Lawson v. United States

3 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Sawyer

    74 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Mass. 1999)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that coram nobis allows for relief in light of a dispositive change in the law created by a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court

    That a guilty plea may be vacated due to a subsequent Supreme Court decision through the writ of coram nobis is well supported in federal law. Lewis, 478 F.2d at 836 (vacating plea-conviction due to subsequent Supreme Court decision), DeCecco, 485 F.2d at 374 (vacating plea-conviction due to subsequent Supreme Court decision); United States v. Aversa, 762 F. Supp. 441, 448 (D.N.H. 1991) (applying coram nobis analysis to plea-conviction, but declining to vacate on other grounds); Lawson v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 370, 371 (N.D.Ga. 1975) (vacating plea-conviction due to subsequent Supreme Court decision); United States v. Russo, 358 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D.N.J. 1973) (vacating plea-conviction due to subsequent Supreme Court decision); United States v. Summa 362 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D.Conn. 1972) (vacating plea-conviction due to subsequent Supreme Court decision). These decisions support the similar premise in Bousley, that a guilty plea is invalid if the acts of the defendant are not made criminal.

  2. Matthew v. United States

    471 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    28 U.S.C. ยง 2401(a); Crown Coat Front Co., Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 853, 89 S.Ct. 123, 21 L.Ed.2d 122 (1968). See also Lawson v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.Ga. 1975). As a third party beneficiary, NEDCF's claim would accrue at the same time as that of NBL, the alleged promisee under third party beneficiary concepts.

  3. Davis v. State

    116 Idaho 401 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 78 times
    In Davis, the Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged that the postconviction court's written decision did not thoroughly address each of the petitioner's claims; nevertheless, the court independently examined the record as to each claim and concluded that denial of relief was proper.

    State v. Aragon, supra. Although the jury was able to observe these exhibits while their admissibility was being resolved, the court neutralized any prejudice arguably flowing from that view by instructing the jury not to consider any offered evidence that was rejected by the court. See United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, Lawson v. United States, 420 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 1446, 43 L.Ed.2d 762 (1975). In addition, once the inadmissible exhibits had been refused, they were apparently removed from the juror's view.