Opinion
C/A No. 8:19-cv-03586-RMG-JDA
01-07-2020
Frederick A. Law, Plaintiff, v. Keyunna Dorsey, Sgt. Chris Neal, Cpt. Lanita Patton, Major Jeff Johnson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Frederick A. Law ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Florence County Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. On March 2, 2018, Plaintiff was booked into the Detention Center. [Id. at 4-5.] When Plaintiff arrived at the Detention Center, he had $897 with him. [Id. at 5.] Upon his arrival, Plaintiff was searched by Defendant Dorsey, his money was placed on the counter, and he was placed in the detox holding cell. [Id.] Plaintiff asked Defendant Dorsey to count his money, but she stated, "'Boy don't nobody want your money.'" [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff knew how much money he had, and he went to sleep in the detox cell. [Id.] When Plaintiff woke up, Defendant Dorsey was gone and $200 of Plaintiff's money was missing. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dorsey stole his money. [Id. at 4.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he sustained mental and psychological injuries due to the fact that "[j]ustice was not served [and] no investigation was done." [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends his money was never returned. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests $1000 in damages and for Defendant Dorsey to be fired. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing grievances through the kiosk system at the Detention Center. [Id. at 8-9.] However, Plaintiff contends, a proper investigation was never conducted, and he was told to stop writing grievances about the situation. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff appears to be a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a due process violation related to the loss of Plaintiff's money. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dorsey stole $200 and that it was never returned. Nevertheless, despite these allegations, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below. Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim against Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson, and they are entitled to summary dismissal on that basis. Indeed, Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever in the Complaint against Defendants Neal and Johnson. Likewise, the only allegation in the Complaint against Defendant Patton is that she told Plaintiff "not to write about this situation anymore" after he filed a grievance. [Doc. 1 at 7.]
In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). "When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed." Faltas v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-cv-3077-TLW-SVH, 2012 WL 988105, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012), aff'd 489 F. App'x 720 (4th Cir. 2012).
Here, the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing against Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson, and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against these Defendants. In the absence of substantive allegations of wrongdoing against these Defendants, there is nothing from which this Court can liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against them. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless).
Accordingly, Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson are entitled to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no factual allegations against them to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (explaining complaint is subject to summary dismissal where no factual allegations against named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Plaintiff's Property Claim
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 as to the $200 allegedly taken by Defendant Dorsey. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dorsey stole $200 and never returned it. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a due process claim.
However, deprivations of personal property do not support actions for damages under § 1983. See Baker v. Stevenson, No. 8:13-cv-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). This is so because negligence, in general, is not actionable under § 1983. See Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75-78 (4th Cir. 1995); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987). Moreover, § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law. In other words, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a random and unauthorized deprivation of personal property by a state official does not rise to a federal due process violation where the state provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of the property or to compensate for the loss. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2008); Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561-63 (4th Cir. 2005); Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (4th Cir. 1986). Instead, the availability of a state cause of action for an alleged loss of property provides adequate procedural due process; in other words, where state law provides such a remedy, no federally guaranteed constitutional right is implicated. See King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986); Slaughter v. Anderson, 673 F. Supp. 929, 930 (N.D. Ill.1987). South Carolina law provides post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of personal property or to compensate for the loss. "[I]n South Carolina, prisoners may bring a civil action in state court for recovery of personal property against prison officials who deprived them of property without state authorization." Drake v. Brown, No. 6:09-cv-1449-JFA-WMC, 2009 WL 1749375, at *2 (D.S.C. June 22, 2009) (citing McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding South Carolina's post-deprivation remedy under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-69-10, et seq. sufficient to satisfy due process requirements)); see also Mosley v. Scarcella, No. 1:19-cv-1550-RMG-SVH, 2019 WL 4280129, at *2 (D.S.C. June 19, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3406612 (D.S.C. July 29, 2019).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence relating to his lost property, such a claim may be cognizable under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. Section 15-78-30 and its subparts encompass a "loss" of property from an occurrence of negligence proximately caused by a person employed by the State of South Carolina, a state agency, or political subdivision while acting within the scope of his or her employment. However, suits brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act must be brought in a state court within the boundaries of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-20(e) (providing that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff cannot pursue such a claim in this Court.
The Court makes no determination on the possible success of any claim Plaintiff may have in the state court.
Further, an unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee, even if intentional, "does not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for loss is available." Hammond v. Dean, No. 3:07-cv-654-SB, 2007 WL 3002362, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). Thus, even if Defendant Dorsey intentionally took Plaintiff's money, Plaintiff has a remedy under South Carolina law to obtain relief in state court. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530-36 (holding that intentional deprivations of property by State employees do not violate due process until and unless the State refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy); Mora, 519 F.3d at 230-31 (finding that the state courts were open to the plaintiff for claims of conversion or trespass to chattels and finding no reason to think that the state process was constitutionally inadequate); see also Samuel v. Ozmint, No. 3:07-cv-178-PMD-JRM, 2008 WL 512736, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (noting that claims related to taking of personal property are cognizable under South Carolina state law); Greene v. Stonebreaker, No. 9:06-cv-3392-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 2288123, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2007) (noting that a person in South Carolina appears to have adequate post-deprivation remedies for personal property loss). Plaintiff can bring an intentional tort civil action in the South Carolina state courts to remedy any intentional taking of his property. Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on any deprivation of his personal property fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge January 7, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).