Under federal law, on the other hand, a state actor who is merely negligent, rather than being plainly incompetent or knowingly violating the law, is entitled to qualified immunity. See e.g. Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Court finds that the Iowa standard for qualified immunity is more stringent than the federal standard.

The standard for qualified immunity is that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1994); Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993) ( en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Rapps, 947 F.2d 332, 338 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960, 112 S.Ct. 1561, 118 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1124, 127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994)); Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Harlow). "[T]o be clearly established, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Bills, 32 F.3d at 335; Latimore, 7 F.3d at 712; Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989); See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

The standard for qualified immunity is that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996); accord Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2001); Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001); Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Talley, 251 F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 2001); Tlanka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001); Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000); Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 1996); Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1994); Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 898 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 739 (1995); Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Rapps, 947 F.2d 332, 338 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). "What this means in practice is that whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken."

Id. Immunity is appropriate if the plaintiff does not allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 114 S.Ct. 1124, 127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994). The mere assertion of such a right, however, will not be adequate: "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."

Id. Immunity is appropriate if the Plaintiff does not allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 114 S.Ct. 1124, 127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994). The mere assertion of such a right, however, will not be adequate: "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."

Kreisher's statements to the press did no more than indicate the charges which had been brought against Michael Boykin and the fact that the police were exploring a possible link between Michael Boykin's arrest and other rapes which had been committed in the Bloomsburg area. In Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the qualified immunity defense of a state prosecutor who was being sued for statements he made to the press concerning an alleged murderer. The Court stated that the prosecutor revealed no more to the media than could be found in the public record.

"Qualified immunity protects a government official from suit if, at the time of the challenged acts, it was not clearly established that those actions would violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known."Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The elements of the defense stated in a three-part inquiry are: (1) Has the plaintiff asserted a violation of a constitutional right? (2) Was the constitutional right allegedly violated clearly established?

Id. at 895. See also Johnson v. Beaver (unpublished opinion), No. 93-1401, available at 1993 WL 450751, at *2 (8th Cir. 1993) (correct standard is whether jail officials actually knew of a risk of harm to plaintiff, not whether such officials should have known of a risk) (citing Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (quoting Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990))). As such, in a "specific threat" case such as this, to demonstrate an impending threat of harm such that a failure to act on knowledge of such harm would constitute deliberate indifference, an inmate must communicate information to a prison official showing that a specific inmate or inmates pose a specific risk of harm to him — a "specific notice" requirement.

C.A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 7 F. 3d 709.

” Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986); see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (“not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable”). “To survive a summary judgment motion on this issue, [Hayden] must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that [Mormon's] statements were the proximate cause of the violation of his constitutional right.” Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir.1993) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 114 S.Ct. 1124, 127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994). He failed to do so.