Opinion
19-P-1664
11-03-2020
Warren C. LAWRENCE v. SWANSEA WATER DISTRICT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Warren C. Lawrence, brought the underlying action seeking overtime compensation for time he spent working from home while on call. Although Lawrence received an on-call stipend, he claims that the defendant, Swansea Water District (water district), should have also paid him overtime at the rate of time and one-half for the on-call work. A jury agreed, and awarded Lawrence $69,000 in damages on his quantum meruit claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Lawrence, and without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence did not permit a reasonable juror to find that Lawrence had a reasonable expectation of payment. See Waite v. Goal Sys. Int'l, Inc., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 700, 701 (2002) (standard of review). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and reverse the order denying the water district's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Lawrence also brought claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. He did not prevail on his breach of contract claim, and the jury did not reach the issue of unjust enrichment. Neither party raises any arguments with respect to either of these other claims.
1. Background. Lawrence was an hourly, weekend treatment operator for the water district from 2006 through 2010. His regular hours were 7:30 A.M. to 4 P.M. , Thursday to Monday. He was also on call between shifts each Friday, Saturday, and Sunday evening until the following morning. Being "on call" meant that he needed to be fit for duty and available to respond to issues that arose. Lawrence received a seventy-five dollar stipend for every two weeks of on-call coverage, which he calculated to amount to seventy-eight cents per hour of on-call time.
While on call, Lawrence had to be near a cell phone and computer provided by the water district so that he could receive and resolve alarms regarding drinking water quality. When Lawrence received an alarm, he needed to determine whether the problem could be resolved using the computer at home, or whether he had to go into work to fix the problem. Lawrence was instructed to fix problems using the computer if possible, rather than to go into work and claim overtime.
The water district's employee handbook provided for overtime compensation as follows: "Service employees shall be paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) times [their] regular rate of pay for work in excess of eight (8) hours in one day and/or forty (40) hours in one (1) week including Saturday and Sunday. Service employees called back to work shall be guaranteed a minimum of two (2) hours of pay at a time and one-half for number [of] hours worked." At the time he was hired, Lawrence was told that he would be compensated for overtime he worked. He was subsequently told that he would not receive overtime pay for work he did on the computer at home while on call because that work was included in the on-call stipend.
The employee handbook provided that "[s]ervice employees shall be paid bi-weekly for standby duty in accordance with the rates established by the Board of Water Commissioners."
Lawrence disagreed with this position and, throughout his tenure at the water district, he requested overtime pay for the work he did at home using the water district computer. In response, Lawrence was consistently told that he was not to request overtime compensation for such instances because the overtime provisions in the employee handbook applied only when employees had to go into work to resolve alarms. In late 2006 or early 2007, Lawrence complained to his immediate supervisor, Michael Bacon, and to the water district's superintendent, Robert Marquis, regarding the overtime compensation issue, to no avail. Later, in 2007, Lawrence made a presentation regarding the issue at a meeting of the board of water commissioners. The minutes of that meeting reflect that Lawrence requested that he "be paid during the time while on the computer at his home. At present, this is included with the on call pay." The board denied the request, based on its understanding that the computer work was only "momentary." After the issue was again put to the water district at an employee meeting during the summer of 2010, Lawrence knew that his compensation would not change.
Not long thereafter, on December 2, 2010, Lawrence resigned from his position because the water district would not pay overtime for the time he spent working from home on the computer while on call. Lawrence testified that he had worked eight to ten hours on the computer at home per week for which he never received overtime compensation.
2. Discussion. The water district argues that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed because Lawrence failed to prove that he had a reasonable expectation that, in addition to receiving the on-call stipend, he would be paid overtime for his work on the computer at home. We agree.
The water district raised the same argument in a motion for directed verdict following the close of evidence.
We review the denial of the water district's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lawrence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Lawrence proved the elements of quantum meruit. See Biewald v. Seven Ten Storage Software, Inc., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 376, 380 (2018). To recover in quantum meruit, Lawrence was required to prove that he conferred a measurable benefit on the water district for which he reasonably expected to receive overtime compensation, and that the water district accepted the benefit with knowledge of Lawrence's reasonable expectation. See Finard & Co., LLC v. Sitt Asset Mgt., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 229 (2011). In addition, Lawrence was required to prove that the water district allowed him "so to act without objection." Home Carpet Cleaning Co. v. Baker, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 879, 880 (1974).
There was ample evidence that Lawrence conferred a measurable benefit on the water district by resolving problems from home using the water district's computer. There was also ample evidence that Lawrence subjectively believed that the on-call stipend was inadequate compensation for that work, and that he believed he should receive overtime pay for it. The question is whether Lawrence presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that his expectation was objectively reasonable, and that the water district failed to object to that expectation.
Lawrence did not. The water district's policy, as articulated to Lawrence by Bacon, Marquis, and the entire board of water commissioners, was clear: time spent resolving alarms from home using the water district computer was "included with the on call pay." Lawrence points to the overtime provision in the employee handbook as the external point of reference by which to establish the reasonableness of his expectation. But the water district repeatedly and unequivocally told Lawrence that those provisions did not apply to the work at issue. Contrast Finard & Co., LLC, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 230 (reasonable expectation based on statements from defendant). While Lawrence may have subjectively believed that the overtime provisions of the employee handbook should be read to extend to the work he performed on the computer while at home on call, the employee handbook itself did not so state explicitly, and the water district consistently and uniformly told Lawrence it disagreed with his interpretation.
The water district's position was based on its view that such work was momentary; there is nothing to suggest that the water district accepted Lawrence's contention that the work took more time than that, or that it expected him to work more than momentarily on the computer while at home.
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For the first time at oral argument, Lawrence's counsel suggested that the reasonableness of Lawrence's expectation could be established with reference to the provisions of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, which counsel argued would entitle Lawrence to time and one-half for the work at issue. Put otherwise, Lawrence's argument is that it would be reasonable to expect to be paid consistent with the provisions of the Wage Act. Lawrence did not advance this theory below. Even were we inclined to consider it nonetheless for the first time on appeal, there was no evidence that Lawrence based his expectation of overtime payment on the Wage Act. Instead, as noted above, the theory at trial was that Lawrence's expectation was based on the employee handbook.
3. Conclusion. Because we conclude that Lawrence failed, as a matter of law, to satisfy the elements of quantum meruit, we do not address the water district's remaining arguments. The judgment is vacated, the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed, and a new judgment shall enter for the water district.
So ordered.
Vacated in part; vacated in part.