Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-11699-PBS
January 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jacqueline Lassiter, an African-American former employee of the Defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"), alleges violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Count I), the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 (Count IV), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V), and breach of contract (Count VI). The defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's claims are time-barred. The plaintiff has also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. After hearing and a review of the record, I ALLOW the MBTA's motion for summary judgment and DENY the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The following discussion assumes familiarity with the factual background as set forth in my Memorandum and Order, dated July 30, 2002 (Docket No. 32).
1. I dismiss the claims charging wage disparity under the Equal Pay Act (Count I) on two grounds. First, plaintiff's last paycheck was on August 28, 1998, and she filed suit on September 6, 2001. Assuming the defendant committed a willful violation, a three-year statute of limitations applies. Even under a willfulness theory, the action is time-barred. See Legoff v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 23 F. Supp.2d 120, 126 (D.Mass. 1998) ("A 'decision to hire an individual at a discriminatorily low salary can, upon payment of each subsequent paycheck, continue to violate the employee's rights.'") (quoting Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 747 (1st Cir. 1982)). Second, the pay disparity is mandated by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The two white males with whom she compares herself were re-hired on May 6, 1996, while plaintiff was a newly hired third class machinist. Therefore, the two white males had seniority over plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (stating it is not unlawful "for an employer to apply different standards of compensation . . . pursuant to a bona fide seniority system").
2. I dismiss the race-based claims (Counts II, IV, V) as time-barred. The statute of limitations, both for Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is three years. See M.G.L. ch. 151B § 9; 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff's last day in the workplace was June 23, 1998, when she left work because of an industrial accident (slipping on oil). She received worker's compensation until September 11, 1998, when she resigned. She claims that she was constructively discharged on the latter date because of a hostile work environment. Plaintiff has alleged three discrete incidents of racial harassment: (1) lewd comments during 1996 at the Lynn Garage; (2) an incident on February 7, 1997 when a white co-worker struck her bus for an allegedly racially motivated reason; and (3) the destruction of her work uniforms on August 8, 1997. Plaintiff can not specify a date when a co-worker named Robert Barclay said she was "dumb" in the Charlestown garage, to which she was transferred after the uniforms were destroyed.
A plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must prove at least one act of discrimination within the limitations period. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2068 (2002) (noting that "a court's task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period"); Winters v. ADAP, Inc., 76 F. Supp.2d 89, 94 (D.Mass. 1999) (requiring "at least one independently actionable claim" within required time period for a valid claim of serial continuing violation); Cuddyer v. Stop Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 531 n. 12 (2001) (noting that serial continuing violations require "at least one act of harassment occurring within the limitations period"). None of these alleged acts provides an anchor within the three-year time bar.
Nonetheless, plaintiff alleges that the trigger date for the statute of limitations was the day she resigned on September 11, 1998 because there was a continuing hostile work environment that forced her to resign on that date. She alleges that her supervisors' failure to properly investigate her claims from August 1997 to August 8, 1998 created a hostile work environment and led to a constructive discharge. However, the standard for a hostile work environment claim is high. See, e.g., Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 613 (1st Cir. 2000) ("If a plaintiff does not resign within a reasonable time after the alleged harassment, [she] was not constructively discharged."). Even if her employer failed to act with sufficient rigor or alacrity to investigate the claims, it did transfer her to a new garage, where only one derogatory comment was made. Furthermore, the MBTA conducted an investigation in response to the plaintiff's complaints. Its conduct was not intolerable.
3. I dismiss the breach of contract claim (Count VI) because plaintiff's contractual relationship with the MBTA is governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.