Opinion
Civil Action CV-2022-82
08-02-2023
LAW OFFICE OF STEPHEAN C. CHUTE, ESQ. and STEPHEAN C, CHUTE, ESQ., Plaintiffs/ Counterclaim Defendants, v. LEGAL-EASE, LLC and JEFFREY BENNETT, ESQ., Defendants/ Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Mary Gay Kennedy, Justice.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants law Office of Stephean C. Chute, Esq., and Stephean C. Chute's (collectively, "Attorney Chute") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to Strike Affirmative Defenses. Defendants / Counterclaim Plaintiffs Legal-Ease, LLC ("Legal-Ease") and Jeffrey Bennett ("Attorney Bennett" and, collectively, "Defendants") oppose the motions. The Court grants the motion in part, as follows.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants request that the Court deny or stay the motion for summary judgment pending completion of Attorney Chute's deposition because the "terms of the parties' agreement is a disputed issue of material fact, which can only be settled after Mr. Chute's deposition is completed." (Defs/ Opp'n 1.) Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), however, requires that a party seeking a continuance to permit discovery to be had before responding to a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate by affidavits "that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition." Defendants have not shown by affidavit that they are unable to present affidavits to oppose Attorney Chute's position regarding the terms of the parties' agreement. In fact. Defendants did submit Attorney Bennett's affidavit on that subject. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' request.
I. Facts
The following is drawn from the parties' statements of material facts.
Attorney Chute is an experienced lawyer admitted to practice in Maine. (Pls.' S.M.F. ¶ 1; Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 20.) Through a series of email exchanges in January 2018, Attorney Chute and Defendants agreed that Attorney Chute would provide legal services to Defendants' clients on certain agreed terms. (Pls.' S.M.F. ¶ 13.) Attorney Chute provided legal services for Defendants' clients from January 2018 through November 2021 on a project-by-project basis. (Pls.' S.M.F. ¶ 3; Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 21.) Attorney Chute provided all work product as drafts, and Attorney Bennett revised the work, affixed his signature, filed, and served the filings. (Pls.' S.M.F. ¶ 6.) Attorney Chute did not assume docket responsibility or enter an appearance in any trial court on behalf of any of Defendants' clients. (Pls.' S.M.F. ¶ 7.)
At the end of January 2021, Attorney Chute met with Attorney Bennett at Legal-Ease's offices. (Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 23.) The purpose of the meeting was to discuss preparation of the opposition to the motion for summary judgment in Abraham v. Broaddus. (Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 24.) Attorney Chute was engaged at that meeting to draft the opposition. (Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 26.)
Attorney Chute objects to Defendants' citations to the transcript of Attorney Chute's deposition on the grounds that a "conformed copy" of the deposition was not filed or served. A copy of the transcript of the deposition was attached to and filed with Defendants' opposition to Attorney Chute's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Attorney Chute does not identify specific deficiencies in the form of the transcript, and no deficiencies are plain to the Court.
The motion for summary judgment filed in Abraham v. Broaddus included a certificate of service documenting service of the motion on January 25, 2021. (Defs.' Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 31.) Attorney Chute knew that the opposition to the motion for summary judgment was due by February 15, 2021. (Defs/ Add'l S.M.F. ¶¶ 29, 30, 32.) Attorney Chute began work on the opposition to the motion for summary judgment on February 25, 2021. (Defs/ Add'l S.M.F. ¶ 33.)
The portions of the record cited in support of paragraph 28 of Defendants' Additional Statement of Material Facts are inconsistent with each other. Because the statement is not properly supported, it will not be considered.
Attorney Chute did not provide work product to Defendants by the deadline to file an opposition, and the deadline was missed. (Defs/ Add'l S.M.F. ¶¶ 34, 35.) Attorney Chute offered to perform and did perform additional work to attempt to mitigate the effect of the missed deadline and to respond to a motion for sanctions filed by the opposing party in Abraham v. Broaddus. (Defs/ Add'l S.M.F. ¶¶ 37, 38.)
As was his usual practice, Attorney Chute provided all work product in Abraham v. Broaddus as drafts. (Pls/ S.M.F. ¶ 15.) Attorney Chute did not assume docket responsibility or enter an appearance in Abraham v. Broaddus. (Pls/ S.M.F. ¶ 16.) All work delivered by Attorney Chute related to Abraham v. Broaddus was specifically requested by Defendants. (Pls/ S.M.F. ¶ 17.)
II Discussion
Attorney Chute moves for partial summary judgment on Count II of Defendants' Counterclaim and moves to strike affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants.
A. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if tire summary judgment record, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at trial." Chartier v. Farm Fam. Life Ins. Co., 2015 ME 29, ¶ 6, 113 A.3d 234; see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a 'genuine issue' when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact." Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, ¶ 8, 261 A.3d 233 (quoting Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass'n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 8, 13 A.3d 773). To survive a counterclaim defendant's motion for summary judgment, a counterclaim plaintiff must present a prima facie case for each challenged element of her claim. See Boivin v. Somatex, Inc., 2022 ME 44, ¶ 10, 279 A.3d 393.
The summary judgment record consists only of the parties' properly supported statements of material fact and the portions of the record referenced therein. See Dorsey v. N. Light Health, 2022 ME 62, ¶ 10, 288 A.3d 386. To controvert an opposing party's statement of fact, a party must "support each denial or qualification by a record citation." M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2).
Count II of Defendants' Counterclaim is a claim for breach of contract. Defendants allege that Attorney Chute breached an agreement to punctually provide legally sound work product by failing to timely draft the summary judgment opposition in Abraham v. Broaddus, resulting in damage to Defendants' client and Defendants.
This is a professional negligence claim. Legal malpractice claims may sound in tort, contract, or breach of fiduciary duty, but the Law Court has held that professional negligence claims, including legal malpractice claims, must be analyzed according to tort law principles. Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 5 n.3, 765 A.2d 571; see Graves v. S.E. Downey Registered Land Surveyor, P.A., 2005 ME 116, ¶ 10, 885 A.2d 779. Excepted from this rule, however, are "[c]laims regarding an express contract.. . such as an agreement to effect a particular outcome." Johnson, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 5 n.3, 765 A.2d 571.
The undisputed facts evidence that the parties agreed that Attorney Chute would provide legal services to Legal-Ease's clients on a project-by-project basis and that, as one of those projects, Attorney Chute would draft an opposition to the motion for summary judgment in Abraham v. Broaddus. The record contains no evidence that the parties had any other express contract that Attorney Chute breached. Nor does the record demonstrate any genuine dispute of material fact as to breach of an express term.
As discussed in the Court's Order on Attorney Chute's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, dated August 12, 2022, Defendants do not have standing to assert a legal malpractice claim. Defendants have not established the existence of an attorney-client relationship between themselves and Attorney Chute, nor have they cited any caselaw to support a legal malpractice claim against co-counsel. See Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 2001 ME 7, ¶ 9, 763 A.2d 1189 (setting out the test for determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists); Saveli v. Duddy, 2016 ME 139, ¶ 29, 147 A.3d 1179 (setting out factors to determine whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient). Accordingly, Attorney Chute is entitled to summary judgment on Count II of the Counterclaim.
B. Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
M.R. Civ. P. 12(f) requires that a motion to strike be brought before a responsive pleading is filed, but the Court may "upon [its] own initiative at any time" order any insufficient defense stricken. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(f). In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will consider the merits of the motion. Defendants' Answer asserts the following affirmative defenses, which Attorney Chute moves to strike:
1. The Complaint, in whole in or part [sic], fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
2. Law Offices of Stephean C. Chute, Esq., is not a legal entity, it lacks standing, and is not a proper party.
3. The Complaint, in whole or in part, fails for lack or failure of consideration.
4. Plaintiffs' claims are barred or estopped by unclean hands.
5. Plaintiffs missed deadlines, produced work which was legally not sound or well founded, and committed legal malpractice and, therefore, are estopped or barred from recovery.
6. Damages suffered by Defendants, due to the wrongful conduct of Plaintiffs, offset and/or exceed any damages alleged to be owed Plaintiffs.
7. Jeffrey Bennett, Esq. acted solely and exclusively in the capacity as President of Legal-Ease, LLC, P.A. and therefore is not a proper party.
8. Plaintiffs' time entries and invoices are unreasonable. 9. Plaintiffs performed services which were excessive and unnecessary and unreasonable.
10. Plaintiffs are seeking to collect for services which would have been unnecessary or avoidable by for the fact that Plaintiffs were mitigating their failure to meet a deadline.
11. Plaintiffs, in the underlying case, asserted ill-conceived and unfounded positions and therefore are not entitled to relief for such work product.(Defs.' Answer 4-5.)
Affirmative defenses five and eleven allege legal malpractice. As discussed above. Defendants do not have standing to raise legal malpractice claims. The Court will strike affirmative defenses five and eleven as insufficient.
Attorney Chute's memorandum of law contains no legal argument regarding the remaining affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the Court will not consider, at this time, striking the remaining affirmative defenses.
III Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Attorney Chute's motions as to Count II of the Counterclaim and Defendants' affirmative defenses five and eleven.
The entry is:
1. Plaintiffs I Counterclaim Defendants Law Office of Stephean C. Chute, Esq., and Stephean C. Chute's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, as follows: Summary judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants on Count II of Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Counterclaim.
2. Plaintiffs/ Counterclaim Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART, as follows: Defend ants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' affirmative defenses 5 and 11 are stricken.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).