Summary
stating that "The Supreme Court noted [in Jones] that, prior to the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, claims of hostile work environment and racial discrimination relating to the conditions of employment were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In other words, the petitioners' § 1981 claims were not available to them until after the federal catchall statute of limitations was enacted. Because the petitioners' claims were cognizable only under a statute enacted after December 1, 1990- i.e., the Civil Rights Act of 1991-they are governed by § 1658's four-year statute of limitations."
Summary of this case from Kao v. Erie Cmty. Coll.Opinion
02-CV-245S(Sc).
January 24, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
DISCUSSION
On March 29, 2002, Plaintiff Laura Banks-Holliday commenced an action against Defendant American Axle Manufacturing, Inc. alleging race discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Docket No. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant created a hostile work environment by failing to act upon her complaints of race-based harassment by a coworker and subjected her to disparate treatment with regard to discipline because of her race ( Id., ¶ 22).
The parties agree that Plaintiff commenced employment at Defendant in June 1995 (Docket No. 1, ¶ 7; Docket No. 28, ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that she was verbally harassed by a coworker over a five year period and that, while she complained to management about said harassment during the course of her employment, Defendant took no corrective action ( Id., ¶¶ 10-12). Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim is based on her allegation that, following an altercation with the same white coworker in April 2000, the coworker was treated more favorably than she with respect to discipline ( Id., ¶¶ 13-17).
On July 15, 2004, Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that this action is time-barred (Docket No. 26). Plaintiff has filed opposing papers. Both parties assert that a three-year statute of limitations applies to this action, but disagree as to the accrual date. This Court finds that both parties are incorrect as to the applicable limitations period and the accrual date(s).
Defendant argues that the accrual date for all alleged incidents is "no later than 1996" (Docket No. 27, p. 2) and Plaintiff claims that the accrual date for all alleged incidents is "no earlier than April 10, 2000" (Docket No. 36, p. 2).
Like many federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations. Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660, 107 S. Ct. 2617, 96 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1987), courts in this Circuit had routinely applied New York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to section 1981 claims, finding it to be "the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations" for such claims. See, e.g., Tadros v. Coleman, 898 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1990). However, following the Goodman decision, Congress enacted a catchall four-year statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. The Supreme Court recently held that this catchall provision applies to claims, such as those presented in this action, that "arise under" the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, ___, 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845-46, 158 L.Ed. 2d 645 (2004). See also, Sleigh v. Charlex, Inc., 03 Civ. 1369, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19118, *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2004); Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. Med. Ctr, 03-CV-6233, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816, *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004). Accordingly, a four year statute of limitations applies and Plaintiff's claims are timely to the extent that they accrued on or after March 29, 1998.
The Supreme Court noted that, prior to the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, claims of hostile work environment and racial discrimination relating to the conditions of employment were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In other words, the petitioners' § 1981 claims were not available to them until after the federal catchall statute of limitations was enacted. Because the petitioners' claims were cognizable only under a statute enacted after December 1, 1990 — i.e., the Civil Rights Act of 1991 — they are governed by § 1658's four-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to harassing racial comments on numerous occasions over a five year period commencing in 1995 or 1996. Neither party has made an attempt to identify the dates on which these numerous incidents purportedly occurred. To the extent that any alleged incident contributing to the hostile work environment occurred on or after March 29, 1998, the claim is timely. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-16, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002) (hostile work environment claims involve repeated conduct which, when taken singly, may not be actionable and, therefore, such claims cannot be said to occur on any particular day for purposes of determining timeliness). Because Defendant has not demonstrated that all incidents contributing to the hostile work environment occurred outside the limitations period, summary judgment on timeliness grounds is inappropriate. It is beyond dispute that Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, based on conduct occurring in or after April 2000, is timely.
It is unclear from the Complaint whether the purported harassment commenced in June 1995 or after Plaintiff was transferred to a different position in late 1996.
Although the hostile work environment claim in Morgan was brought under Title VII, this Court finds the analysis with respect to the accrual date for such claims — i.e., the claim is timely if any of the purported conduct contributing to the claim occurred during the limitations period — to be applicable to § 1981, as well.
However, the foregoing does not end this Court's consideration as to whether this case may go forward. In reviewing the instant motion, it has come to this Court's attention that Plaintiff is pursuing claims that are entirely duplicative of those in another pending lawsuit. For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that dismissal of this duplicative action is warranted.
Plaintiff presently has two actions pending against Defendant in this Court, with this action (02-CV-0245) being the later filed. The first action, 00-CV-1048, was commenced on December 20, 2000. In that case, Plaintiff, acting pro se, alleged race discrimination by Defendant in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (00-CV-1048, Docket No. 1). Plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on precisely the same incidents as were subsequently pleaded in 02-CV-0245 ( Id.). In short, 00-CV-0245 does not assert any claim under section 1981 that is different or more expansive than those alleged in the Title VII action.
The Court held a scheduling conference in 00-CV-1048 on June 1, 2001. Although Plaintiff had commenced her action pro se, an attorney appeared at that conference on her behalf (00-CV-1048, Docket No. 12). The Court issued a Scheduling Order setting July 2, 2001 as the deadline for a motion to amend the pleadings ( Id., Docket No. 13).
Plaintiff subsequently sought to extend the initial deadlines, a request that Defendant did not oppose and the Court granted ( Id., Docket Nos. 14, 15, 17, 18). At no time did Plaintiff seek to amend her Complaint. Instead, after the initial case had been pending for more than fifteen months, Plaintiff simply commenced the second action asserting the same claims on the same facts under a different theory of recovery.
It is well-settled that "plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court against the same defendant at the same time." Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) ( citing Zerilli v. Evening News Ass'n, 202 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 628 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc)). See also, Kidd v. Andrews, 340 F.Supp. 2d 333 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing the principle of avoiding duplicative litigation in two different federal courts and enjoining the plaintiff from participating in a second action asserting the same claims).
In addition, a duplicative action should not be permitted to expand upon the procedural rights the plaintiff otherwise would have enjoyed. In particular, the Court "must insure that the plaintiff does not use the incorrect procedure of filing duplicative complaints for the purpose of circumventing the rules pertaining to the amendment of complaints." Walton, 563 F.2d at 71. In Curtis, the Second Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented plaintiffs from pursuing claims in a second action that could have been brought in their first action but for the plaintiffs' delay. 226 F.3d at 140. To the extent that Plaintiff wished to assert an additional legal theory, she should have done so through amendment of the first Complaint and there was no impairment to her having done so.
Moreover, Plaintiff's first action is presently ready for trial. Were Plaintiff permitted to maintain her second action, it is virtually certain to be barred in any event. "[I]f claims arise out of the same factual grouping, transaction, or series of transactions, they are deemed to be part of the same cause of action and the later claim will be barred without regard to whether it is based upon different legal theories or seeks different and additional relief." United States v. Alfano, 34 F.Supp.2d 827, 833-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (applying New York law relating to res judicata).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to this Court's general power to administer its docket, foster judicial economy and protect parties from concurrent litigation over the same subject matter, this Court finds that dismissal of this case, which is entirely duplicative of an earlier-filed and still pending action, is warranted.
ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground of timeliness (Docket No. 26) is DENIED.
FURTHER, that sua sponte dismissal of this duplicative case is warranted pursuant to this Court's power to administer its docket.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to take the necessary steps to close this case.
SO ORDERED.