Opinion
No. 04-16-00606-CR
05-10-2017
Peter Carl LARSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016CR1029
Honorable Steve Hilbig, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice AFFIRMED
A jury found Peter Larson guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver, and the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-seven years' imprisonment with a $3,000 fine. On appeal, Larson contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Based upon information he received from an informant, San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) Detective Craig Clancy conducted surveillance on Peter Larson's residence for approximately two weeks. Detective Clancy then obtained a search warrant for Larson's residence. The search of the residence and Larson's vehicle resulted in discovery of two digital scales, a handgun, an unspecified amount of cash, and over 280 grams of methamphetamine. A grand jury indicted Larson for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. A jury found Larson guilty of the offense, and the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-seven years' imprisonment. Larson appealed.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, Larson contends the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he knowingly possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it. In particular, Larson argues there are insufficient links connecting him to the possession of the methamphetamine.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial cases. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
As the factfinder, the jury is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so long as the inferences are supported by the record. Id. Further, the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the factfinder's exclusive province. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If a record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove the defendant exercised control, management, or care over the substance in question and he knew the substance possessed was contraband. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.002(38) (West Supp. 2015); see Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413. "A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). According to the Texas Controlled Substances Act ("TCSA"):
"Deliver" means to transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia, regardless of whether there is an agency relationship. The term includes offering to sell a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia.TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.002(8) (West Supp. 2015). Additionally, the TCSA classifies methamphetamine as a Penalty Group 1 controlled substance. See id. § 481.102(6) (West 2010).
In this case, the State was required to prove Larson exercised control, management, or care over the methamphetamine recovered from the hollowed-out speaker box in the garage, that he knew the substance in the speaker box was methamphetamine, and that he had the conscious objective or desire to transfer the methamphetamine to another person. However, the State was entitled to rely upon circumstantial evidence because it "is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt." Carrizales, 414 S.W.3d at 742.
Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish that a defendant's connection to contraband was more than fortuitous. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the defendant, the factfinder may nonetheless infer that the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference. Id. at 406. In Evans v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarized a non-exclusive list of fourteen factors that may indicate a link connecting the defendant to the knowing possession of contraband:
(1) the defendant's presence when the search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (3) whether the defendant was found with large amounts of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Although these factors can help guide our analysis, ultimately our inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inference therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19.
Discussion
Larson's appellate argument centers on the lack of the kinds of links identified in Evans. Larson is correct that some of those factors are not present in this case. However, the "absence of various affirmative links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the affirmative links present." James v. State, 264 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). Other circumstantial evidence shows Larson exercised control, management, or care over the methamphetamine. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405.
Detective Clancy testified he received information that led him to place a residence under surveillance, which was at the address Larson listed as his residence and where Larson received mail. Detective Clancy testified he observed Larson in and around the garage on each day he conducted surveillance, with the exception of two or three days. Detective Clancy also observed many visitors approach the property, some multiple times. The visitors either went inside the house and stayed for less than five minutes before leaving, or they met with Larson or his brother in the front yard. Detective Clancy observed that those who met with one of the brothers in the front yard attempted to secretly exchange objects hand-to-hand through handshakes or other greetings. Detective Clancy witnessed items passing between the individuals. According to Detective Clancy, Larson conducted the majority of the hand-to-hand exchanges. Detective Clancy explained the short visits inside the house and the manner of the front-yard exchanges were indicative of drug transactions and narcotics trafficking. Detective Clancy also observed several security cameras placed around the house, which he testified were also common to residences used for narcotics trafficking and drug transactions.
Detective Clancy obtained a search warrant based on the observations he made during the surveillance. When SAPD units approached the residence to execute the search warrant, an officer observed Larson driving away in a truck. Detective Charles Covington testified he followed Larson's truck and approached it when it stopped at a business. Officers recovered a handgun, a digital scale, and an unspecified amount of cash from Larson's truck. Both Larson and the passenger were returned to the residence prior to execution of the search warrant.
Larson, his passenger, and three other occupants of the house were detained outside as officers searched the residence. Officers located a digital scale in the kitchen and a large piece of methamphetamine that weighed over 280 grams, along with smaller pieces of methamphetamine in baggies that had been broken down for packaging and sale, hidden in a hollowed-out speaker box in the garage. Officers additionally found a black tool bag containing several "edged" weapons in the speaker box, as well as Larson's state-issued identification card in a toolbox that was located next to the speaker box.
Detective Covington characterized the large piece of methamphetamine found as the "single largest piece" of methamphetamine he had seen during his twenty-four year career. Detective Clancy testified that amount of methamphetamine was indicative of a higher-end drug dealer, as opposed to a lower-end drug dealer who generally carried only 28 grams, or an ounce, for sale at a time. Detective Clancy further testified that the common personal use amount was just a single gram.
In this case, the jury charge authorized the jury to find Larson possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it if it found Larson exercised control, management, or care over the methamphetamine, that he knew the substance was methamphetamine, and that he had the conscious objective or desire to transfer the methamphetamine to another person. The methamphetamine, which was an amount far greater than that characterized as "for personal use," was found in the garage of a residence Larson listed as his and where he received mail. Larson was observed spending time nearly daily in the garage, and he was seen conducting the majority of the hand-to-hand transactions. Further, weapons and digital scales, both which are indicative of narcotics trafficking, were recovered both from the residence and Larson's truck. This evidence supports a reasonable juror's belief beyond a reasonable doubt that Larson possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational factfinder could have found Larson possessed methamphetamine and knew the substance he possessed was methamphetamine. A rational jury could also have determined Larson possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it. Consequently, we conclude the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Larson committed the offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
Accordingly, we overrule Larson's sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Irene Rios, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH