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explaining that non-traumatic injuries, such as plaintiff's mental impairment, require determination of onset based on “consideration of the applicant's allegations, work history, if any, and the medical and other evidence concerning impairment severity” (quoting SSR 83–20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1)
Summary of this case from Rascoe v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:10-CV-291.
September 27, 2011
OPINION AND ORDER (Docs. 8 and 11)
Claimant Kimberly (Carminati) Larkin brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Child's Insurance Benefits ("CIB") under 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). Pending before the court are Larkin's motion seeking an order reversing the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 8), and the Commissioner's motion seeking an order affirming the same (Doc. 11). For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Larkin's motion, and denies the Commissioner's.
Background
Larkin was born on August 8, 1968, and has twelve years of education. (Administrative Record ("AR") 29-30, 160.) She did not graduate high school on schedule, leaving during her senior year and instead attending "Job Corp," which she was unable to finish. (AR 29-30, 50, 160.) Larkin testified that she left home when she was sixteen years old; and after she dropped out of high school, she lived "on the streets," had trouble keeping a job, and had "emotional problems." (AR 42-43, 49.) The record reflects Larkin's reporting to medical providers that she was emotionally, physically, and sexually abused by family members, including her brother, sister, and mother's boyfriend, beginning when she was a child. (AR 42, 52, 177, 327, 487, 846.) In 1991, she became pregnant while living on her own in a subsidized apartment. (AR 31-32.) According to Larkin, since the time she left high school, she has "constantly" changed residences and has had difficulty maintaining a job due to mental impairments, including problems socializing and an inability to concentrate for extended periods. (AR 42-48.) In fact, she has had many jobs — including deli clerk, road construction worker, housekeeper, and nursing home aide — but all have been for only short durations. (AR 127-52, 155, 487, 488.)
As chronicled in Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Robert Klingebiel's decision, Larkin first applied for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits in October 2001, alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 1999. (AR 10.) After a hearing, the applications were denied by the ALJ, but in May 2004, the Appeals Council remanded the matter for further proceedings largely due to an inaudible hearing tape. ( Id.) In September 2005, after another hearing, ALJ Klingebiel denied Larkin's applications for a second time. ( Id.) Larkin appealed the denial to this Court, which reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. ( Id.) Prior to the re-hearing, however, Larkin was found disabled on new applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits (filed in March 2006), with an onset date of September 16, 2005. ( Id.) The Appeals Council affirmed this finding of disability, but remanded pursuant to the Court's order on the initial applications to ascertain whether the evidence supported an onset date prior to September 2005. ( Id. at 11.) On February 7, 2008, ALJ Frederick Harap issued a decision finding that Larkin was disabled as of April 1, 1999. ( Id.)
Meanwhile, on November 13, 2007, Larkin filed her application for CIB, alleging that she became disabled on or before July 1, 1990, approximately one month before her twenty-second birthday. (AR 11, 55-58, 121-26.) It is this application which is currently under review by this Court. Pursuant to such application, Larkin claims that, since on or before July 1, 1990, she has suffered from chronic depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), and "several mini-strokes." (AR 154.) She asserts that mood swings and anxiety have interfered with her ability to work; that she "spaz[es] out" and becomes depressed easily; that "people irritate [her] easily"; and that she does not work well with authority figures. ( Id.) She further claims that she has usually quit her jobs because she "get[s] paranoid or irritated with [her] coworkers or [her] boss." ( Id.) On May 20, 2010, an administrative hearing was held on Larkin's CIB application (AR 23-54), and on June 30, 2010, ALJ Klingebiel issued a decision finding that Larkin was not disabled prior to attaining the age twenty-two (AR 10-18). Thereafter, the Decision Review Board notified Larkin that it had not completed its review of the claim during the time allowed, making the ALJ's decision final. (AR 1-3.) Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Larkin filed her Complaint in the instant action on December 1, 2010. ( See Doc. 1.)
A claimant may prove entitlement to CIB based on the earnings record of a deceased or disabled insured person (usually a parent) by demonstrating that he or she became disabled before turning twenty-two years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)(ii); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350-404.368. In this case, Larkin's claim is based on the earnings record of her father, Joel Francis Carminati, who died on August 20, 2003. (Doc. 8 at 2; AR 121.)
ALJ Decision
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is so engaged, he is not considered disabled. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a "severe impairment." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires the ALJ to make a determination as to whether the claimant's impairment "meets or equals" an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984); Gravel v. Barnhart, 360 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, the fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") precludes the performance of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). The fifth and final step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can do "any other work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant bears the burden of proving his case at steps one through four, Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 383, and at step five, there is a "limited burden shift to the Commissioner" to "show that there is work in the national economy that the claimant can do," Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step five is limited, and the Commissioner "need not provide additional evidence of the claimant's residual functional capacity").
Employing this five-step analysis, ALJ Klingebiel first determined that, although Larkin had engaged in "some work activity" since the alleged onset date of July 1, 1990, she had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" during that period. (AR 13.) At step two, the ALJ found that, prior to attaining the age twenty-two, Larkin's "personality disorder" was a medically-determinable impairment, but did not rise to the level of being "severe." (AR 14-17.) Thus, the ALJ found that Larkin was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time prior to August 7, 1990, the date she attained the age twenty-two. (AR 17-18.) In his decision, the ALJ explicitly did not disturb ALJ Harap's decision finding Larkin disabled as of April 1, 1999. (AR 17-18.)
In fact, Larkin did not attain the age twenty-two until August 8, 1990, not August 7, 1990, as the ALJ implies. ( See AR 17, 19.) But the error is harmless.
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act defines the term "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found to be disabled only if it is determined that his "impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In reviewing a Commissioner's disability decision, the court limits its inquiry to a "review [of] the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard." Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court's factual review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether "substantial evidence" exists in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Poupore, 566 F.3d at 305.
Although the reviewing court's role with respect to the Commissioner's disability decision is "quite limited[,] and substantial deference is to be afforded the Commissioner's decision," Hernandez v. Barnhart, No. 05 Civ. 9586, 2007 WL 2710388, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), the Social Security Act "must be construed liberally because it is a remedial statute that is intended to include, rather than exclude, potential recipients of benefits," Jones v. Apfel, 66 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981) ("In its deliberations the District Court should consider the fact that the Social Security Act is a remedial statute to be broadly construed and liberally applied.").
Analysis
Larkin contends that the ALJ failed to follow the directives of Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-20 with respect to inferring a disability onset date, and that the ALJ should have consulted a medical expert on this issue. In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ's duty to infer an onset date was never triggered because the medical evidence does not permit an inference of onset before 1990, and that even if the ALJ should have inferred an onset date, the error was harmless. The Commissioner further claims that the ALJ was not required to consult a medical advisor, and that even if he was, the failure to do so was harmless, particularly in light of the opinions of state agency consultants Drs. Reilly and Hurley.
Where a claimant with an alleged disability onset date preceding her twenty-second birthday files an application for CID, and has already been found disabled for the period post-dating her twenty-second birthday, SSR 83-20 requires the ALJ to determine the onset date of disability. The ruling states: "In addition to determining that an individual is disabled, the decision[-]maker must also establish the onset date of disability." SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (1983). For injuries of non-traumatic origin, such as the mental disability at issue here, "the determination of onset [date] involves consideration of the applicant's allegations, work history, if any, and the medical and other evidence concerning impairment severity." Id. at *2.
"Social Security Rulings are agency rulings `published under the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the Administration.'" Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n. 9 (1990) (quoting 20 CFR § 422.408 (1989)).
In this case, the ALJ did not follow SSR 83-20's mandate to establish an onset date of Larkin's disability. Rather, the ALJ determined merely that Larkin was not disabled prior to her twenty-second birthday, leaving unanswered the question as to when, if ever, she became disabled prior to April 1, 1999. The ALJ's principal rationale for this determination was the lack of treatment records during the relevant period. He stated:
The record fails to reveal evidence of a treatment history and/or any medically[-]documented objective findings consistent with the alleged severity of [Larkin's] symptoms and limitations during the period prior to the date she attained the age 22 (August 7, 1990). The record reveals no evidence of any treatment received by [Larkin] for any mental health[-]related impairment prior to July of 1992. . . .
(AR 16.) The ALJ also noted that the record contained "no evidence of any psychiatric/psychological evaluation" during the relevant period, and relied on the non-examining state agency consultants' opinion that "there exists insufficient evidence to assess [Larkin's] functional limitations and/or mental [RFC] during the period prior to November of 2002." ( Id. (citing AR 1026-40).)
The ALJ's focus on the absence of medical records from the relevant period was improper. In cases like this, where disability has already been decided and the court need only determine the onset date of disability, and where the impairment is a slowly progressive mental impairment such as Larkin's personality disorder, SSR 83-20 acknowledges that "it is sometimes impossible to obtain medical evidence establishing the precise date an impairment became disabling." SSR 83-20, at *2; see also Plumley v. Astrue, No. 2:09-CV-42, 2010 WL 520271, at *7 (D. Vt. Feb. 9, 2010). Therefore, in these cases, SSR 83-20 directs that "it will be necessary to infer the onset date from the medical and other evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the disease process." Id. (emphasis added). Here, as noted above, the ALJ did not attempt to infer an onset date, and instead improperly required medical records of treatment during the relevant period. In a case involving facts similar to those at issue here, one district court in this Circuit found this approach improper:
Miller has no medical records for the time period between 1996 and 2001. There consequently are no contemporaneous records which can establish that she was disabled as of May 15, 1999. The absence of these records, however, does not preclude her from otherwise demonstrating th[at] she was disabled as of that date. Social Security Ruling . . . 83-20 provides instructions for the determination of disability onset date in such circumstances when the date needs to be inferred.Miller v. Astrue, No. 03 Civ. 2072 (LAP) (FM), 2008 WL 2540750, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 23, 2008) (emphasis added). Similarly, another district court dealing with similar facts held: "Nowhere in the SSR is there any suggestion that the absence of medical records establishing an onset date is fatal to an individual's disability claim." Moriarty v. Astrue, No. 07-cv-342-SM, 2008 WL 4104139, at *6 (D. N.H. Aug. 28, 2008).
The Commissioner points out that the ALJ did not support his decision solely based on the absence of medical records from the relevant period, but also relied on 1992 records which the ALJ found "fail[ed] to reveal evidence of medically documented findings consistent with the alleged severity of her symptoms and limitations." (AR 16.) Specifically, the ALJ stated that these 1992 records, reflecting Larkin's treatment with social worker Suzanne Murphy, document merely "a brief [two-year] period of treatment [starting in 1992] wherein [Larkin] attempts to address various relationship issues." ( Id.) But multiple treatment records from 1992 and later include references to Larkin's abusive childhood, raising the inference that her mental impairments may have arisen when she was a child. Specifically, the notes of various treatment providers include the following observations:
• February 1992 treatment note prepared by social worker Suzanne Murphy: "[Larkin] gave a [history] of extensive abuse, from 3 men, beginning at 10 yrs old with her mother's boyfr[iend]. Later her older bro[ther] molested her until she stopped it." (AR 327 (emphasis added).)
• March 1992 unsigned "referral sheet": "[Larkin reported being] molested as a child by mom's boyfriend"; "having memories, nightmares[.]" (AR 328 (emphasis added).)
• May 1997 "contact note" prepared by psychologist Andrea Kelly: "[Larkin] discusses that past trauma (her ma's [boyfriend] forcing her to stay under a blanket until she stopped crying; and possibly forcing her to perform oral sex) may intrude on her in her relationship. . . ." (AR 255 (emphasis added).)
• February 2000 "intake interview" signed by therapist Jessica Wright: "[Larkin] reports that she had a ` very bad childhood'; her parents divorce[d] when she was 3 and she remembers being beaten by an older sister [and] brother. She believes that she was molested at age 10 by her mother's boyfr[iend] but is not sure about the memories." (AR 487 (emphasis added).)
• November 2002 treatment note prepared by APRN James Greenleaf: "Of note is the fact that [Larkin] had an extremely difficult childhood, characterized by sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. She states that she was initially sexually abused at age seven, and this repeatedly occurred. (AR 846 (emphasis added).)
• April 2006 letter prepared by advanced practice registered nurse ("APRN") Phyllis Satink: "[Larkin] has a history of physical, emotional[,] and sexual abuse which continues to prevent her from having healthy social interactions." (AR 974 (emphasis added).)
Larkin's counsel has failed to reference many of these records in his motion. In the future, counsel is advised to "refer to the pertinent facts" and "include specific page citations to the administrative record", in compliance with Local Rule 9(a)(6)(C).
Additionally, another medical provider's notes from 2001 reference "some past trauma," "past abuse," and a "history of failed relationships." (AR 228, 230, 234.) And an October 2002 report from psychiatrist Dr. John Porter states that the onset date of Larkin's ADHD and depression was "CHILDHOOD." (AR 698.) In accord, APRN Satink opined in June 2010 that Larkin's "maladaptive responses probably began quite early in her childhood as an attempt to understand the treatment of her parents and siblings." (AR 1042.) These records support an inference that the onset date of Larkin's mental impairment — which impairment the Commissioner has already found to have been "disabling," as defined in the Social Security Act, beginning on April 1, 1999, and which finding the ALJ did not disturb — preceded her 1992 treatment and her twenty-second birthday. Of all these records, however, the ALJ discussed in his opinion only the 1992 treatment notes of social worker Murphy and the 2010 opinion of APRN Satink. (AR 16.)
Although in many cases the ALJ's failure to follow SSR 83-20's requirement to determine an onset date amounts to harmless error, see, e.g., Quimby v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:09-CV-20, 2010 WL 2425904, at *23 (D. Vt. Apr. 13, 2010), this is not one of those cases. Here, there are no medical records from the relevant period which document Larkin's mental health problems, and thus it is unclear how severe those problems were at that time. The record does reflect, however, that Larkin (a) left home at a young age to live on her own in the streets or in subsidized housing; (b) was unable to finish either high school or the Job Corp, apparently due to social problems and an inability to concentrate; and (c) despite many attempts, was unable to maintain a job for any significant length of time while she was in high school and in the years immediately following. Moreover, the record, as described above, reflects that Larkin suffered from a slowly progressive mental illness (deemed a "personality disorder" in the ALJ's decision ( see AR 14)) which was likely caused by childhood traumatic events including emotional, physical, and sexual abuse by family members. Given this record, there was "ambiguity" with respect to the onset date of Larkin's disability.
Where, as here, the record is ambiguous regarding the onset date of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must call on a medical advisor to assist in inferring a date. Plumley, 2010 WL 520271, at *8 (citing Kelly v. Astrue, No. 06-168-P-S, 2007 WL 2021923, at *7 (D. Me. Jul. 11, 2007)); Felicie v. Apfel, No. 95 Civ. 2832 (LAP), 1998 WL 171460, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1998). SSR 83-20 specifically states that, at the administrative hearing, the ALJ "should call on the services of a medical advisor when [the] onset [date] must be inferred." SSR 83-20 at *3. While SSR 83-20 does not mandate that a medical advisor be called in every case, courts have construed this step to be "essential" when, as here, the record is ambiguous regarding onset date. See, e.g., Katt v. Astrue, 225 F. App'x 455, 456 (9th Cir. 2007); Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 2005); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 1993). In this case, in addition to there being ambiguity in the medical evidence with respect to the onset date of Larkin's disability, virtually all of the non-medical evidence, including Larkin's failure to graduate high school, difficulty maintaining a job, and testimony and reporting to medical providers about an abusive childhood, supports an onset date preceding her twenty-second birthday.
The Court concludes that the evidence is ambiguous with respect to the onset date of Larkin's mental impairment, and the ALJ's failure to call upon the services of a medical advisor to assist in inferring Larkin's onset date requires remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 912-13 (10th Cir. 2006); Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703, 709-10 (3d Cir. 2001). The Court rejects the Commissioner's argument that remanding the matter "would be an exercise in futility" and "would waste scarce judicial and administrative resources," given the likelihood that a medical advisor's opinion would merely duplicate that of Dr. Reilly. (Doc. 11 at 25.) First, the ALJ himself stated in his decision that "additional evidence was received at the hearing level" and thus after Dr. Reilly reviewed the claim. (AR 16.) Second, Dr. Reilly's "Psychiatric Review Technique" report is somewhat ambiguous with respect to the period under review. On the first page of the report, the "[a]ssessment" is noted to be for the period from "11/01/2002 to 9/15/05," long after Larkin's twenty-second birthday. (AR 1026.) In contrast, on the final page of the report, Dr. Reilly stated, "Reviewed MER for period of 7/31/90 to 9/15/05," which begins approximately one week prior to Larkin's twenty-second birthday." (AR 1038.) In a very brief, two-sentence report, state agency consultant Dr. Hurley affirmed Dr. Reilly's report but then referenced a period not under review therein, stating, "THERE REMAINS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RATE THE PERIOD 8/8/86-8/8/90." (AR 1040.) Neither Dr. Reilly nor Dr. Hurley actually opined that Larkin did not have a disabling mental impairment prior to her twenty-second birthday. Instead, they merely noted that there was insufficient medical evidence from that period to make a determination on the issue. As discussed above, this level of analysis is insufficient under SSR 83-20 and the applicable case law. On remand, a medical advisor should, under the guidance of the ALJ and in consideration of all the evidence, offer an opinion as to when Larkin's disability began and explain how he or she arrived at that opinion. The ALJ may then use that opinion in inferring Larkin's disability onset date, as required under the law.
The Commissioner asserts that Larkin waived the right to have her claim remanded for purposes of calling a medical advisor because Larkin's attorney neglected to ask the ALJ to call such an advisor at the administrative hearing, even after the ALJ and counsel discussed that the ALJ planned to rely on Dr. Reilly's opinion. ( See Doc. 11 at 24.) But the relevant portion of the transcript of the administrative hearing does not reflect, as the Commissioner's claims, that "the ALJ signaled [to Larkin's attorney] that he intended to rely upon Dr. Reilly's . . . review of the evidence in satisfying SSR 83-20." ( Id. (citing AR 38-39).) Rather, the ALJ and Larkin's attorney's discussion about Dr. Reilly's report is confusing, and the ALJ even makes statements which seem to indicate he will not be relying on Dr. Reilly's report, such as: (a) "[T]hat [(referring to Dr. Reilly's report)] was filed by the state agency. The November 1st of 2002 [date] [(This is the beginning date of Dr. Reilly's assessment, as recorded on AR 1026.)] was a pivotal point, or was a period of time that was no longer disputed[, b]ut the issue still remains in terms of . . . establishing disability prior to July 31 of 1990 [(This is the beginning date of Dr. Reilly's assessment, as recorded on AR 1038.)] . . . [a]nd that's why we're here today" (AR 38 (emphasis added)); and (b) "I would say at the outset that I'm not bound by what was cited or what was offered in terms of an opinion that's an adjudicatory document [(referring to Dr. Reilly's report)]" (AR 40).
Moreover, there is no requirement that a claimant or a claimant's representative request a medical advisor at the administrative hearing. Rather, as explained above, it is the ALJ's duty to assess whether an onset date must be inferred, and then call a medical advisor if the record is ambiguous with respect to determining that date. Finally, although the Second Circuit has not yet decided whether a claimant's failure to raise an issue before the ALJ waives judicial review of that issue, the Commissioner is correct that a number of district courts in this Circuit have found in the affirmative. See Watson v. Astrue, No. 08 Civ. 1523 (DAB) (JCF), 2010 WL 1645060, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010) (citing cases). Notwithstanding these cases, here, the Court finds that the waiver argument is unpersuasive, given that it has already determined that remand is required so that the ALJ may infer an onset date (an issue which Larkin's counsel explicitly addressed at the administrative hearing and thus could not have waived), and therefore there is no risk of wasting judicial or administrative resources if, while on remand, the ALJ calls a medical advisor to assist in inferring a date.
Conclusion
Because the Court concludes that the ALJ did not follow the correct legal standards in inferring an onset date, Larkin's motion (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, the Commissioner's motion (Doc. 11) is DENIED, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this ruling. The Court does not reach the remaining issues raised in Larkin's motion because they may be affected by the ALJ's onset date determination on remand. See Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, Larkin's remaining arguments (and Larkin's onset date and medical advisor arguments as well, to a lesser extent) are not adequately supported by proper citation to the record or applicable case law. As mentioned earlier, Larkin's counsel is directed to follow Local Rule 9(a)(6)(C) in his future motions, especially when the motion demands the Court's review of a lengthy administrative record, in this case exceeding one-thousand pages.