Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo No. JV46364, Roger Picquet, Judge
Laverne D., in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
R. Wyatt Cash, County Counsel, Leslie H. Kraut, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
PERREN, J.
Laverne D. (mother), appearing in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the order of the juvenile court setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 with regard to her son J.D. We summarily deny the petition because mother has completely failed to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court (rule 8.452).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
J.D. was born in April 2002. On August 21, 2007, a section 300 petition was filed alleging failure to protect and no provision for support. The petition alleged that mother had been arrested for burglary and was in custody in the San Luis Obispo County jail. The petition further alleged that mother was chronically homeless and that J.D. faced "a substantial risk of neglect due to his mother's unstable lifestyle, unsafe associations, criminal history and inability to meet her son's emotional and physical needs." Mother also left J.D. in the care of his paternal grandparents for long periods of time, and continued to associate with a boyfriend who had physically abused her in J.D.'s presence.
J.D.'s father is not a party to these proceedings.
On August 22, 2007, the San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services (DSS) reported that J.D. has been placed with his paternal grandparents. On September 26, 2007, DSS filed its jurisdiction and disposition report recommending that J.D. be declared a dependent of the juvenile court and continue in his placement with his paternal grandparents. Family reunification services were ordered to be provided to mother, who was still in jail awaiting trial on nine burglary charges. Mother was subsequently granted contact visits with J.D. at the jail.
At the six-month review hearing, DSS recommended termination of reunification services, based in part on the fact that mother had been convicted and was serving three years in state prison. DSS also reported that J.D. was doing well in his placement with his paternal grandparents. Mother's attorney indicated that petitioner agreed with J.D.'s current placement and wanted it to continue. On April 8, 2008, mother's reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing was set for July 21, 2008.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to rule 8.452(a)(1)(D), a petition for an extraordinary writ to vacate an order of the juvenile court setting a section 366.26 hearing must include "[a] summary of the grounds of the petition." Rule 8.452(b) provides that the petition must be accompanied by a memorandum providing "a summary of the significant facts" with supporting citations to the record. "The memorandum must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and support each point by argument and citation of authority." (Rule 8.452(b)(2).) The memorandum "must, at a minimum, adequately inform the court of the issues presented, point out the factual support for them in the record, and offer argument and authorities that will assist the court in resolving the contested issues." (Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 583.)
Mother's petition simply states that she wants to reunify with J.D. and for him to remain in the custody of his paternal grandparents. She did not provide a memorandum of points and authorities, nor did she otherwise "offer argument and authorities that will assist the court in resolving the contested issues." (Glen C. v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) While the petition must be liberally construed (rule 8.452(a)(2)), liberal construction cannot cure mother's complete failure to comply with the straightforward procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Moreover, this failure constitutes "exceptional circumstances" justifying summary denial of the petition, as contemplated by rule 8.542(i)(1). (Glen C., supra, at p. 584; see also Anthony D. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 149, 157-158; Cresse S. v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 947, 956; Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1512.)
The petition for extraordinary writ is summarily denied. In light of the need to promptly proceed with the section 366.26 hearing, set for July 21, 2008, our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.