsistent with the medical record” and appeared to have cherry-picked facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding); Pearce, 2020 WL 7585915, at *3 (remanding for failure to properly assess opinion evidence under current regulations because “the ALJ has failed to explain how the evidence supports her conclusion and meaningful review is frustrated”).
Further, the ALJ did not acknowledge the significant lifting limitations opined by Dr. Louis and Dr. Hutchinson. (R. at 32, 996, 1046.) Both physicians opined that Plaintiff could lift 10 pounds on an occasional basis and 5 pounds on a frequent basis. (R. at 996, 1046.) This omission is troubling given that the ALJ did not assess any lifting limitations in his RFC finding. (R. at 32.) The limitations opined by these physicians could support a finding that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time . . . .) As Plaintiff notes, the testimony at the ALJ hearing from the ALJ and the Vocational Expert indicated that an exertional level of sedentary would render Plaintiff disabled, given her age. (Dkt. No. 9 at 30; R. at 103.) Consequently, the ALJ's assessment of the opinions from Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis could directly impact Plaintiff's RFC.
Based on the ALJ's inadequate consideration of the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians, the Court cannot find that the ALJ built “an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion” that Plaintiff is not disabled. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189. The RFC adopted by the ALJ did not account for the functional limitations opined by Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis. The ALJ's decision regarding the evaluation of their opinions is not supported by substantial evidence, and remand is therefore appropriate. See, e.g., Marquita F. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-456 (JAG), 2021 WL 3645101, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2021) (remanding for failure to properly assess opinion evidence under current regulations where ALJ did not explain how he “concluded that Dr. Hackelton's opinion was unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the record”; noting “[t]he ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Hackelton's opinion fails to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion” (internal quotations omitted)), adopted sub nom. Marquita R. F. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 3641464 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2021).
Given the ALJ's finding that many of limitations opined by Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis were “speculative, ” it may be appropriate, on remand, for the ALJ to recontact these physicians for clarification and/or order further examinations. However, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the undersigned does not find that the ALJ's failure to do so in the first instance provides an independent basis for remand. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b)(2), 416.920b(b)(2) (“If the evidence is consistent but we have insufficient evidence to determine whether you are disabled, or if after considering the evidence we determine we cannot reach a conclusion about whether you are disabled, we will determine the best way to resolve the inconsistency or insufficiency.”).
In sum, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the opinions of Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Louis, and remand is warranted for proper consideration of this opinion evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and that the case be REMANDED for a new hearing consistent with this Report & Recommendation.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).