Delaware recognizes the traditional "but for" definition of proximate causation. Laws v. Webb, Del.Supr., 658 A.2d 1000 (1995); Moffitt v. Carroll, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 169, 174 (1994); Culver, 588 A.2d at 1097. "[O]ur time-honored definition of proximate cause . . . is that direct cause without which [an] accident would not have occurred."

e.g. Boyd v. Hammond, Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 413, 416 (1963).Laws v. Webb, Del. Supr., 658 A.2d 1000, 1008-09 (1995).Boyd, 187 A.2d at 416; White v. Clark, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-01-107-JOH, Herlihy, J., mem. op. at 3 (Dec. 16, 1998); Baio v. Zalis, Del. Super., C.A. No. 86C-JN-56, Del Pesco, J., mem. op. at 6 (Oct. 19, 1990).

Delaware recognizes the traditional "but for" definition of proximate causation. Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000 (Del. 1995); Moffitt v. Carroll, 640 A.2d 169, 174 (Del. 1994); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Del. 1991). "Our time-honored definition of proximate cause . . . is that direct cause without which an accident would not have occurred."

See Duphily, 662 A.2d at 828-29.See Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Del. 1995) (quoting Chudnofsky v. Edwards, 208 A.2d 516, 518 (Del. 1965)).Laws, 658 A.2d at 1007 (quoting James v. Krause, 75 A.2d 237, 241 (Del. 1950)).

Absent qualification of the witness as an expert in accident reconstruction, opinion testimony on the "primary contributing circumstance" of an accident is inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 701. Because the admission of this opinion testimony jeopardized the fairness of the trial in this case, we reverse and remand this matter for a new trial. 658 A.2d 1000 (Del. 1995).I. Factual Background

A proximate cause is defined as "that direct cause without which the accident would not have occurred." See Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Del. 1995). 4. Defendant United States' employee was negligent when he ran a stop sign.

To satisfy this test, "a proximate cause must be one `which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Emerson v. United States, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6461, *16 (D. Del. 1998) (citing Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Del. 1995)). "Proof of nothing more than the occurrence of a fall is insufficient to show negligence."Hess, 666 F. Supp. at 671.

SeeSheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales , 15 A.3d 1247, 1257 (Del. 2011) (noting that the General Assembly "made a policy decision to set gross negligence as the floor—not the ceiling—for invoking [the Child Victim's Act's] applicability"); Laws v. Webb , 658 A.2d 1000, 1006 (Del. 1995) (noting that the General Assembly adopted comparative negligence to abolish the " ‘all or nothing’ common law rule of contributory negligence," and, thus, the Court "perceive[ed] no logical basis to retain the ‘all or nothing’ doctrine of last clear chance"), overruled on other grounds byLagola v. Thomas , 867 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 2005) ; In re Rural/Metro Corp. S'holders Litig. , 102 A.3d 205, 222–23 (Del. Ch. 2014) (noting that the General Assembly enacted the Delaware Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in order to abolish "the common law ban on contribution" among joint tortfeasors). I am reminded of Justice Wolcott's opinion in Ciociola v. Delaware Coca–Cola Bottling Co. , where he cautioned against dispensing with common-law shields to liability without input from the legislature.

See D.R.E. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible . . . ."); D.R.E. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); D.R.E. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); see also Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1010 (Del. 1995) (finding the plaintiff's alcohol consumption relevant, partly because "[it] could assist in the jury's determination of her perceptive abilities around the time of the accident"), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891 (Del. 2005); Scott v. Ritterson, 2004 WL 1790134, at *2 (Del. Super.

Legislation of that kind does not amount to the General Assembly exercising "judicial power," nor does it raise a separation of powers issue.See, e.g., A.W. Fin. Servs., S.A. v. Empire Res., Inc., 981 A.2d 1114, 1122 (Del. 2009) (noting that the General Assembly may repeal the common law by statute, but "the legislative intent to do so [must be] plainly or clearly manifested" (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Del. 1995) ("The enactment of the comparative negligence statute manifests a legislative intent to change Delaware's common law rule of contributory negligence."), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 2005); Acierno v. Worthy. Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Del. 1995) ("Courts have also held that legislative intent to change the common law must be clearly expressed. . . .").See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) (holding that Courts may assume "that Congress has legislated with an expectation that [preclusion] principle[s] will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."