No. 14-07-00091-CR
Opinion filed April 30, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the Chambers County Court at Law, Chambers County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 23905-05.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices ANDERSON and SEYMORE.
JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.
A jury convicted appellant, Bryant Keith Laughlin, of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). The trial court sentenced appellant to 180 days' confinement, probated for two years, and a $2,000.00 fine. Appellant raises three issues on appeal. In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In his second and third issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant was driving while intoxicated as defined by the Texas Penal Code. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of April 22, 2005, Chambers County Sheriff's Office Patrol Deputy Shannon Strybos was patrolling the Pinehurst neighborhood due to a string of recent burglaries. Toward the end of her shift, sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., Deputy Strybos observed a Ford pickup truck pulled over on the shoulder of the road facing east toward State Highway 146. The truck had not been there on her previous round at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. Deputy Strybos decided to make another round of the neighborhood and see if the truck was still there when she returned. After completing the round, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Deputy Strybos saw the truck was still parked in the same spot. Deputy Strybos pulled her patrol car up behind the truck. At that point, Deputy Strybos noticed the truck was still running because its parking lights were on. Deputy Strybos decided to check whether anyone was in the truck. When she approached the driver's side window, she noticed the windows were foggy, as if the air conditioner was on. Deputy Strybos shined her flashlight in the window to get a better look and saw appellant apparently asleep in the driver's seat. She then began tapping on the window to determine whether appellant was conscious. After five minutes of tapping and alerting dispatch of the situation, appellant finally awoke and rolled down his window. Immediately, Deputy Strybos detected a strong odor of alcohol. When Deputy Strybos asked him for his driver's license and insurance she noticed his speech was slurred. Deputy Strybos asked appellant to step out of the vehicle and as he did so, she noted the truck was in neutral. Deputy Strybos did not take notice of whether appellant's foot was on the break. When Deptuy Strybos asked appellant where he was going, he replied he was going to the store to get something to drink and he thought it was sometime around 10:00 p.m. Deputy Strybos asked appellant to move to the back of the vehicle, where he subsequently sat on the bumper of the truck due to his unsteady balance. When asked whether he had been drinking, appellant stated he had, but that his last drink was around 10:00 p.m. Deputy Strybos decided it was not safe for appellant to be driving, so she requested a State trooper to come to the scene for a possible field sobriety test. Less than thirty minutes later, State Trooper Brigitte Hazleton arrived to conduct the field sobriety test. When Trooper Hazleton arrived she also detected the smell of alcohol on appellant and noticed appellant was unsteady on his feet. She then determined it was necessary to conduct a field sobriety test. Before conducting the test, Trooper Hazleton asked appellant why his car was parked on the shoulder and whether he had been drinking. Appellant responded he had been drinking, had too much to drink, and decided he shouldn't drive anywhere and that was why he was parked on the shoulder. When Trooper Hazleton asked appellant what time he had consumed his last alcoholic beverage, appellant responded that it was around 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. Appellant also stated he believed it was still around 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. The entire exchange was captured on Trooper Hazleton's in-car video camera. Trooper Hazleton observed 11 out of 18 clues indicating intoxication during the field sobriety test. After determining appellant was intoxicated, Trooper Hazleton arrested him for the offense of driving while intoxicated and placed him in the back of her patrol car. Appellant refused to submit a specimen of his breath. Appellant was subsequently found guilty of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Deputy Strybos and Trooper Hazleton. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and allowed in the testimony of Deputy Strybos and Trooper Hazleton as well as the video recorded by Trooper Hazleton's in-car video camera. The trial court sentenced appellant to 180 days' confinement, probated for two years, and a $2,000.00 fine. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION
I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress? In his first issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) Deputy Strybos had no legal reason to approach him, and (2) his subsequent detention was unreasonably prolonged. Therefore, appellant contends, any evidence obtained pursuant to his detention, including the video, Deputy Strybos and Trooper Hazleton's testimony, and the results of field sobriety tests, should have been suppressed because they were the product of an illegal seizure. The State argues the denial of the motion to suppress was proper because (1) Deputy Strybos' approach of appellant's car was not a seizure requiring a warrant or an exception thereto, and (2) the subsequent detention of appellant was not unreasonable. A. Standard of Review
A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). An appellate court affords almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. The appellate court affords the same amount of deference to a trial court's ruling on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. The court reviews de novo those questions not turning on credibility and demeanor. Id. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). If the trial judge's decision is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855B56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). B. Analysis
1. No seizure took place when Deputy Strybos approached appellant's vehicle. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court of Criminal Appeals held a seizure does not occur when an officer approaches a parked car in a public place and knocks on the window. See Merideth v. State, 603 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Stewart v. State, 603 S.W.2d 861, 861-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); see also State v. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d 758, 760-62 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding defendant who was sitting in his vehicle parked in a public place was not seized when police officer got out of his patrol car, approached defendant's vehicle, and knocked on the window). Furthermore, no stop or detention occurs if a police officer merely approaches a person in a public place and asks questions, as long as the person is free to leave. Ashton v. State, 931 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Here, appellant was approached by Deputy Strybos while sitting in his parked truck in a public place. Deputy Strybos did not ask appellant to roll down his window, she only knocked until he awoke. Thus, no seizure took place when Deputy Strybos knocked on appellant's window. See Merideth, 603 S.W.2d at 873. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record indicating appellant was detained or not free to leave at the time Deputy Strybos knocked on his window. Cf. Beasley v. State, 674 S.W.2d 762, 766-67 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (holding defendants were "seized" where two patrol cars surrounded defendants' car and defendants were required to "ask" for cigarettes from their truck). Consequently, appellant was not seized in any manner until after Deputy Strybos had reasonable suspicion appellant may have been driving while intoxicated. See Merideth, 603 S.W.2d at 873 (finding seizure did not occur until defendant opened his car door and the smell of marijuana was detected). Reasonable suspicion arose once appellant, at his own volition, rolled down his window and Deputy Strybos detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed appellant's speech was slurred. See Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 719-20 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and an open container of alcohol on the passenger's seat gave rise to reasonable suspicion defendant may have been driving while intoxicated). Therefore, there was no search and seizure requiring a warrant or an exception thereto at the time Deputy Strybos approached the vehicle and, accordingly, no violation of appellant's rights under the Fourth Amendment. 2. Appellant failed to preserve error on his allegedly prolonged detention. As to appellant's argument that his detention was unreasonably prolonged, we hold appellant waived this issue on appeal. At the suppression hearing, appellant's sole argument concerned the applicability of the community caretaking function. At no point did appellant argue because the detention was prolonged its subsequent fruits were illegally obtained. This new argument is raised for the first time on appeal. Where appellant's trial objections do not comport with his arguments on appeal, appellant fails to preserve error on this issue. Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 551 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We overrule appellant's first issue. II. Is the evidence legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction?
In his second and third issues, appellant contends (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction for driving while intoxicated and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient for the jury to find appellant operated a motor vehicle. A. Standard of Review In a legal sufficiency challenge, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). This standard of review applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony. See Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Harris v. State, 164 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd). B. Analysis
1. The evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction of driving while intoxicated. A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Appellant argues there is no evidence of intoxication at the time he was operating his motor vehicle. The critical inquiry here is whether there is proof from which a fact finder could conclude appellant was intoxicated at the time of the driving in question, in other words, a temporal "link" between his driving and the intoxication. See Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 139 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Appellant claims there is no evidence showing how long he had been parked on the side of the road and furthermore, he argues, it is entirely feasible he was not intoxicated at the time he drove to that location. The evidence shows appellant was intoxicated when Deputy Strybos found him asleep in the driver's seat at approximately 5:30 a.m. Furthermore, Trooper Hazleton's HGN test and field sobriety tests, less than 30 minutes later, confirmed Deputy Strybos' suspicion appellant was intoxicated. Appellant does not dispute he was intoxicated at the time the officers found him in his truck. The record also shows appellant's truck arrived in its location between 2:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. There is some dispute as to the time appellant consumed his last alcoholic beverage. Deputy Strybos testified appellant stated his last drink was at 10:00 p.m., but that he was confused as to what time it was when she approached him. Trooper Hazelton testified appellant stated his last drink was around 2:00 a.m. and that he thought it was still near that time. In either event, the police video of appellant captured appellant stating that he had consumed "more than he should have" and that was why he had parked his truck on the side of the road. In sum, appellant was intoxicated when Deputy Strybos approached him, his truck had been parked on the side of the road for no more than three hours, and there is no evidence appellant consumed alcohol while his truck was parked. To the contrary appellant admitted to having consumed alcohol before driving his truck to its destination on the side of the road. Thus, in light of the short amount of time appellant's truck could have been parked on the side of the road, appellant's admitted consumption of alcohol before driving, and his proven state of intoxication when approached by the officers, a rational trier of fact could conclude appellant had been intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle. See Zavala, 89 S.W.3d at 140 (holding evidence was legally sufficient to prove appellant was intoxicated while driving where there was evidence he consumed alcohol at 11:30 p.m. and was apprehended at the scene of a car accident at 3:40 a.m.); Purvis v. State, 4 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.) (holding evidence was legally sufficient to prove appellant was intoxicated while driving where she appeared intoxicated when found at scene of accident and admitted to consuming alcohol before driving). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second issue. 2. The evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding appellant was operating a motor vehicle. In his third issue, appellant contends there is no evidence to support a finding appellant was operating a motor vehicle. There is no statutory definition of "operate." Barton v. State, 882 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held, to find operation of a motor vehicle, "the totality of the circumstances must demonstrate that the defendant took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle's use." Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Under this standard, "operating" a motor vehicle is interpreted very broadly. Strong v. State, 87 S.W.3d 206, 215 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd). Because Aoperating a motor vehicle is defined so broadly, any action that is more than mere preparation toward operating the vehicle would necessarily be an "action to affect the functioning of [a] vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle's use." Id. at 216. Numerous cases have upheld DWI arrests or convictions under the totality of the circumstances test even though the person "operating the motor vehicle" was initially found asleep or unconscious. For example, persons asleep or unconscious were found to be "operating" their motor vehicle when the vehicle was "oddly parked" in a parking lot with its headlights on, engine running, and music playing loudly, Dornbusch v. State, 262 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); stopped on a roadway with its engine idling, transmission in neutral, one foot on break and one on the clutch, Barton, 882 S.W.2d at 457; stopped in a moving lane of traffic with the engine running and the vehicle's owner in the driver's seat, Hearne v. State, 80 S.W.3d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). We are faced with similar facts here. To determine whether the trial court's resolution of this question was supported by legally sufficient evidence, we examine the totality of circumstances to determine if appellant took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle's use. Denton, 911 S.W.2d at 390. In this case, all parties agree appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of his truck parked on the shoulder of the road with the parking lights on, the truck in neutral, and the engine running. We hold the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, is legally sufficient to show appellant operated a motor vehicle. See Dornbusch, 262 S.W.3d at 438. We overrule appellant's third issue. CONCLUSION
Having considered and overruled each of appellant's three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.