Opinion
No. 27155
Decided March 8, 1939.
Workmen's compensation — Injury received in employment, while employee violating employer's rule, compensable, when.
An employee who receives an injury while engaged in doing work he is employed to do, during the course of which he violates rules of his employer dealing with the method or manner of performing the work, will, notwithstanding such violation, be deemed to have been injured in the course of his employment.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.
The appellant, The Hunkin-Conkey Construction Company, was a self-insuring empoyer and the appellee, Patsy Laudato, was an employee of the appellant. On November 14, 1931, appellee received severe injuries as a result of the falling or a material hoist upon which he was riding.
The construction company was engaged in building the administration building of John Carroll University, in University Heights, Cleveland, Ohio. Laudato was a laborer employed in this construction. On the day in question, Laudato had been instructed to clear certain rubbish and debris from the sixth or seventh floor of this building, to load the material on a wheelbarrow or buggy, and then to place the wheelbarrow on the material hoist for lowering to the ground level. Another laborer had been assigned to help him in this work.
The appellee placed two wheelbarrow loads of the rubbish on the hoist platform, climbed on the handles of the wheelbarrows, and signalled the foreman to lower the hoist. The engineer, in response to the signal relayed by the foreman, lowered the material hoist, but because the injector cable "broke" and spilled water upon the friction brake the engineer could not stop the downward fall quickly enough. The platform struck the ground with considerable force, by reason of which appellee was severely injured.
The appellee thereupon filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Ohio, which for a period of time granted compensation, but later dismissed the claim. Upon rehearing, the commission again denied the claim on the ground that the proof furnished failed to establish an injury sustained in the course of and arising out of the employment.
The appellant offered evidence on the rehearing to show that the appellee had been instructed to walk down the steps and unload the wheelbarrows; that he had been expressly instructed not to ride the hoist; that the hoist had safety gates at each floor; and that there had been posted on these gates signs prohibiting riding on the hoist.
The appellee contended, however, that not only had he not been instructed not to ride the hoist, but that he had obtained permission to ride from the foreman, and that the foreman saw him on the hoist when he gave the signal to lower the platform.
Appellee appealed to the Common Pleas Court, which, at the first trial entered a final judgment for the claimant, Patsy Laudato, on his motion for judgment upon the pleadings and opening statements. An appeal upon quesions of law was perfected by the construction company to the Court of Appeals of Eighth Appellate District, wherein the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for trial.
At the close of all the evidence upon the second trial in the Common Pleas Court, appellee moved that judgment be entered for him on the evidence, the opening statement and the answer of the appellant, which motion was overruled. After argument, however, the court reversed its ruling and granted the motion, and caused the jury to return a verdict finding that the appellee was entitled to participate in the Workmen's Compensation Fund. Final judgment was entered for the appellee upon the finding and verdict.
A second appeal upon questions of law was perfected by the appellant herein, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting by designation in place of the judges of the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Appellate District, on May 31, 1938, entered its judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Laudato.
The judges of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Appellate District, finding their judgment in this matter in conflict with the judgment heretofore rendered by the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Appellate District upon this same question in the prior appeal of this case, certified the record to this court as a conflict case for review and final determination.
Mr. Blase A. Buonpane and Mr. Paul Mancino, for appellee.
Messrs. Horn, Weisell, McLaughlin Lybarger, for appellant.
The sole question presented is whether appellee's violation of the rule of his employer forbidding workmen to ride the material hoist, is a defense sufficient to bar recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Ohio.
So much of Section 1465-68, General Code, as is here pertinent, reads: "Every employee mentioned in 1465-61, who is injured, and the dependents of such as are killed in the course of employment, wheresoever such injury has occurred, provided the same was not purposely self-inflicted, * * * shall be paid such compensation out of the State Insurance Fund for loss sustained on account of such injury or death as is provided in the case of other injured or killed employees * * *."
Appellant contends, in substance, that an employer has a right to define and limit the scope of employment of his workmen by rules and instructions, and to determine the terms and conditions under which their work is to be prosecuted; that in promulgating and enforcing a rule which forbade its employees to ride the material hoist, the scope of their employment was defined and limited; that appellee departed from his sphere of employment when he rode the hoist in violation of this rule; and that the injuries received were not, therefore, sustained in the course of employment and are not compensable.
The right of an employer to limit and define the scope of employment of his workmen cannot be denied. However, the rule here invoked has no such effect.
A distinction must be drawn between rules which define the sphere of employment and those which merely direct the manner in which work within the sphere is to be done.
"There are prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment, and prohibitions which deal only with conduct within such sphere. A transgression of a prohibition of the latter class leaves the sphere of employment where it was, and consequently will not prevent recovery of compensation. A transgression of the former class carries with it the result that the man has gone outside the sphere." I Honnold on Workmen's Compensation 390 et seq., Section 113.
A rule which forbids employees to ride a material hoist does not define the sphere of employment but merely pertains to conduct within the sphere.
In using the forbidden means of descent, appellee was guilty of an act of negligence. However, that act was one committed within the sphere of his employment. Nowhere in the Workmen's Compensation Law of Ohio is to be found a provision which makes injuries compensable only when and if sustained during proper performance of work. On the contrary, all injuries, except those wilfully self-inflicted, received in the course of and having a causal connection with the employment, "either through its activities, it conditions or its environments," are compensable, independent of the question of negligence, fault or assumption of risk. "The test of right to award from the insurance fund under the Workmen's Compensation Law, for injury in the course of employment, is not whether there was any fault or neglect on the part of the employer, or his employees, but whether the employment had some causal connection with the injury, either through its activities, its conditions or its environments." Industrial Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38, paragraph two of the syllabus.
An employee who receives an injury while engaged in doing the work he is employed to do, during the course of which he violates rules of his employer dealing with the method or manner of performing the work, will, notwithstanding such violation, be deemed to have been injured in the course of his employment.
What is meant by the phrase "in the course of employment"?
This court has often interpreted the phrase 'in the course of employment' as used in the Constitution and statutes, and has consistently held that it refers only to an injury which is the result of or arises out of the employment. No injury having its cause outside of and disconnected with the employment is contemplated, even though the employee at the time may be engaged in the work of his employer in the usual way. And it is essential for a claimant to establish that the employment had a causal connection with the injury, either through its activities, its conditions or its environment. Fassig v. State, ex rel. Turner, Atty. Genl., 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104; Industrial Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38; Grabler Mfg. Co. v. Wrobel, 125 Ohio St. 265, 181 N.E. 97; Industrial Commission v. Lewis, 125 Ohio St. 296, 181 N.E. 136; Industrial Commission v. Bankes, 127 Ohio St. 517, 189 N.E. 437; Industrial Commission v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400, 92 A. L. R., 1032." Highway Oil Co. v. State, ex rel. Bricker, Atty. Genl., 130 Ohio St. 175, at 178, 198 N.E. 276.
The causal connection between the injuries and the employment of appellee is clear. Appellee's duties required him to ascend to an upper floor for the purpose of loading debris upon the hoist, and then to descend to the ground floor for the purpose of unloading. These were part of his duties. These duties defined the scope of his employment. Descending to the first floor was an act included in his work. In descending by means of the hoist, he committed a violation of a rule of his employer, within the scope of his work, and to that extent failed to comply with the rules. However, notwithstanding such non-compliance, it cannot reasonably be said that during his descent by a means forbidden to him he ceased to work for his employer. The descent was consistent with a continuance rather than a termination of his work. It cannot be denied that he was at all times in the general performance of the duties he was employed to perform. The injury did not have its cause outside of and disconnected with the employment.
The Workmen's Compensation Law of Ohio is humanitarian in its concept and must be humanitarian in its application. This dictates a liberal construction of the law in favor of the injured employee. Reasons, more compelling than mere disobedience of rules prescribing the conduct of employees within the scope of employment, must be advanced to defeat his right to compensation.
The trial court sustained appellee's motion for a directed verdict in his behalf. In this we find no error.
Judgment affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN, WILLIAMS, MYERS, MATTHIAS and HART, JJ., concur.