Opinion
No. 10–P–1788.
2012-05-23
Jeffrey LAVALLEY v. Leah L. GUZMAN.
By the Court (CYPHER, SMITH & FECTEAU, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The landlord, Leah L. Guzman, appeals from a judgment of the Housing Court in favor of the tenant, Jeffrey Lavalley, on his statutory quiet enjoyment claim. See G.L. c. 186, § 14. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment.
At the initial hearing on the complaint, a judge found that possession was no longer an issue and that the sole issue for resolution concerned the removal and temporary storage of Lavalley's belongings. Guzman, who elected not to purse a formal summary process action, claimed that after Lavalley abandoned the apartment (a claim he later denied), she removed all of Lavalley's personal belongings from the unit and placed them in secured areas on the premises, and that despite several demands, Lavalley had simply not picked up most of them. The judge ordered Lavalley to move his belongings into a storage facility with the cost of thirty days of storage to be paid by Guzman.
At a subsequent contempt hearing presided over by a different judge, Lavalley maintained that when he went to retrieve his belongings from the “secured” areas, most were missing. He also informed the judge that he observed some of his items inside his former apartment, to which he no longer had access. The judge ordered Guzman to make Lavalley's belongings available on the following Saturday and ordered Lavalley to remove them at that time, threatening them both with jail if they did not work the matter out.
Four hearings later, the same judge who heard the initial complaint found that despite the court orders, Lavalley was still without some of his belongings and that some were no longer available for return. Rescinding all previous orders, including a contempt finding against Guzman, the judge concluded that Guzman had violated G.L. c. 186, § 14, and ordered her to pay statutory damages of three months' rent.
Any error surrounding the contempt proceeding was thus rendered moot.
On appeal, Guzman challenges certain findings in the order for judgment. As the appellant, Guzman had the burden of furnishing us with a record that supported her claims on appeal. See Arch Med. Assocs. v. Bartlett Health Enterprises, Inc., 32 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 406, 589 N.E.2d 1251 (1992). Here, Guzman included in her appendix only limited transcript excerpts. Tempting though it may be, an appellant should not omit pages containing testimony favorable to the other party. As the record stands, we have no basis to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's findings.
See Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 81, 83–84, 653 N.E.2d 595 (1995).
We note that Guzman admitted that Lavalley was locked out for a day in May, 2009, as he alleged in his verified complaint. Moreover, on June 1, 2009, Guzman rented the apartment to a new tenant, permanently terminating Lavalley's access. Guzman further admitted that on June 2, 2009, she received notice of the restraining order from the court prohibiting her from evicting Lavalley.
None of the procedural improprieties, misrepresentations by Lavalley, alleged errors by the clerk, or judicial shortcomings pointed out by Guzman warrant reversal of the judgment.
To the extent that Guzman argued that the court's failure to record the July 21, 2009, hearing impaired her ability to present her appeal, Guzman did not avail herself of the remedy provided by Mass.R.A.P. 8(c), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979). Guzman also has not disclosed the specific judicial statements made at that hearing that triggered her claim that the judgment was based on judicial frustration.
Finally, Guzman maintains that Lavalley's “clear and repetitive” contradictions would have been caught if this case had been handled by one judge or if there had been better communication between the two presiding judges. Unfortunately, scarce judicial resources prevent one judge from handling all matters in any particular case. Housing Court judges carry a heavy case load and cannot be expected to discuss prior hearings with other judges. The judges here were entitled to rely upon the parties (and in Guzman's case, her attorney) to bring any prior inconsistent statements to their attention. Guzman lost this case because the judge who adjudicated the § 14 claim believed Lavalley's version of events as of that date, a discretionary decision entirely within her province.
Guzman asks this court to deduct $600 in unpaid rent from any amount owed to Lavalley. The record before us establishes that Lavalley denied any liability for rent. Given this unresolved factual dispute, we are unable to grant the relief requested.
Judgment affirmed.